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Since 1945, states have increasingly been called upon to use their power in order to 
enforce egalitarian norms.  The Anglo-American countries have done so through the 
construction of antidiscrimination regimes.  Given their common law foundations, this 
entailed a complex and politically fraught renegotiation of state-society relations.  This 
dissertation provides an account of the origins and development of antidiscrimination 
regimes in the Anglo-American countries between 1945 and 1995 and it performs two main 
analytic tasks.  First, it identifies and elaborates the component parts of antidiscrimination 
regimes, and second, it specifies the political processes through which those component 
parts change over time.  I chart the development of an ideology of antidiscrimination, and 
through two case studies, I show the conditions under which political elites in Australia and 
New Zealand institutionalized its core tenets.   
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Chapter One:  Introduction 
This dissertation provides an account of the origins and development of 
antidiscrimination regimes in the Anglo-American countries between 1945 and 1995, with 
special emphasis on Australia and New Zealand, and it performs two main analytic tasks.  
First, it identifies and elaborates the component parts of antidiscrimination regimes, and 
second, it specifies the political processes through which those component parts change 
over time.  Beyond the American case, antidiscrimination regimes have remained an 
understudied area of political life as is evidenced by the dearth of literature within the 
comparative field.  As I will show, however, these regimes constitute an important 
transnational and supranational trend, the study of which allows us to examine a number of 
important theoretical propositions concerning institutional creation and development.  In 
any country, the creation of an antidiscrimination regime constitutes significant socio-legal 
reform and therefore deserves a special place in the comparative study of state development.  
As Richard Epstein notes, legal regimes are of fundamental importance, because they govern 
the ways in which “social life is ordered,” and this is even more the case with 
antidiscrimination statutes because they are no ordinary laws.1 They reconfigure the public-
private divide, renegotiate citizenship rights, expand the state’s coercive power, and 
legitimize the creation of new state institutions, while mobilizing new sets of political actors.  
Thus, in devising antidiscrimination regimes, political actors bring to the fore two key issues:   
the rights and duties of citizenship, and the role of the state in enforcing those rights and 
duties.   
1Richard Epstein, Forbidden Grounds:  the case against employment discrimination laws (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1992), 3.  
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As I will show, Australia and New Zealand are particularly interesting cases because 
they were relatively late developers in comparison to other similarly situated states, namely 
Great Britain, Canada, and the United States, with regard to the development of 
antidiscrimination regimes.  Furthermore, despite their close geographical proximity and the 
close ties that developed between their respective antidiscrimination policy communities, 
Australia and New Zealand nevertheless developed significantly different types of state 
capacities to enforce these laws.  This not only presents us with an interesting empirical 
puzzle, it also provides us with a unique opportunity to examine the mechanics of 
institutional innovation and development.  
Generally speaking, antidiscrimination regimes consist of laws that prohibit 
discrimination and the rules and institutions through which those laws are enforced.  They 
constitute an important subject of inquiry for at least three main reasons.  First is the 
political significance of these regimes.  Since World War II, an elaborate body of 
international human rights instruments has recognized a state duty to eliminate 
discrimination.2 States have been encouraged to establish domestic antidiscrimination 
regimes as a means of complying with those instruments, and as a result, the number of 
states with antidiscrimination laws on their books has multiplied.3 Within different 
institutional settings, the process of enacting these laws generates various political dilemmas.  
The second and third reasons for studying antidiscrimination regimes speak to their 
theoretical import.  The creation and development of these regimes are part of a broader 
process of democratization, and as such, they require greater explication and impose a more 
exacting theoretical standard.  Antidiscrimination regimes also constitute a new substantive 
2 Robert Brian Howe and David Johnson, Restraining Equality:  Human Rights Commissions in Canada, (Toronto:  
University of Toronto Press, 2000), 3. 
3 This is discussed more fully in Chapter Three, infra. 
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field in which to examine complex theoretical propositions about the roles of ideas and 
institutions in political change.   
 
THE POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF ANTIDISCRIMINATION REGIMES 
World War II served as an important “turning point,”4 “a watershed, marking the 
beginning of a steady growth and consolidation of anti-discrimination policies,”5 which was 
then followed by a “world revolution in minority rights.”6 A new international commitment 
to human rights was expressed in both the United Nations Charter7 of 1945 and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)8 of 1948.  It was these early documents 
that laid the foundation for a postwar politics premised on the obligation of states to 
recognize and protect a broad range of citizen rights, not only against government itself but 
also against offending parties, including nongovernmental actors and institutions.9
Subsequent international documents reinforced the primacy of a right to nondiscrimination, 
and they displayed a preference that states enforce this right through legal and administrative 
means.10 Consider, for example, the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
4 Robert Brian Howe, “Human rights policy in Ontario: The tension between positive and negative state 
values” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Toronto, 1988), 65. 
5 Rainer Knopff, Human Rights and Social Technology: The New War on Discrimination (Ottawa:  Carleton University 
Press, 1989), 36; and Martin MacEwen, Anti-discrimination law enforcement: a comparative perspective (Brookfield, Vt.: 
Avebury, 1997). 
6 John D. Skrentny, The Minority Rights Revolution (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 2002), 347; Thomas F. Powers, “The Transformation of Liberalism, 1964-2001” The Public Interest (Fall, 
2001), 59-81, 63; Frank Dobbin and Frank R. Sutton, “The Strength of a Weak State:  The Rights Revolution 
and the Rise of Human Resources Management Divisions” 104 The American Journal of Sociology (Sep., 1998), 
441-476; Charles R. Epp, The Rights Revolution: lawyers, activists, and supreme courts in comparative perspective (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1998). 
7 June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. 993, 3 Bevans 1153, entered into force Oct. 24, 1945. 
8 G.A. res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810 at 71 (1948). 
9 Alan Cairns and Cynthia Williams, “Constitutionalism, Citizenship and Society in Canada:  An Overview” in 
Alan Cairns and Cynthia Williams (research coordinators), Constitutionalism, Citizenship and Society in Canada 
(Toronto:  University of Toronto Press, 1985), 1-50, 31; Martin MacEwen, Tackling racism in Europe: an 
examination of anti-discrimination law in practice (Washington, D.C.: Berg, 1995), 21; Asbjørn Eide, “The historical 
significance of the Universal Declaration” UNESCO (1998), 484-92. 
10 Howe and Johnson, Restraining Equality, 3. 
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Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD),11 the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR),12 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR)13 all of which obligated states to protect individuals from 
discrimination in several areas of life.  A right to nondiscrimination thus served as a 
cornerstone of the international human rights system after World War II, and today it 
continues as an integral component of both human rights and public international law.14 
In addition to the state obligations created by international human rights 
instruments, the creation of antidiscrimination regimes is promoted around the world by a 
number of supranational organizations.  Both the International Labour Organization (ILO) 
and the United Nations (UN) have long histories in this area.15 Today, for example, the UN 
Center for Human Rights (UNCHR) in Geneva encourages states to construct domestic 
legal infrastructure for the protection of human rights.  In October 1991, the UNCHR 
convened an international workshop to review and update information on existing national 
human rights institutions.  Its participants—which included representatives of member 
states, UN agencies, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations—drew up a 
comprehensive series of recommendations on the role, composition, status, and functions of 
national human rights institutions.  They decreed that such institutions should be dedicated 
to protecting nationals against discrimination and other human rights violations.16 Known 
11 G.A. res. 2106 (XX), Annex, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14) at 47, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1966), 660 U.N.T.S. 
195, entered into force Jan. 4, 1969. 
12 See Articles 3, 24, and 26, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 
(1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976. 
13 G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N.GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 
entered into force Jan. 3, 1976. 
14 Peter Bailey, Human Rights:  Australian in an International Context (Sydney:  Butterworth’s, 1990), 28-29; 
MacEwen, Tackling racism in Europe, 21. 
15 John P. Humphrey, Human rights & the United Nations:  a great adventure (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Transnational 
Publishers, 1984);  Paul Gordon Lauren, Power and Prejudice:  The Politics and Diplomacy of Racial Discrimination 
(Boulder, Col.:  Westview Press, 1998), Chap. 8. 
16 See Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Fact Sheet No.19, National Institutions for the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, accessed on 21 July 2004 at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs19.htm. 
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as the Paris Principles, these recommendations were endorsed by the Commission on 
Human Rights in March 199217 and by the UN General Assembly in December 1993.18  
Within Europe, several bodies promote antidiscrimination legislation as an 
appropriate means of regulating increasingly diverse societies.  The U.S. Helsinki 
Commission, an independent federal agency created by Congress in 1976, monitors and 
encourages progress in implementing provisions of the Helsinki Accords.19 It encourages 
East European countries, in particular, to adopt antidiscrimination legislation directed at 
protecting their Roma populations.20 And, through the office of the High Commissioner on 
National Minorities, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) also 
promotes the growth of antidiscrimination regimes.21 Perhaps most dramatically, in 1999 
the European Union (EU) amended the Treaty of Amsterdam to empower the European 
Commission to take appropriate action to combat discrimination based upon racial or ethnic 
origin, among other grounds.  Thirteen months later, the European Council unanimously 
adopted a Racial Equality Directive that required the adoption of national legal protections 
against racial discrimination by July of 2003.22 This Directive supplements an already strong 
EU commitment to addressing sex discrimination in employment.23 
17 See resolution 1992/54. 
18 See resolution A/RES/48/134. 
19 The Helsinki Commission, known formally as the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 
is a U.S. Government agency created by Public Law 94-304 with a mandate to monitor the activities of the 
OSCE and to encourage compliance with the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe, known as the Helsinki Accords, that was signed in Helsinki, Finland, on 1 August 1975, by the leaders 
of over thirty European countries, the U.S., Canada, and the U.S.S.R. 
20 U.S. Newswire, “U.S. Helsinki Commission Co-Chairman Smith Praises Slovak Reforms, Urges Passage of 
Anti-Discrimination Law,” 12 June 2002 accessed on 5 June 2003 at 
http://web5.infotrac.galegroup.com/itw/infomark/582/67/36552105w5/purl=rc1_EAIM_0_A87111341&dy
n=7!xrn_5_0_A87111341?sw_aep=txshracd2598.   
21 See the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s Copenhagen Document on the Human 
Dimension.  See also Rolf Ekeus, OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, “From the Copenhagen 
Criteria to the Copenhagen Summit:  The Protection of National Minorities in Enlarging Europe” delivered to 
the conference on National Minorities in the Enlarged European Union, 5 November 2002. 
22 Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between 
persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, Official Journal (OJ) L 180/22, 19 July 2000. 
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The international human rights movement of the twentieth century was a reaction to 
atrocities committed both before and during World War II.  The Nazi experience starkly 
demonstrated the powers of the state to perpetrate the worst sorts of crimes against 
humanity.  Post-war activists drew two paradoxical lessons from that experience.  First, state 
power should be circumscribed to prevent abuses of individual rights, and second, state 
power should be expanded to effect progressive, egalitarian social change.  The resulting set 
of international human rights instruments and institutions are therefore best understood in 
terms of this duality of purpose.  Although each dimension of reform raises distinctive 
analytic political and legal issues, scholars typically either ignore these differences or conflate 
them by examining human rights writ large.  In the case studies that follow, I show how 
these two dimensions of reform generate specific political patterns and how they must, 
therefore, be examined with a discerning eye.  
As traditionally conceived, human rights were thought to regulate only relations 
between individuals and voracious states.  States were, accordingly, cast as the problem, and 
their containment was cast as the solution.24 This conceptualization has framed much of the 
empirical work on international human rights, especially the focus on rights to freedom from 
torture, arbitrary arrest and execution and the rights to freedom of expression and 
assembly.25 In contemporary parlance, these rights are usually called civil liberties, and they 
are codified in the main UN human rights conventions.26 Because UN institutions lack any 
Interestingly, Britain’s Commission on Racial Equality played an important role in the negotiations that 
produced the Racial Equality Directive.  On this see Terri Givens and Rhonda Evans Case, “The Racial 
Equality Directive:  Minority Rights Revolution or Politics as Usual” (Working Paper, Summer 2004). 
23 Mark Bell, Anti-discrimination law and the European Union (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2002), 8-9, 30. 
24 Louis Henkin, How nations behave:  law and foreign policy, 2nd ed. (New York:  Columbia University Press, 
1979), 2; Jack Donnelly, International human rights, 2nd ed. (International human rights, 1998), 403; Eide, “The 
historical significance of the Universal Declaration,” 479; Dan Friedman and Daphne Barak-Erez, Human rights 
in private law (Portland, Or.:  Hart Pub., 2001), 3. 
25 Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, eds., The Power of Human Rights:  International Norms 
and Domestic Change (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
26 These are discussed infra, p. 3-4. 
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real authority to enforce state protection of civil liberties,27 their enjoyment depends almost 
entirely upon the willingness of states to institutionalize legal infrastructures necessary for 
their protection, typically through a bill of rights.  Such measures often prove politically 
contentious.  After an aborted effort in 1960, New Zealand enacted a statutory bill of rights 
in 1990 that was intentionally designed to protect human rights without dramatically 
empowering the courts.28 Australia, by contrast, has demonstrated a longstanding antipathy 
to such measures and has rejected proposals to create a statutory bill of rights, as well as 
other proposals that would amend its constitution.29 
As Jack Donnelly suggests, however, constraining states is only part of the story, for 
a benign state may govern a society in which private actors routinely violate individuals’ 
human rights.  Therefore, 
 
[t]he human rights functions of the State must also include protecting individuals against 
abuses of power by other individuals and private groups.  The State, although needing to be 
tamed, is in the contemporary world the principal institution we rely on to tame social forces 
no less dangerous to the enjoyment of human rights.”30 
According to this logic, the task is “to transform the State from a predator into a protector 
of rights.”31 In pursuit of that aim, international human rights instruments not only 
prescribe “negative obligations” that require states to refrain from abusing citizens, they also 
prescribe positive obligations intended to rectify power imbalances between various social 
groups.32 This requires an activist state, perhaps more active than some find politically 
27 Donnelly, International Human Rights, 206-13; David Forsythe, The internationalization of human rights (Lexington, 
Mass.: Lexington Books, 1991),  60-70, 2000:  57-79. 
28 The success of their design in that regard is debatable, see Paul Rishworth, et al., The New Zealand Bill of 
Rights (New York:  Oxford University Press, 2003). 
29 Bailey, Human Rights:  Australia in an International Context, 45-78; George Williams, Human rights under the 
Australian Constitution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 33-45, 250-60. 
30 Jack Donnelly, International Human Rights, 403; see also Walter S. Tarnopolsky and William Pentney, 
Discrimination and the Law in Canada (Toronto:  R. De Boo, 1982), 25. 
31 Donnelly, International Human Rights, 402; Eide, “The historical significance of the Universal Declaration,” 
487. 
32 Elizabeth Heger Boyle and John W. Meyer, “Modern Law as a Secularized and Global Model:  Implications 
for the Sociology of Law” in Yves Dezalay and Bryant G. (eds.), The internationalization of palace wars:  lawyers, 
economists, and the contest to transform Latin American states (Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 2002); David 
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acceptable, and it requires an expansion, or at least a renegotiation, of the scope of state 
authority vis-à-vis society.   
In order to meet these international human rights prescriptions, states must often 
enact legislation that establishes, or rearranges, rights and obligations between private 
individuals and thus alters the public-private divide.33 This essentially requires using the state 
to democratize society,34 an endeavor that may chaff against concomitant commitments to a 
limited state.  It also entails divesting some individuals of their preexisting prerogatives and 
powers, which may also generate opposition.35 For these reasons, determining the scope of 
the state’s authority vis-à-vis society to enforce a right to nondiscrimination poses an 
inherently controversial political problem.36 Indeed, in Epstein’s estimation, such matters 
demonstrate that the “separation between private law and the grander questions of 
constitutional law and public regulation” is difficult, if not impossible, to maintain.37 
A large body of scholarship suggests that in providing for human rights protections 
states may thereby extend their power over society.  For example, according to Ramm, “the 
fight against social discrimination requires, nearly always, state intervention.”38 Critics of 
antidiscrimination laws often seize upon this fact.  Ray Honeyford, a critic of Britain’s 
antidiscrimination regime, suggests that such laws embody “the notion that the state knows 
Jacobson, Immigration and the decline of citizenship (Baltimore : Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); Eide, “The 
historical significance of the Universal Declaration,” 487. 
33 Williams, Human rights under the Australian Constitution, 11. 
34 See Epstein, Forbidden Grounds, 91-94; Andrew Koppelman, Antidiscrimination law & social equality (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 4; Powers, “The Transformation of Liberalism,” 59-81, 74. 
35 Kairys 2001:  1880. 
36 Eide, “The historical significance of the Universal Declaration,” 487. 
37 Epstein, Forbidden Grounds, xi. 
38 Ramm 1978:  22; Kristin Bumiller, The Civil Rights Society:  the social construction of victims (Baltimore:  Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1988), 15; Koppelman, Antidiscrimination law & social equality; James W. St. G. Walker, 
“Race,” Rights and the Law in the Supreme Court of Canada (Waterloo, Ont.:  Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1997), 
321. 
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best about an issue which, in the past, has always been settled in societal terms.”39 This, in 
his opinion, distorts the “established and settled ways of settling matters connected with 
rights in relation to the acceptance and integration of newcomers and their descendants.”  
The state serves as the principal enforcer of democratic rights.  But, the precise rights that it 
enforces and the mode of enforcement have changed in important ways. 
That human rights are often understood as presenting a challenge to the scope and 
authority of the state creates a puzzle:  does expanding human rights in reality enlarge or 
limit state power?  My findings confirm that human rights expand state power, but I refine 
our understanding of this expansion’s significance.  Better understanding the thrust of 
human rights enables us to see that democratization can involve shifting authority from 
society to the state as well as from state to society.  For society, it involves constructing new 
rights and for the state it entails developing enforcement mechanisms. 
 
THE POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF ANTIDISCRIMINATION REGIMES 
Antidiscrimination regimes consist of laws that prohibit discrimination on specified 
grounds in specified areas of life, as well as the rules and institutions that govern 
enforcement of those laws and protections.  They call upon states to exercise both 
constitutive and coercive powers.  As employed here, a regime consists of a complex of 
rules, norms, principles and procedures that regulate state activities,40 and as such, it 
institutionalizes core assumptions in a specific issue area.  Once established, a regime 
“governs the meanings actors give to events occurring both within the structure of 
institutions and of political discourse.”41 
39 Ray Honeyford, The Commission for Racial Equality:  British bureaucracy and the multiethnic society (New Brunswick, 
N.J.: Transaction, 1998), 5. 
40 Paul Pierson, Politics in Time:  History, Institutions, and Social Analysis (Princeton, N.J.:  Princeton University 
Press, 2004), 150. 
41 Alexander 2000:  61. 
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The scope of antidiscrimination regime can be assessed along two dimensions:  1) 
the grounds upon which discrimination is prohibited, and 2) the areas of life to which that 
prohibition extends.  It is along these dimensions that we may speak of regime expansion 
and contraction.  The first antidiscrimination laws generally protected against racial 
discrimination.  Today, however, the list of protected grounds has grown dramatically.  The 
addition of new protected grounds has often proven contentious, especially where 
discriminatory attitudes and practices link up with religious faith, as at present in the case of 
homosexuality.  Often, such additions challenge fundamental assumptions held by a society 
about the core social arrangements that maintain social stability.  Symbolically, 
antidiscrimination laws convey social meaning about who belongs to a community and upon 
what terms.  They codify norms of behavior, declare particular rights and freedoms to be 
“fundamental to the conduct of society,” and pronounce certain actions and forms of 
behavior to be socially unacceptable.42 Debates over protected grounds, therefore, are often 
the frontlines in broader conflicts about citizenship. 
In addition to identifying protected grounds, antidiscrimination regime architects 
must also decide whether the law will apply to the state, to non-state actors, or both.  These 
decisions are controversial and consequential.  Political elites in Australia and New Zealand 
have usually been reluctant to bind the state under such laws because they do not want to 
constrain state action, and they do not want to empower the courts further.  In contrast to 
the U.S., Australia and New Zealand lack a tradition of constitutional rights that are 
enforceable against the state.43 Individuals aggrieved by state actions have generally been 
limited to seeking relief through traditional common law writs.  Australian and New Zealand 
42 Chris Ronalds, Affirmative action and sex discrimination:  a handbook on legal rights for women (Sydney:  Pluto Press, 
1987), 10-12. 
43 In 1990, however, New Zealand adopted a statutory Bill of Rights (see Chapter 4, infra), but it was 
deliberately designed to prevent the courts from exercising American-style judicial review.  Australia, by 
contrast, has repeatedly rejected amending its Constitution to provide protection for rights and liberties. 
11
have courts customarily evaluated whether executive actions are ultra vires or whether they 
constitute a denial of natural justice,44 but they could not declare acts of parliament 
inoperative.   
By binding the state, antidiscrimination statutes opened the possibility in Australia 
and New Zealand of new challenges against the executive government.  The relationship of 
those statutes to other acts of parliament proved to be more problematic, however.  Because 
antidiscrimination laws codify fundamental values, some political actors have argued that 
they possess a “quasi-constitutional” status, and therefore other laws that abridge the 
protections they afford should be unenforceable by the courts.  In the late 1990s, these 
complex issues confounded members of the New Zealand Parliament, and they found 
themselves engaged in a protracted debate over the appropriate relationship between the 
Human Rights Act of 1993 and the Bill of Rights adopted in 1990.  Facing such quandaries, 
courts in Australia and New Zealand have borrowed heavily from the jurisprudence of other 
Anglo-American countries, Canada in particular, in order to elevate the status of 
antidiscrimination laws and justify liberal interpretations thereof. 
Political elites in Australia and New Zealand have also had to determine the outer 
boundaries of the state’s authority vis-à-vis society.  Like other areas of regulation, such as 
those involving financial institutions and the environment, antidiscrimination regimes 
grapple with issues about these boundaries.  This raises nettlesome questions of 
philosophical importance.  Should small businesses and “private” clubs be prohibited from 
discriminating?  Should antidiscrimination laws apply to the operation of religious 
organizations?  And should they apply to individuals who take on boarders in their homes?  
Tricky political questions are also raised.  For example, the Labor Party in Australia and the 
Labour Party in New Zealand have historically been closely tied to trade unions, many of 
44 Benjafield and Whitmore 1971; Hotop 1985:  168-246; McMillan and Williams 1998. 
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which were racially and sexually discriminatory and opposed to the enactment of 
antidiscrimination laws.  As I will show, the two parties had great difficulty in determining 
whether unions should be included within the antidiscrimination regime’s scope. 
Once issues of regime scope are decided, political elites must determine the means 
by which antidiscrimination laws are to be enforced.  In devising the rules and institutions 
that govern the laws’ enforcement, elites have confronted a number of subsidiary but 
significant matters.  Over time, as I will show, antidiscrimination enforcement has changed 
in important ways.  In devising an enforcement scheme, elites first must determine whether 
the law will be criminal or civil in nature, or both.  Early statutes in the U.S. and Canada, for 
example, criminalized specific acts of discrimination,45 and France’s antidiscrimination 
regime still employs a criminal approach.46 Elites must decide, further, whether to create a 
special agency dedicated to enforcing these laws.  Without such an agency, enforcement is 
left to preexisting institutions apathetic, if not hostile, towards efforts to end discrimination.  
Australia and New Zealand have primarily relied upon civil laws, and both have created 
special enforcement agencies, with varying sets of powers.47 
Once decisions to establish enforcement agencies have been made, a number of 
corollary decisions follow:  How will these agencies be staffed?  What will be their linkages 
to other agencies and institutions?  And, what powers will they be accorded?  Enforcement 
agencies are generally charged with some combination of educational and coercive powers. 
They may be granted broad regulatory powers, such as responsibility for designing, 
monitoring, and enforcing affirmative action plans.  They may be empowered to conduct 
inquiries, as is the case with the Commission on Racial Equality and Equal Opportunities 
45 Milton R. Konvitz, A century of civil rights (New York:  Columbia University Press, 1961); Tarnopolsky and 
Pentney, Discrimination and the Law in Canada.
46 See Erik Bleich, Race politics in Britain and France:  ideas and policymaking since the 1960’s (New York : Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), Chaps. 6-7. 
47 Both Australia and New Zealand do, however, have laws that criminalize the incitement to racial hatred and 
racial violence.  Those laws are not included within the scope of this study. 
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Commissions in Britain.  Most often, they are empowered to receive and conciliate 
individual complaints, as is the case in both Australia and New Zealand.  Elites must also 
decide the agency’s role in cases in which conciliation fails. Should there be a right of appeal, 
for example, and if so, what institution should be charged with hearing it?  New Zealand has 
a special administrative tribunal, now known as the Human Rights Review Tribunal.  A 1995 
decision by the Australian High Court, however, foreclosed that option there;48 unconciliated 
complaints, instead, go directly into Australia’s federal court system. 
Supporters of antidiscrimination regimes also often demand that administrative 
tribunals and courts be comprised of individuals possessing expert knowledge of 
antidiscrimination law.  Because they typically consider the enforcement of 
antidiscrimination law to be in the public’s interest, as opposed to simply serving the 
interests of individual complainants, antidiscrimination enthusiasts also seek to have the state 
provide legal representation for complainants.  This can be accomplished through generous 
legal aid schemes or by empowering enforcement agencies to represent complainants.  
Australian and New Zealand’s antidiscrimination regimes differ on this key point.  New 
Zealand has a Director of Human Rights Proceedings, functionally independent of its 
Human Rights Commission, who may choose to represent individual complainants if he or 
she deems the litigation to be of strategic importance to the jurisprudential development of 
the law.  Australia, by contrast, has resisted assigning the state such an activist role; its 
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC) is empowered only to 
intervene in antidiscrimination litigation, a power that it has used sparingly.  Even so, a 
recent attempt by the politically conservative government of Prime Minister John Howard to 
require the HREOC to obtain the Attorney-General’s permission before exercising that 
power was thwarted only after a public outcry from civil society organizations.  Finally, the 
48 See Brandy v. Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission (1995) 127 ALR 1. 
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rules and institutions that govern enforcement can rely upon the state’s enforcement capacity 
or they can incentivize private enforcement, thereby spurring new forms of political action in 
the name of social reform.  Private enforcement can be encouraged by laws that provide for 
large damages awards and that authorize class actions.  These have been highly controversial 
matters in Australia and New Zealand. 
The political forces that shape the politics of antidiscrimination regime formation 
and development include ideology, elites, and institutions.  These forces undergo important 
changes over time that affect the trajectory of regime development.  My analysis, therefore, 
will distinguish between the point of regime formation and the subsequent period of regime 
development.  This periodization enables me to demonstrate the “feedback effects” that a 
regime may generate and the ways in which they affect its scope, its enforcement scheme, 
and the status assigned to antidiscrimination laws.49 New Zealand’s antidiscrimination 
regime was created in 1971 with the passage of the Race Relations Act, and Australia’s was 
created four years later with the passage of the Racial Discrimination Act.50 
Between the 1940s and 1970s, three important currents of intellectual thought 
emerged across the Anglo-American world and laid the ideological foundation for the 
construction of antidiscrimination regimes.  First, scientific views that conceived of race and 
gender in terms of inherent biological differences were supplanted by a social constructivist 
conception of human differences.51 According to the latter view, human behavior was a 
product of environmental stimuli; it followed that by reengineering those stimuli, human 
behavior could be shaped and controlled.  Second, a number of sociologists and social 
49 Paul Pierson, “When Effect Becomes Cause:  Policy Feedback and Political Change” 45 World Politics (Jul., 
1993), 595-628; and Pierson, Politics in Time.
50 The first law against discrimination, targeting racial discrimination, was enacted by the State of South 
Australia in 1966.  No such other laws were enacted until the federal law in 1975. 
51 See Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma:  the Negro problem and modern democracy (New York:  Harper & 
Brothers, 1944); Knopff, The New War on Discrimination.
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psychologists concluded that law could, in fact, serve as an effective tool in that 
reengineering effort.52 It had previously been thought that social change could not be 
accomplished through the coercive force of law; rather, social change could only be 
accomplished through educational efforts undertaken within civil society.53 Third, as a 
normative matter, democracy was accorded a more substantive definition.  It not only 
required that government be subject to popular control, but it now required that society 
operate according to egalitarian norms.  In sum, these three currents of thought were used to 
support a more activist state role in terms of regulating society in accordance with egalitarian 
norms.  I refer to them collectively as the ideology of antidiscrimination. 
Although the ideology of antidiscrimination was ascendant between the 1940s and 
1970s, it was not without challengers.  By the 1980s, a counter-ideology of free markets54 
and socially conservative values was increasingly articulated by economists, other social 
scientists, and religious groups.  This was more accepting of social hierarchy and viewed 
antidiscrimination laws as coercive measures that inhibit rather than protect individual 
liberty.  Furthermore, exponents of this counter-ideology sought generally to scale back the 
scope of the state in favor of society-driven patterns of social ordering.  As I will show, this 
counter-ideology exercised less influence on New Zealand’s antidiscrimination regime than 
on Australia’s.  By 1977, New Zealand had already constructed an expansive regime, whereas 
Australia had taken only limited steps during the 1970s.  The effort to expand Australia’s 
regime to include women and to create new enforcement agencies coincided with a 
52 Gordon W. Allport, ed., Controlling Group Prejudice (Philadelphia, 1946), and Gordon Allport, The Nature of 
Prejudice (Reading, Mass., Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1954). 
53 William Graham Sumner, Folkways:  a study of sociological importance of usages, manners, customs, mores, and morals 
(Boston:  Ginn, 1906). 
54 See Milton Friedman, Free to choose:  a personal statement (New York:  Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1980). 
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rightward turn in the thinking of the traditionally conservative Liberal Party, as well as in that 
of the Australian Labor Party.55 
As Thomas Risse-Kappen has observed, “ideas do not float freely”; but rather, to 
have effects they require agents of dissemination.56 Thus, one cannot take ideas seriously 
without also taking seriously the role of political elites.57 Three different sets of political 
elites appear to be especially important in adopting a particular ideology and in advocating 
particular policies:  civil society actors, bureaucrats, and politicians.  A wide range of civil 
society actors may advocate antidiscrimination laws.  They include individuals seeking legal 
protection based upon a particular characteristic they share, such as race or sex; progressive 
religious or secular organizations; academics, especially lawyers and law professors.  
Government bureaucrats situated in foreign affairs departments may also press for 
antidiscrimination laws in response to international human rights developments.  So, too, 
may bureaucrats in departments dedicated to minority interests or in departments of justice, 
for they may perceive such laws as expanding their bureaucratic interests.  Finally, politicians 
may detect an electoral advantage in advocating antidiscrimination laws.  Such advocacy may, 
for example, allow one party to distinguish itself from another as more progressive party, or 
it may allow a party perceived as too conservative to portray itself in a more favorable light.  
The identities of the political elites who act in support of antidiscrimination, therefore, can 
be expected to change over time, and over time those elites confront changed policymaking 
contexts. 
55 Ken Coghill, ed., The New Right’s Australian Fantasy (Ringwood, Vic:  Penguin Books, 1987). 
56 Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Ideas do not float freely:  transnational coalitions, domestic structures, and the end 
of the cold war,” 48 International Organization (Spring, 1994). 
57 John Higley, Desley Deacon and Don Smart.  Elites in Australia (Boston:  Routledge & K. Paul, 1979); 
Michael G. Burton and John Higley, Elite Settlements (Austin: Institute of Latin American Studies, University of 
Texas at Austin, 1987). 
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In working to institutionalize a commitment to antidiscrimination, civil society, 
bureaucratic, and political elites must work within given institutional contexts that involve 
both opportunities and constraints.  When enacting national antidiscrimination legislation, 
Australian elites—whose constitution-making forebears borrowed heavily from the 
American model—faced a fundamental constitutional quandary.  The Australian 
Constitution accords the federal (also known as the Commonwealth) government a limited 
list of specified powers, and authority to enact antidiscrimination legislation is not clearly 
among them.  Accordingly, in 1975, international human rights obligations were used to 
justify the enactment of the Racial Discrimination Act under the Commonwealth’s 
constitutional authority over “external affairs.”58 The High Court affirmed that controversial 
move seven years later.59 In addition, Australia, like the U.S., has a bicameral parliament, 
with a powerful Senate.  Since 1949, the Senate has been elected by a proportional 
representation, and, as a result, governments formed by commanding a majority in the 
House of Representatives have rarely commanded a simultaneous majority in the Senate.  As 
I will show, Australian Senates hostile to governments of the day have played a pivotal role 
in shaping the country’s antidiscrimination regime.  Because New Zealand lacks a written 
constitution and because its upper chamber was abolished in 1950, its elites have faced no 
such obstacle.   
The creation of an antidiscrimination regime may have three main effects on a 
political system.  First, it may generate political mobilizations among new actors who see 
inclusion within the regime as a measure of “full citizenship” in the polity and who therefore 
demand the extension of the regime’s protections to their own and additional groups.  
Further, as new civil society actors study or make use of antidiscrimination laws, they may 
58 Australian Constitution, § 51 (xxix). 
59 Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen (1982) 153 CLR 168. This decision was reaffirmed in Commonwealth v Tasmania 
(Tasmanian Dams Case) (1983) 158 CLR 1. 
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become advocates for further reforms.  Law professors and practicing attorneys who 
specialize in antidiscrimination law are sound examples.  The development of new 
supranational human rights instruments may necessitate the addition, or at least 
consideration, of new protected grounds.  Second, scholars who examine rights-based 
minority politics suggest that “institutional homes” can affect a political system in several 
ways,60 and agencies charged with enforcing antidiscrimination laws can serve as such 
institutional homes.  Among other things, they may constitute as a focal point for civil 
society demands and, as such, push for an expansion in the law’s scope.  Further, 
enforcement agencies can provide resources and positions of influence from which a new 
group of supportive elites can justify the expansion and strengthening of their own political 
power.  The third broad effect of antidiscrimination regimes on political systems involves 
their linkages with parliament and the courts, because they may enable emerging elites to 
play an important role in agenda-setting and developing the law through the courts.  As I will 
show, the actual effects of enforcement institutions vary depending upon the skill sets and 
ambitions of the individuals that inhabit them.   
It can be seen, therefore, that antidiscrimination enforcement agencies are embedded 
within broader ideological and institutional settings, and they often rely upon the actions of 
political elites.  In particular, these agencies depend upon the government of the day to 
provide financial resources and appoint agency leaders, and governments frequently use their 
budgetary powers to constrain the agencies.   
 
60 Chris Bonastia, “Why Did Affirmative Action in Housing Fail during the Nixon Era?  Exploring the 
“Institutional Homes’ of Social Policies,” 47 Social Problems (2000), 523-42; Epp, Lawyers, activists, and supreme 
courts in comparative perspective; Knopff, The New War on Discrimination, 86; F.L. Morton and Rainer Knopff, The 
Charter Revolution and the Court Party (Orchard Park, N.Y.:  Broadview Press, 2000), 114-125; Skrentny, The 
Minority Rights Revolution, 8. 
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ANTIDISCRIMINATION REGIMES AND POLITICAL SCIENCE  
Proponents of antidiscrimination regimes often portray their development as the 
product of inevitable,61 organic, or evolutionary processes62 that mark “a milestone in the 
evolution of democracy.”63 According to this teleological account, antidiscrimination 
regimes are part of a continuous sequence of events beginning with the Magna Carta in 1215 
and culminating in the latest proposal for human rights reform.64 Unfortunately, this 
account hinders our understanding of the politics of human rights and antidiscrimination 
regimes in at least three ways.  First, it denies that a transformation in the substance and 
scope of rights has occurred over the years, thus ignoring the fact that some rights may have 
been lost or circumscribed to accommodate the creation of new rights.  Second, it summarily 
dismisses any opposition to antidiscrimination laws as immoral and reactionary, thereby 
denying that opposition may be grounded in a preference for other worthy values, such as 
limited government and classical liberal freedoms.  And third, the teleological account 
attributes considerable causal power to ideas, but fails to specify exactly how and why 
particular rights or ideas come to exert such power.  By obscuring the dynamics of the 
political contestation that produces reforms, the significance of reform achievements is, 
itself, obscured.  While a teleological account helps to legitimize antidiscrimination laws by 
61 See remarks of New Zealand Minister of Justice, 411 NZPD 1474. 
62 For example, a discussion paper produced by the New Zealand government in 2000 maintained that the 
country’s human rights law and institutions had “grown organically, largely in response to the adoption of the 
international standards we have helped to develop” (Discussion Paper  2000:  6).  Similarly, a discussion paper 
produced by the Canadian government in 2004 described the development of its antidiscrimination protections 
in terms of an “evolutionary process” (Promoting Equality:  A New Vision, Chapter 3 last accessed on 6 May 2004 
at http://canada.justice.gc.ca/chra/en/frp-c3.html).   
63 See the comments of Australian Senator Arthur Gietzelt during his second reading speech on the 
Commonwealth Race Discrimination Bill 1975, Senate, Hansard, 15 May 1975, 1528. 
64 Alice Ehr-Soon Tay, Human rights for Australia:  a survey of literature and developments, and a select and annotated 
bibliography of recent literature in Australia and abroad (Canberra:  Australian Government Publishing Service, 1986), 
7-8.  New Zealand M.P. Graeme Reeves suggested that the Human Rights Bill 1993 was “a further step” in the 
“evolution” of human rights, 537 NZPD 16912. 
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making them appear natural and inevitable, it does not accurately reflect the political 
development of those laws and their enforcement mechanisms.     
Political scientists are well poised to challenge this account and pinpoint the political 
processes that actually drive antidiscrimination regime formation and development.  While 
various monographic studies of the U.S.,65 Canada,66 and Great Britain67 have been made, 
few scholars have engaged in a systematic and comparative analysis.68 Moreover, those 
studies that do exist typically pay too little attention to the ideological differences that have 
separated regime proponents from opponents.  In this section, I discuss the recent and 
relevant political science scholarship on ideas, elites, and institutions, scholarship that offers 
theoretical and conceptual tools to frame just such an analysis.   
These tools derive mainly from the historical institutionalist approach,69 a body of 
research that emphasizes the interactive role of ideas and institutions in political change.70 
Historical institutionalists, for example, pay close attention to changes in the role of the state 
vis-à-vis society, focusing on the demands that drive those changes as well as the ways in 
which changes reshape social and political interests and subsequent demands upon the 
65 Charles Whalen and Barbara Whalen, The Longest Debate:  A Legislative History of the 1964 Civil Rights Act 
(Washington, D.C. : Seven Locks Press,1985); Hugh Davis Graham, The Civil Rights Era (New York:  Oxford 
University Press, 1990). 
66 Herbert A. Sohn, “Human Rights Legislation in Ontario” (DSW, Thesis, Toronto:  University of Toronto, 
1975); Howe, “Human Rights Policy in Ontario”; Morton and Knopff, The Charter Revolution and the Court Party.
67Anthony Lester and Geoffrey Bindman, Race and Law in Great Britain, Cambridge, Mass.:  Harvard University 
Press, 1972.
68 Cf. Freeman, Immigrant labor and racial conflict in industrial societies:  the French and British experience, 1945-1975 
(Princeton, N.J.:  Princeton University Press, 1979); and Bleich, Race Politics in Britain and France, both of whom 
compared Great Britain and France. 
69 Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth, eds., Historical institutionalism in comparative analysis 
(New York:  Cambridge University Press, 1992); Mark Blyth, Great transformations: economic ideas and institutional 
change in the twentieth century (New York:  Cambridge University Press, 2002); Kathleen Thelen, How Institutions 
Evolve:  The Political Economy of Skills in Germany, Britain, the United States, and Japan (New York:  Cambridge 
University Press, 2004). 
70 One might also include here work commonly referred to as American Political Development, see Karen 
Orren and Stephen Skowronek, The Search for American Political Development (Cambridge:  Cambridge University 
Press, 2004); Jeffrey K. Tulis, The Rhetorical Presidency (Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University Press, 1987); 
Gretchen Ritter, Goldbugs and Greenbacks: the antimonopoly tradition and the politics of finance in America (New York:  
Cambridge University Press, 1997).   
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state.71 Substantively, much of historical institutionalist scholarship examines economic and 
welfare policies, and as such situates itself within the terrain of political economy.72 By 
contrast, this dissertation suggests that the intersection of law and politics is another 
important locus for the application of historical institutionalist analysis.   
Institutional analysis does not attempt to show that ideas are all that matter but 
rather to show how they matter.73 Ideas, Robert C. Lieberman suggests, 
 
constitute much of the substantive raw material upon which institutional theory feeds—the 
goals and desires that people bring to the political world and, hence, the ways they define 
and express their interests; the meanings, interpretation, and judgments they attach to events 
and conditions; and their beliefs about cause-and-effect relationships in the political world 
and, hence, their expectations about how others will respond to their own behavior.74 
Successful institutionalization of a set of ideas depends upon their dissemination.  Randall 
Hansen and Desmond King suggest that political actors who operate as “carriers” of ideas 
perform two essential functions.  First, they proselytize in favor of new ideas, providing 
them with an audience and helping to bring them into prominence; second, they channel 
prominent ideas into the policy process.75 Hansen and King argue that the “specific content 
of the interest is less important than the actor’s perception that particular ideational 
frameworks further these interests.”76 They contend, further, that ideas are more likely to be 
translated into policy when actors believe that promoting particular ideas will advance their 
interests, when they possess the “requisite enthusiasm and institutional position,” and when 
“timing contributes to a broad constellation of preferences that reinforce, rather than detract 
71 Pierson, Politics in Time.
72 Thelen, How Institutions Evolve.
73 See Sherri Berman, “Ideas, Norms, and Culture in Political Analysis” 33 Comparative Politics: 231-50 2001; 
Blyth, Great Transformation; Martha Finnemore, National interests in international society (Ithaca, N.Y.:  Cornell 
University Press, 1996); Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists beyond borders:  advocacy networks in 
international politics (Ithaca, N.Y. : Cornell University Press ,1998). 
74 Robert C. Lieberman, “Ideas, Institutions, and Political Order: Explaining Political Change,” 96 American 
Political Science Review (2002):697-712, 697. 
75 Lieberman, “Ideas, Institutions, and Political Order,” 258. 76 Lieberman, “Ideas, Institutions, and Political Order,”  256. 
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from, these ideas.”77 Ideas may serve an actor’s interests in three ways:  first, by simply 
providing “cover” for what he or she wants to do anyway; second, by enhancing a 
politician’s profile and reputation; and third, by facilitating coalition building.78 Hansen and 
King make clear that institutional context and timing matter greatly.  Other scholars agree 
that explaining choices among competing ideas requires knowledge about institutional power 
and resources available to advocates in policy debates.79 Rather than maintaining that 
specific actors will always be central to policymaking, institutionalists survey the prevailing 
political landscape to understand how, and to whom, “power is parceled out.”80 
According to Lieberman, “[p]art of understanding political development and 
institutional change is understanding which ideas win (or, in fact, which ideas are in the arena 
to begin with), why and with what consequences for whom.”81 Further, one must recognize 
that such ideas may emanate from international or domestic sources, or both.  Temporally, 
therefore, we might expect the ideational origins of antidiscrimination regimes to differ from 
the ideas that drive their subsequent development.  Paul Pierson encourages scholars to 
incorporate the temporal dimension into their analyses.82 Following Pierson, I contend that 
it is precisely through antidiscrimination statutes that political actors manipulate legal rules 
and institutions in order to create and maintain new socio-legal frameworks within which 
social conflict and change occur,83 and it is the legal system that plays a primary role in 
77 Lieberman, “Ideas, Institutions, and Political Order,” 262. 
78 Lieberman, “Ideas, Institutions, and Political Order,” 259 
79 Peter A. Gourevitch, Politics in hard times:  comparative responses to international economic crises (Ithaca:  Cornell 
University Press, 1986), 54. 
80 Bleich, Race Politics in Britain and France, 23; Peter A. Hall, Governing the economy: the politics of state intervention in Britain and France (Cambridge:  Polity, 1986), 264; Desmond King, In the name of liberalism illiberal social policy in the 
USA and Britain (New York:  Oxford University Press, 1999), 2. 
81Lieberman, “Ideas, Institutions, and Political Order,” 260. 
82 Pierson, Politics in Time.
83 Frank K. Upham, Law and social change in postwar Japan (Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 1987), 
3-4. 
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determining which forums are available to disputants and what forms of conflict are 
appropriate.   
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
My study examines the emergence of an antidiscrimination ideology and the 
formation and development of antidiscrimination regimes in Anglo-American countries.  
These countries are of particular interest because their development is frequently explained 
in terms of a teleological narrative, and scholars often take for granted the pre-existence of a 
“civil rights template” without questioning its origins.  Thomas Burke, for example, suggests 
that the Anglo-American countries could easily include disability as a protected ground 
within their civil rights tradition because they did not have to develop “a new way of 
thinking about equality.”84 As other scholars have shown, however, civil rights traditions are 
themselves political constructions,85 and we need a better understanding of the process 
through which they were constructed.86 
In this dissertation, I trace the development of an ideology of antidiscrimination and 
show the patterns of its institutionalization in the Anglo-American countries between 1945 
and 1995.  The specific processes through which institutionalization occurs are examined in 
case studies of two countries, Australia and New Zealand.  The comparative, case study 
approach has been recommended by a number of scholars.87 Australia and New Zealand 
were selected because they raise interesting empirical questions, and because they have 
84 2000: 5. 
85 Ken I. Kersch, Constructing Civil Liberties:  Discontinuities in the Development of American Constitutional Law 
(Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
86 Powers, “The Transformation of Liberalism.” 
87 Donnelly, International Human Rights, 267-68; Jacobson, Immigration and the Decline of Citizenship, 2-3; Anne 
Gallagher, Making human rights treaty obligations a reality:  Working with new actors and partners,” in Philip 
Alston and James Crawford (eds.), The Future of UN Human Rights Treaty Monitoring (Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), 201-28,  201. 
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received far less attention within the literature than the U.S., Canada, and Great Britain.  
Each case study focuses primarily on the national antidiscrimination regime.  Australia has a 
federal political system.  Developments at the state and territorial levels are considered only 
to the extent that they influenced national development.  New Zealand, by contrast, is a 
unitary state.  My analysis also incorporates developments in international human rights.   
Employing qualitative techniques, such as process tracing and content analysis, I 
identify the individuals and groups who sought to influence the decisions to enact and 
expand antidiscrimination legislation.  By examining their arguments, I identify their 
preferences and trace the extent to which they were able or unable to get their preferences 
realized.  Tracing regime development over such a long period of time requires the 
evaluation of a broad range of materials, including both primary and secondary sources.  I 
examine discussions of discrimination in parliamentary debates and the production of 
government documents, and I marshal data from archives, personal interviews, and 
secondary accounts.  In some instances, especially fir the early period of regime 
development, copies of the legislative bills were not available.  Nevertheless, the contents of 
those bills could be reconstructed through analysis of parliamentary debates, committee 
hearings, and secondary sources.  Lists of individuals and organizational representatives 
attending committee hearings or filing submissions were obtained.  Participant interviews 
illuminated details not captured by other accounts, describing events and relationships 
between developments that were sometimes not visible to outside observers.  Reliance upon 
multiple sources of evidence facilitates the identification of converging information.88 
88 Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research:  Design and Methods (Newbury Park, CA:  Sage Publications, 1994). 
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ROADMAP TO SUBSEQUENT CHAPTERS 
Chapter Two sets forth the logic of the common law regime that preceded the 
adoption of antidiscrimination regimes.  Chapter Three provides a historical overview of the 
emergence and development of the antidiscrimination ideology at both national and 
international levels, paying close attention to developments in the U.S., Canada, and Great 
Britain.  Chapters Four and Five examine the formation and development of 
antidiscrimination regimes in Australia and New Zealand.  Finally, in Chapter Six, I assess 
the implications of these regimes for liberal democratic governance. 
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Chapter Two:  The Common Law 
 
The common law, marvelous as it has been in developing safeguards for human rights in certain 
fields, never succeeded in tackling the problem of the alien, never succeeded in tackling the problem 
of the woman and never succeeded in tackling the problem of religious minorities and it has in our 
day had to be supplemented by detailed legislation to ensure a measure of justice to racial groups. 
 
~ Lord Scarman (1978) 
The common law originated in the local courts of ancient England and was later 
transplanted in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the U.S. by British colonists.89 Its rules 
are not found in codes written by a single authority, but rather they derive from a body of 
decisions made over time by judges who were expected to issue rulings that followed 
principles established in previous, similar cases.  The common law governs torts—civil 
wrongs that result in personal injury or property damage—as well as contracts, property, and 
other areas of private life.  In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the common law 
was generally viewed as a “neutral, pre-political ordering of society” that “provided the 
natural ordering for relations among private parties.”90  Before the relatively recent explosion 
in statutory law, which codified some common law rules and supplanted others with new 
rules, the common law provided the terms upon which social relations were governed.  As I 
show in this chapter, by privileging classical liberal values of property and contract,91 courts 
generally interpreted the common law as recognizing a right to discriminate, and they 
thereby accorded non-state actors and institutions important community-defining powers.  
89 See Arthur R. Hogue, Origins of the Common Law (Bloomington:  Indiana University Press, 1966); and George 
W. Keeton, The Norman Conquest and the Common Law (New York:  Barnes and Noble, 1966).  On the common 
law generally, see Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law (Boston:  Little Brown, 1923); S.J., Stoljar, A
history of contract at common law (Canberra: Australian National University, 1975); Joel Prentiss Bishop, 
Commentaries on the law of married women under the statutes of the several states, and at common law and in equity (Boston:  
Little, Brown, and Company, 1873); Bayefsky 1985:  328. 
90  “Note:  The Antidiscrimination Principle in the Common Law,” 102 Harvard Law Review 1989:  2010. 
91 Cf. Karen Orren, Belated Feudalism:  Labor, the Law, and Liberal Development in the United States (Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
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As Lord Scarman suggests, judges did not see the problem of discrimination experienced by 
aliens, women, religious minorities, or racial groups. 
Those who controlled property and capital were able, if they so chose, to wield their 
common law rights for the purpose of excluding certain individuals—typically on grounds of 
race or religion—from public accommodations, employment, and housing.  No state law or 
regulation prescribed such exclusion; rather, it was accomplished by individuals and groups 
acting upon personal prejudices or assessments of community, or market, preferences.  The 
state, however, could become involved in enforcing private exclusionary practices if those 
practices were challenged in the courts.  Judges could, for example, enforce a restrictive 
covenant that prohibited the sale of property to a racial or religious minority.  Throughout 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, courts often protected the right to discriminate 
at the expense of those who challenged that right in the name of equal access.  Even in those 
cases where judges found for plaintiffs alleging discrimination, they were only willing to 
award what amounted to nominal damages that failed to redress the personal humiliation 
that was suffered.  Cumulatively, the exclusionary practices of private actors defined the 
community and one’s membership in it through the physical separation of the different 
groups, which had the corollary effect of stigmatizing some groups as second-class citizens 
by denying them equal respect and treatment.   
The common law did not recognize discrimination as a cause of action,92 but in the 
absence of statutory or constitutional provisions prohibiting discrimination by non-state 
actors, a challenge under the common law was an aggrieved individual’s only mode of legal 
redress.  Such individuals had to craft a cognizable common law claim, typically in tort or for 
breach of contract.  In some cases, judges disposed of the legal issues without so much as 
discussing the nature of the alleged discrimination.93 Through a discussion of representative 
92 B. Gaze and M. Jones, Law, Liberty and Australian Democracy (North Ryde:  Law Book Co.,1990), 402. 
93 Barnswell v. National Amusement Company (1915) 31 WLR 542 (BCCA). 
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court cases, I show the types of common law claims that were pursued and the ways in 
which courts disposed of those claims, focusing on the competing conceptions of rights and 
freedoms and the competing conceptions of the state’s appropriate role in managing social 
relations.  As Marshall S. Shapo suggested, the common law judge “semiconsciously 
capture[s] society’s ideas about justice in legal issues framed by specific disputes.”94 This 
chapter concludes with a discussion of the common law’s failures as they were diagnosed 
and understood by elites.  My purpose is not to show that during the middle decades of the 
twentieth century the common law was, or is today, incapable of being adapted to 
accommodate egalitarian values or social justice imperatives,95 rather, I seek to show that the 
common law, as it was interpreted by judges, was perceived by key elites to have failed as a 
viable mode of organizing social relations in a diverse society.  Notably, this perceived failure 
of the common law contrasts with its perception historically.  “Thinkers in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries,” Kathleen Sullivan suggests, “saw the common law not as an 
archaic and feudal tradition but as protective of freedom and compatible with modernity.”96 
94 1995:  1569. 
95 Some scholars seek to demonstrate that the common law is capable of protecting rights beyond liberty and 
property, see “Note:  The Antidiscrimination Principle in the Common Law,” 102 Harvard Law Review (1989) 
1993; Amnon Reichman, “Professional Status and the Freedom to Contract:  Toward a Common Law Duty of 
Non-Discrimination,” 14 Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence (2001) 79.  Over the past fifteen years, judges 
in Australia and New Zealand have rediscovered the common law as a means of creatively importing human 
rights values into domestic jurisprudence.  With regard to Australia, see Mabo v. the State of Queensland [No 2] 
(1992) 175 CLR 1.  On these developments, see Haig Patapan, Judging Democracy: the new politics of the High Court of 
Australia (New York : Cambridge University Press, 2000), 26. 
96 Kathleen Sullivan, “Liberalism’s Domesticity: The Common-Law Domestic Relations as Liberal Social 
Ordering (Ph.D. Dissertation, The University of Texas at Austin, 2002), 16. 
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PATTERNS OF SOCIETAL DISCRIMINATION     
Because property and economic power have historically been enjoyed 
disproportionately by white men, those positioned to enjoy common law rights have 
traditionally been white men.  Women and racial minorities were often accorded by law an 
inferior status that denied them the legal capacity to possess property in their name.  Until 
the mid-nineteenth century, a married woman’s legal status was similar to that of slaves, 
convicts, children, and lunatics.97 After the institution of slavery was abolished in the U.S., 
the Black Codes were used to limit the ability of blacks to acquire and hold property in the 
South.  In Australia, Canada, and the U.S., indigenous peoples were often deprived of the 
requisite legal status to hold property.  Similar laws were used to limit the ability of Asian 
minorities to acquire property in the U.S. and Canada.98 To the extent that one’s capacity to 
possess property was diminished, so, too, was one’s capacity to exercise common law rights. 
Disproportionate control of physical resources, combined with the common law 
system of rights, facilitated the maintenance of segregated communities and sent to racial 
and religious minorities the message that they did not belong.  A few cross-national 
examples illustrate the seriousness of the problem.  In An American Dilemma, Gunnar Myrdal 
not only documented the Jim Crow society of the South, but he also captured the de facto 
discrimination that characterized much of the North.  He observed that while African 
Americans in the North had secured “practically unabridged civic equality in all [their] 
relations with public authority, whether it was in voting, before the courts, in the school 
97 The common law of coverture, as this was known, was changed by statute.  Mississippi enacted the first 
statute that recognized women’s legal capacity in 1839, and by 1850 nearly half of the states had enacted their 
own Married Women’s Property Acts.  In New Zealand, by contrast, it was not until 1976 that the Matrimonial 
Property Act was amended to provide that a married woman with the same legal capacities and duties as her 
husband. 
98 See the submission of the National Japanese-Canadian Association to the Special Committee of the Senate 
on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in The Senate of Canada—Proceedings of the Special Committee on 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950), pp. 269-79.  Also see Union Colliery of British Columbia v. Bryden,
[1899] A.C. 580; Cunningham v. Tomey Homma, [1903] A.C. 151. 
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system or as a relief recipient,” they were nonetheless “discriminated against ruthlessly in 
private relations, as when looking for a job or seeking a home to live in.”99 Thus, if America 
was to resolve its dilemma, it would need to address both state and non-state discrimination.   
Likewise, in Ontario, discrimination against African Canadians was accomplished by 
private actors rather than by statute.100 Dresden, a small town in the southwestern part of 
the province—known as the burial place for the man thought to have inspired the character 
of Uncle Tom—was a racially segregated community.  Most restaurants there discriminated 
against blacks, who comprised approximately 15% of the town’s population;101 black men 
were only hired for manual labor; blacks could not use the local barber and beauty shops; 
and two of the three community swimming pools were segregated.102 In December 1949, 
voters in Dresden rejected a referendum proposal in support of a municipal 
antidiscrimination law by a vote of 517 to 108.103 During the 1930s, anti-Semitism increased 
within Ontario and Quebec.104 Jewish Canadians experienced discrimination with regard to 
public accommodations, housing, and employment.105 Hotels and resorts commonly 
advertised that they catered to an “exclusive clientele,” which meant that they refused to 
serve Jews.  Restrictive covenants were used against Jews across Canada.  In Nova Scotia, 
99 Myrdal, An American Dilemma, 1010. 
100 See Ida Greaves, The Negro in Canada (Orillia, ON:  Packet-Times Press, 1930); Robin W. Winks, The Blacks 
in Canada:  a history (Montreal:  McGill-Queen's University Press, 1971); John C.Bagnall, “The Ontario 
Conservatives and the Development of Anti-Discrimination Policy:  1944-1962” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Queen’s 
University at Kingston, Canada, 1984), 108-10; Walker, “Race,” Rights and the Law in the Supreme Court of Canada,
122-81.  This contrasted with the de jure discrimination directed against Asians. 
101 Sidney Katz, “Jim Crow Lives in Dresden,” Maclean’s, 1 Nov. 1949 
102 John C.Bagnall, “The Ontario Conservatives and the Development of Anti-Discrimination Policy:  1944-1962,” 108-10. 
103 Bagnall, “The Ontario Conservatives and the Development of Anti-Discrimination Policy:  1944-1962,” 
130. 
104 Lita-Rose Betcherman, The Swastika and the Maple Leaf:  Fascist Movements in Canada in the Thirties (Toronto:  
Fitzhenry and Whiteside, 1975). 
105 Walker, “Race,” Rights and the Law in the Supreme Court of Canada, 183-245. 
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those instruments were used to exclude blacks, whereas in British Columbia, they were 
directed against Asians.106 
Similarly, the files of the Department of Maori Affairs in New Zealand contain 
numerous complaints of racial discrimination by Maori with regard to employment and 
housing.107 Some of these complaints even received national media attention.  In 1955, for 
example, Donald Hiki, a Maori, alleged that he had been denied employment with the 
Huntly Branch of the Bank of New Zealand (BNZ) on account of his race.  His accusations 
garnered national media attention.108 At the time, no Maori men served as bank officers at 
the BNZ, but the Bank did employ a couple of young Maori women.  According to the 
Department of Maori Affairs’ records, the BNZ preferred that employees “not be of a dark 
colour” because “some of their depositors were a bit fussy.”109 Five years later, a 
Department survey of business practices found that for positions involving “face to face” 
service with the public “there was a strong tendency to deny entry to Maori because of 
possible adverse and customer re-action.”110 In addition, discrimination existed in housing, 
hotels, theaters, employment, barbershops, private bars, and lounges.111 
Societal discrimination was rife in Australia, too.  The eminent historian, Ann 
Curthoys, in a memoir of her experiences as a “freedom rider” in New South Wales in 1965, 
recounts how many of the same exclusionary practices used in the U.S. and Canada were 
also used against indigenous peoples in rural towns, most notably at swimming pools and 
other public places.112 In 1973, Fred Hollows, well known for his work on indigenous 
health issues, witnessed firsthand Australia’s discriminatory practices.  While working in the 
106 Walker, “Race,” Rights and the Law in the Supreme Court of Canada, 190. 
107 “Non Legal Discrimination” (1 April 1960) MA 36 1/21, p. 1.   
108 “No job at bank for Maori,” New Zealand Herald, 29 April 1955; “Maori Progress and Problems,” The 
Taranaki Daily News (4 October 1956). 
109 MA 36 1/21 19/1/539 Placement of Donald Hiki (8 March 1955). 
110 “Non Legal Discrimination” (1 April 1960) MA 36 1/21, p. 1. 
111 “Relations between Maori and European People in New Zealand,” MA 19/1/539 (10 May 1960), p. 1. 
112 Ann Curthoys, Freedom Rides:  a freedom rider remembers (Crows Nest, NSW:  Allen & Unwin, 2003). 
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New South Wales town of Enngonia, he was advised by a local hotel operator that the 
Aboriginal people accompanying him would be served outside at the rear of the hotel rather 
than in the lounge.  Hollows recounted the incident in a letter to the Attorney-General, 
Lionel K. Murphy, later that month.113 Finally, during the 1950s and 1960s, Britain’s 
demographic profile began to change as a result of immigration from the Caribbean and the 
Indian subcontinent.114  The arrival of increasing numbers of “colored” immigrants 
generated social tensions, including race riots in Notting Hill and Nottingham in 1958.115 
Many employers and landlords discriminated against the newcomers.  As all of these 
foregoing examples show, private actors operating independently of state support, exercised 
considerable power over access to public places, employment, and housing. 
 
PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS 
Challenges to discriminatory exclusion from various venues, such as swimming 
pools, theaters, restaurants, taverns, and dance halls, constituted the most frequent type of 
common law claim.  The common law traditionally accepted the rule “he who owns may do 
as he pleases with what he owns,”116 but courts carved out three main exceptions to that 
rule.  The first and second exceptions pertained to innkeepers117 and common carriers.118 
Both were placed under a duty to serve all comers, unless a particular customer posed a 
unique risk, such as through unruly behavior.  Courts, for example, exempted innkeepers 
from liability for refusing service to guests on a number of grounds deemed reasonable.  
113 See Hollows, Prof. F. corr. To Murphy, L.K. 26 November 1973 Australian Archives M132 Box 21.  
Murphy responded with a letter detailing the Racial Discrimination and Human Rights Bills. 
114 See Freeman, Immigrant labor and racial conflict in industrial societies.
115 Bob Hepple, Race, Jobs, and the Law in Britain (London:  Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1968). 130. 
116 Gaze and Jones, Law, Liberty and Australian Democracy, 401. 
117 See Rex v. Ivens, 32 E.C.L. 495, 7 C. & P. 213 (1835); Story, Commentaries on the Law of Bailments (Schouler, 
9th ed., 1878 476); and, “The Liability of Innkeepers” (1947), 203 L.T. 287. 
118 See Chicago etc. R. Co. v. Williams, 55 Ill. 185 (1870); West Chester etc. R. Co. v. Miles, 55 Pa. 209 (1867). 
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These included turning away individuals who refused to pay for services;119 who were 
intoxicated and badly behaved;120 who failed to meet hygienic standards;121 or who insisted 
on bringing dogs into a hotel.122  By contrast, a number of courts found it unreasonable to 
refuse service to a person who arrived ill123 or whom the hotelkeeper personally disliked and 
no longer desired as a customer.124 
Scholars disagree about the rationale that underlaid these two exceptions.  Anthony 
Lester and Geoffrey Bindman assert that the duty to serve derived from judges’ practical 
concerns with the speed and safety of travel in medieval England.125 Some suggest that inns 
and carriers were regarded as “common” because they offered their services to anyone, 
absent an explicit contract.126 In other words, they “held themselves out” to the public.  In 
that sense, inns and common carriers resembled the third type of entity placed under a duty 
to serve, namely businesses granted a state monopoly or position of privilege.127 Scholars in 
the law and economics school of thought, such as Richard A. Epstein,128 contend that as a 
general principle the duty to serve stems from a desire to combat the dangers of monopoly, 
be it a licensed business, an inn, or a common carrier.  They reject the idea that private 
property is converted into public space simply by virtue of its owner holding out its services 
to the public. 
119 Doyle v. Walker (1867), 26 U.C.Q.B. 502; Bellairs v. Yale Hotel Calgary Ltd., [1936] 1 W.W.R. 316 (Alta D.C.).  
But cf. R. v. Ivens (1835) 7 C. & P. 213, 217. 
120 R. v. Ivens (1835) 7 C. & P. 213; Hawthorn v. Hammond (1844), 1 Car. & Kir. 404, 407. 
121 Pidgeon v. Legge (1857), 21 J.P. 743, per C.B. Pollock and B. Bramwell. 
122 R. v. Rymer (1877), 2 Q.B.D. 136. 
123 R. v. Luellin (1701), 12 Mod. 445. 
124 Kenny v. O’Loughlin (1944), 78 Ir. L.T.R. 116. 
125 1972:  63. 
126 Walker, “Race,” Rights and the Law in the Supreme Court of Canada, 144. 
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In the hands of judges, innkeeper, common carrier, and a monopolistic enterprise all 
became terms of art with very specific meanings.129 Thus, if a business could establish that it 
was a private hauler, a lodging-house, or a private hotel, then it was not obligated to serve all 
comers.130  In order for the duty to serve to apply, courts had to determine first whether the 
parties satisfied the legal definitions of “guest” and “innkeeper,” and second, whether the 
refusal of service was “reasonable.”  Judges often disposed of plaintiffs’ claims by finding 
that an establishment did not meet the requisite criteria to be considered an inn.  In Canada, 
for example, where blacks were refused service in restaurants and taverns, recourse to the 
duty to serve proved unsuccessful because the courts simply found that the defendants’ 
premises were not inns and refused to extend the duty to additional entities.131 
Christie v. York Corp. [1940] 1 D.L.R. 8, serves as a key exemplar of this line of 
jurisprudence.  Although the case arose in the civil law province of Québec, it is important 
because courts in the common law provinces relied upon it as precedent.132 Born in Jamaica, 
Fred Christie had been a resident of Montreal for over twenty years and a frequent patron of 
the York Tavern, an establishment situated adjacent to the city’s largest black neighborhood.  
In 1936, the tavern relocated to the Montreal Forum.  Although Christie, as well as other 
blacks, had frequented the previous location on numerous occasions, the management 
instructed employees not to serve them on the new premises.  On his first visit there, 
Christie’s repeated requests for service were denied.  He called the police, who advised him 
that there was nothing under the law they could do.  Christie subsequently sued the tavern 
for breach of contract and in tort, citing the humiliation that he had suffered, and he claimed 
two hundred dollars in damages.  His attorney argued that because the tavern had a public 
129 See Molot, “The Duty of Business to Serve,”  615-16. 
130 Quintin Hogg, “Race Relations and Parliament”  Race, XII, 1 (July, 1970):  1-13,  3. 
131 See Franklin v. Evans (1924) 55 OLR 349; King v. Barclay (1966) Que. C.S. (1965). 
132 See Rogers v. Clarence Hotel Co. Ltd. at 584, where Chief Justice B.C. MacDonald concludes that Christie 
enunciated the general principle that “a merchant or trader, not engaged in a monopolistic or privileged 
enterprise, may conduct a business in the manner best suited to advance his own interests.” 
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license and because it publicly advertised its sale of beer, it had offered an implicit contract, 
which it then broke by refusing service.133 He also used the courtroom as a forum in which 
to prove that the problem of racial discrimination was common within the city.  Counsel for 
the tavern’s owner countered that his business was “’a private enterprise for gain’” and that 
his denial of service was within the tavern owner’s right to protect his “’business 
interests.’”134  Moreover, he suggested that Christie was spared humiliation by the quiet and 
polite way in which the tavern’s staff had refused service.   
During the hearing, Justice Philippe Demers suggested that the case posed “’a 
question of rights,’” specifically whether the tavern possessed “’the right to refuse a man on 
account of his color.’”135 He concluded that the refusal to serve blacks was illegal according 
his reading of sections 19 and 33 of the Quebec License Act.  Section 33 provided that “no 
licensee for a restaurant may refuse, without reasonable cause, to give food to travelers,” and 
section 19 defined a restaurant as “an establishment, …, where in consideration of payment, 
food (without lodging) is habitually furnished to travelers.”  Further, a traveler was defined 
as “a person who, in consideration of a given price … is furnished by another person with 
food or lodging or both.”136 In Demers’ view, beer qualified as nourishment and thus as 
food, and Christie qualified as a traveler.  He awarded Christie twenty-five dollars, plus the 
costs of the action.  The tavern owner appealed. 
The Court of King’s Bench reversed the lower court’s decision on a five-to-four 
decision.  The majority concluded that there was no contract.  One justice argued that no 
contract existed because Christie had been immediately refused service, before a bargain 
could be struck.  Another denied that a contract had been formed because, in his opinion, 
the tavern’s general advertising constituted an invitation to buy and not an offer to sell, the 
133 Walker, “Race,” Rights and the Law in the Supreme Court of Canada,151-52. 
134 Quoted in Walker, “Race,” Rights and the Law in the Supreme Court of Canada, 153. 
135 Quoted in Walker, “Race,” Rights and the Law in the Supreme Court of Canada, 154. 
136 RSQ 1925 c. 25, §§19, 33. 
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latter being required for contract formation.  The majority also found that the duty to serve 
established by the Québec License Act applied to restaurants and hotels, but not to taverns.  
“The fact that a tavern-keeper decides in his own business interests that it would harm his 
establishment if he catered to people of colour cannot be said to be an action which is 
against good morals or public order,” observed the majority justices.137 James W. St. G. 
Walker observed that no one at trial challenged the contention that white patrons preferred 
not to associate with blacks.138 In fact, to the contrary, the evidence indicated that such 
prejudice was common and generally acceptable.  In its decision, the court favored a 
principle of freedom of commerce over a principle of equality.  One justice explicitly stated 
that the case did not call upon the court “to express any opinion upon the abstract 
philosophical concept that all men are born equal.”139 The dissenting justice, Antonin 
Galipeault, by contrast, formulated the issue in terms of the patron’s liberty rather than that 
of the proprietor.  He asserted that as a British subject, and as a willing and suitable 
customer, Christie had a right to buy beer at a public establishment, which the York Tavern 
in his opinion surely was, and further that a contract had, in fact, been formed.  Christie, 
nevertheless, lost.  His defense team issued a public plea to Montreal’s black community for 
more funds to support another appeal, venturing that the Supreme Court would not uphold 
“’this malicious principle of racial discrimination, which is certainly contrary to British 
principles and traditions.’”140 
137 Christie at 124-25.  Subsequent common law cases affirmed the right of business owners to make such 
decisions based upon their judgment.  See Scala Ballroom (Wolverhampton) Ltd. v. Ratcliffe [1958] 2 All E.R. 220, 
where England’s Court of Appeal stipulated that the proprietors of the ballroom were entitled to maintain a 
color bar deemed to be in their business interest; and, Re Lysaght, Hill v. Royal College of Surgeons [1965] 3 W.L.R. 
391, 402, where Justice Buckley accepted that “racial and religious discrimination is nowadays widely regarded 
as deplorable in many respects,” but nevertheless asserted that it was “going much too far to say that the 
endowment of a charity, the beneficiaries of which are to be drawn from a particular faith, or to exclude 
adherents to a particular faith, is contrary to public policy….  It is undesirable but it is not, …, contrary to 
public policy.” 
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139 Christie at 112. 
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Christie, however, would be disappointed.  The Supreme Court of Canada framed 
the issue not as one concerning the legality of discrimination per se, but rather as an issue of 
the York Tavern’s right to refuse service at its own discretion.141  Christie’s legal counsel 
argued the moral impropriety of racial discrimination and further argued that it undermined 
public order.  Such discrimination, he claimed, was insulting, slanderous, and degrading.142 
The tavern’s attorney countered that maintenance of a color bar was a business decision 
based upon an assessment of white prejudice against “’drinking in company with negroes’” 
and further that such a policy was “’common in the better class of establishments’” in the 
city.143 Further, he argued that absent special statutory provisions, merchants were not 
under any “’duty to enter into a contractual relationship with anyone.’”144 A majority of the 
Supreme Court agreed, affirming the general principle of complete freedom of commerce.  
“Any merchant,” it ruled, was “free to deal as he may choose with any individual member of 
the public.  It is not a question of motives or reasons for deciding to deal or not to deal; he is 
free to do either.”145 Moreover, the majority suggested that the tavern’s policy did not 
abridge good morals or threaten to undermine public order.   
Again, there was a lone dissenter.  Justice Henry Davis argued that because Québec 
had established “complete governmental control” over the sale of beer and forbade its sale 
by anyone not holding a “special privilege,” the holder of a permit lacked “the right of an 
ordinary trader to pick and choose those to whom he will sell.”146 It was, therefore in his 
opinion, a matter for the legislature to determine whether taverns should maintain 
exclusionary policies.  Christie lost, and, adding insult to injury, he was required to pay the 
141 [1940] SCR 139. 
142 Walker, “Race,” Rights and the Law in the Supreme Court of Canada, 159, 160. 
143 Quoted in Walker, “Race,” Rights and the Law in the Supreme Court of Canada, 160. 
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tavern’s costs.147 The outcome of the case drew little public attention.  Writing of the 
Christie decision, law professor Bora Laskin characterized the “principle of freedom of 
commerce enforced by the Court majority” as “merely the reading of social and economic 
doctrine into law, and doctrine no longer possessing its nineteenth century validity” due to 
the state’s increased regulation of the economy.148 Over the ensuing years, a number of legal 
commentators would look upon the majority opinion with disdain, arguing that the court 
could have decided the case differently.149 
Nevertheless, Christie served as precedent for subsequent cases.  In Rogers v. Clarence 
Hotel Co. Ltd. [1940] 3 DLR 583, Rogers sued a beer parlor operator after she refused to 
serve him beer in her premises solely on account of his race.  The defendant admitted that 
she refused service on account of the man’s color, but argued that that she was entitled to 
exercise unfettered discretion to refuse any patron, without being obliged to show 
reasonable cause for doing so.  The trial court awarded Rogers twenty-five dollars in 
damages, finding that Government Liquor Act, R.S.B.C. 1936, had affected the sale of beer 
with a public interest.   The Court of Appeals, however, reversed that decision.  There, the 
majority judges endorsed the principle of freedom of commerce espoused in Christie.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Cornelius O’Halloran described the plaintiff as “a 
British subject,” and “a taxpayer,” who had lived in Vancouver for some twenty-two years.150 
He asserted that it was “contrary to the common law to refuse to serve a person solely 
because of his colour or race” because all British subjects possess the same rights and 
privileges under the common law, irrespective of “class, race or religion.”151 Such 
147 Costs amounted to $594.43, see Walker, “Race,” Rights and the Law in the Supreme Court of Canada, 164, fn. 
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discrimination was, thus, unreasonable.  O’Halloran also asserted that the defendant 
advertised her establishment and thus held it out to the public without reservation or 
limitation.  Moreover, the provincial licensing requirement “removed beer from the sphere 
of commerce and made it instead a governmental enterprise conducted by the Government 
for the good and welfare of the people.”152  For these reasons, it did not matter that the 
parlor was not a monopoly.153 He recognized that the court was being called upon to weigh 
two competing rights, the right of the beer parlor operator to refuse the respondent and the 
right of the respondent to be served.  One must necessarily give way to the other, and 
O’Halloran concluded that based upon the facts presented, the right to be served should 
prevail.154 In response, one commentator in the Canadian Bar Review asserted that 
O’Halloran had gotten it wrong.  The common law, in his opinion, only entailed equal 
treatment “under the law or before the Courts or as against the Crown or government,” but 
it did not apply between private individuals.155 
Racial discrimination was also common in theaters and other places of 
entertainment.  Into the 1930s, for example, theaters in Windsor, Ontario designated 
separate seating areas for black patrons, which were often known by such derogatory names 
as “Crow’s nests” or “Monkeys’ cages.”156 On one occasion, a riot broke out at the Empress 
Theatre in Victoria, British Columbia, when a group of African Canadian citizens abrogated 
local convention by taking seats in the dress circle.157 Sparrow v. Johnson (1899) 15 CS 104, 
another Canadian case, involved a legal challenge to this practice.  There, Justice John Sprott 
Archibald of the Québec Superior Court awarded Frederick Johnson fifty dollars in damages 
for humiliation on a breach of contract claim.  Johnson and a guest had been refused seating 
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in the orchestra section of the Academy of Music on racial grounds, after he had been 
erroneously sold the tickets by a clerk who thought that Johnson was on an errand for a 
white patron.  Archibald framed the case in terms of two separate issues:  first, could the 
theater restrict black customers to certain sections, and second, was there a contract for the 
seats?   With regard to the first, the judge characterized such racially discriminatory policies 
as relics of the “prejudices created by the system of negro slavery.”  “Our constitution,” he 
argued,  
 
is and always has been essentially democratic, and it does not admit of distinctions of races 
or classes.  All men are equal before the law and each has equal rights as a member of the 
community. …  I should certainly hold any regulation which deprived negroes as a class of 
privileges which all other members of the community had a right to demand, was not only 
unreasonable but entirely incompatible with our free democratic institutions.”158 
For him, it did not matter that the “regulation” was issued by a private, as opposed to a state, 
institution.  With regard to the second, more technical issue, Archibald analogized theater-
goers to hotel guests and held that theaters were under a duty to serve.  Like hotels, he 
reasoned, theaters required public licenses and operated under municipal regulations.  They 
are thus not strictly private enterprises and not free to discriminate among their customers.  
Archibald, therefore, found a breach of contract.   
On appeal, however, the Québec Court of Queen’s Bench upheld the decision, but 
on narrower grounds.  It rejected the analogy between hotels and theaters, and thereby 
denied that theaters were under a duty to serve.  Because Johnson had purchased the tickets, 
however, it found that the Music Academy had breached its contract, and it awarded him the 
cost of the tickets in damages.159 In the U.S., too, courts often refused to place theaters 
under a duty to serve, even though they recognized that theaters were licensed by the state 
and thereby affected by a public purpose.  Such licensing, courts concluded, was for the 
158 Sparrow, 15 CS at 106. 
159 See also Barnswell v. National Amusement Company (1914) 21 BCR 435; (1915) 31 WLR 542 (BCCA). 
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purpose of generating revenue and, as such, did not constitute a state franchise to initiate 
and conduct business.160 
On those occasions in which an inn was held liable for breaching its duty to serve, 
the available remedies awarded by the courts seemed inadequate to redress the nature of the 
harm suffered.  In Constantine v. Imperial Hotels [1944] K.B. 693, for example, Sir Learie 
Constantine, a famous West Indian cricketer, was refused accommodations at the Imperial 
Hotel in London because his presence, it was contended, might offend American guests.161  
Although it was disputed at trial, Constantine’s witnesses testified that the manager had said 
“’We won’t have niggers in this Hotel.’”162 Constantine prevailed in his suit, but he was 
awarded a mere £5 in damages, although the judge expressly recognized that Constantine 
suffered “unjust humiliation and distress.”163 
These court decisions influenced the thinking of government officials.  During the 
early decades of the twentieth century, on various occasions and upon experiencing 
discrimination, aggrieved individuals approached Canadian government officials for advice.  
In 1912, for example, the Edmonton Capital reported that two blacks were denied bar 
service in two hotels.  When asked what recourse was available, an official from the Attorney 
General’s Department reportedly replied that although the province gives the hotel keeper a 
right to sell liquor, “‘it cannot compel him to sell to anyone if he does not wish to do so.’”164 
Four years later, another group of African Canadians asked the federal government whether 
racially discriminatory practices by private actors were legal.  The Deputy Minister of Justice 
advised them that no legislation spoke to the issue of private discrimination; rather, he said, 
160 See People ex rel. Burnham v. Flynn, 189 N. Y. 180; Collister v. Hayman, 183 N. Y. 250; Aaron v. Ward, 203 N. Y. 
351. 
161 See Learie 1954; Jowell 1965:  172 
162 Quoted in Hepple, Race, Jobs, and the Law in Britain, 102. 
163 Constantine v. Imperial Hotels [1944] K.B. 693, 696. 
164 Quoted in Walker, “Race,” Rights and the Law in the Supreme Court of Canada, 131. 
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“‘[t]he remedy is in the court.’”165  He failed to explain that the courts were likely to uphold 
the right of a property owner to exclude individuals from his property on the basis of race.  
The Deputy Attorney General of Ontario was more forthcoming in his explanation of the 
common law in a 1929 letter to a group of concerned African Canadians.  He wrote,  
 
“Coloured people have exactly the same rights as others in the matter of public places of 
entertainment, but as the obligation of a proprietor to sell seats in his theatre or meals in his 
restaurant does not ordinarily exist, he can refuse to sell to Negroes if he pleases, just as he 
could refuse to sell to any other person or class of people, as long as the refusal is not 
accompanied by insult or violence.”166  
The common law right to exclude influenced public thinking about how to respond 
to racial discrimination in Canada.  In 1936, for example, a Toronto hotel denied a black 
singer, and hotel guest, access to its dining room.  In its coverage of the incident, the 
magazine Saturday Night asserted that such behavior constituted “’an intolerable anomaly in 
a free, liberal and supposedly Christian country,’” but in its opinion, private initiative rather 
than state action constituted the appropriate response.167 It thus observed that the “’only 
feasible way of dealing with the situation appears to be the establishment of international 
clubhouses in the larger urban centers in which foreigners of any race, color, religion or 
political philosophy, provided that they are personally acceptable, will be admitted to the full 
enjoyment of all privileges.’”168 Essentially, it identified a niche market for some 
entrepreneur to exploit, rather than a need to create an obligation upon businesses not to 
discriminate on grounds of race.   
 
165 Quoted in Walker, “Race,” Rights and the Law in the Supreme Court of Canada. 143-44. 
166 Quoted in Greaves 1930:  62. 
167 Quoted in Walker, “Race,” Rights and the Law in the Supreme Court of Canada, 131. 
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REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 
Individuals desiring to maintain a segregated community did not have to rely upon 
local ordinances to achieve it.  They could attach a restrictive covenant to their property 
deed.  A covenant resembles a contract in that a violation gives rise to a cause of action for 
damages or an injunction.  Property covenants restrict the sale of land, thereby abridging the 
principle that the sale of property should be unrestrained; however, partial restrictions, 
which did not totally inhibit the free enjoyment and disposal of property, were generally 
accepted.  These restrictions typically prohibited the transfer of property interests to 
individuals belonging to particular racial, religious, or ethnic groups for a specified period of 
time.169 
In Canada, a number of courts had heard various challenges to restrictive covenants, 
but none had directly addressed the legality of those instruments.170 In 1945, however, 
Justice Keiller Mackay of the Ontario High Court heard the case Re: Drummond Wren [1945] 
OR 778, which directly challenged a restrictive covenant targeting “Jews or persons of 
objectionable nationality.”  Mackay struck down the covenant on three grounds.  First, he 
argued that such instruments were contrary to public policy and that it was an established 
practice of common law courts to use “the doctrine of public policy as an active agent in the 
promotion of the public weal.”171 Second, because the covenant was not temporally limited 
in duration, Mackay found the covenant to be an improper restraint on alienation, and third, 
he determined the language concerning the prohibited classes to be uncertain, thus rendering 
the covenant void.  By 1945, no American court that had ruled upon the legality of such 
169 See Clement E. Vose, Caucasians Only:  The Supreme Court, the NAACP, and the Restrictive Covenant Cases 
(Berkeley and Los Angles:  University of California Press, 1959).  
170 See Essex Real Estate v. Holmes (1930) 38 OWN 392; Re: Bryers and Morris ((1931) 40 OWN 572; Re: 
McDougall and Waddell [1945] OWN; [1945] 2 DLR 244. 
171 Re Drummond Wren at 678-79.  On public policy and the common law, see C.J. Tindal in Homer v. Graves (1831) 7 Bing. 735, 743, where he states that “[w]hatever is injurious to the public is void.” 
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restrictive covenants had struck them down.  Instead, those courts generally deemed them 
valid, absent an explicit legislative prohibition against such covenants.172 This changed in 
1948 with the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, which found 
that state courts could not be used to enforce restrictive covenants because such 
enforcement would constitute “state action” and thereby violate the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.173 
Three years after the decision in Re: Drummond Wren, the Ontario High Court heard 
another challenge to a restrictive covenant directed against Jews.  Noble and Wolf v. Alley,
[1948] OR 579, arose out of a restrictive covenant against Jews that was contained in a 
property deed for a beach house at a lakeside resort.  Upon discovering the covenant, 
Bernard Wolf, who had agreed to purchase the property, sought a judicial determination of 
the covenant’s legality so as to ensure clear title prior to his purchase.  In this, he was 
opposed not by the seller, Annie Maud Noble, but rather by a group of adjacent property 
owners within the resort community.  At the hearing, counsel for the Beach O’Pines 
Association argued that since that association had been formed in 1935, few changes in 
ownership had occurred, thereby stressing the intimacy of the community.174 Wolf’s 
attorney advanced the arguments that had prevailed in Re: Drummond Wren. Justice 
Schroeder, showing his hand during the hearing, announced that in “protecting the rights of 
minorities, we must not lose sight of the rights of the majorities as well.”175 He ultimately 
ruled that the restrictive covenant was valid for three reasons.  First, it contained an 
expiration date (1 August 1962), making it a partial and thus permissible restriction.  Second, 
contrary to precedents,176 Schroeder found that one could determine with sufficient certainty 
172 See Vose, Caucasians Only, pp. 23-38. 
173 For a discussion of the “state action” doctrine, see Chapter Three, infra. 
174 Noble and Wolf, OR at 580-82. 
175 See Walker, “Race,” Rights and the Law in the Supreme Court of Canada, 208. 
176 See Clayton v. Ramsden [1943] 1 All ER 16.  
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whether an individual was Jewish.  And third, he rejected the argument that such restrictions 
were against public policy, asserting that guarding against interference with freedom of 
contract was of paramount importance.177 Moreover, Schroeder observed that the property 
involved a summer home rather than basic shelter, suggesting that the property was not a 
necessity and that it was imbued with a special sense of community. 
Before the Ontario Court of Appeal, counsel for the Beach O’Pines Association 
invoked the Christie decision and argued that freedom to choose one’s associates advances an 
important public interest, namely that of facilitating a pluralistic society and guarding against 
the “complete regimentation” of society.178 The Court sustained the decision.  Chief Justice 
Robertson suggested that the covenant was simply intended “to assure, …, that the residents 
are of a class who will get along well together,” an effort that he characterized as “innocent 
and modest” rather than “criminal or immoral.”  He further asserted that laws were 
“impotent” in the development of public sentiments.  Such a constrained view of the law’s 
capacity to shape society, in Robertson’s opinion, undoubtedly restrained Canadian 
legislators from enacting, “and should restrain[Canadian] Courts from propounding, rules of 
law to enforce what can only be of natural growth, if it to be of any value to anyone.179 
Wolf appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.180 There, counsel for the 
Association argued that Christie had established “the right of persons to deal with whom they 
pleased.”  Further, he asserted that if the Court accepted Wolf’s argument then it was 
essentially accepting the proposition that “we must all think and act in the same way.”  This, 
he argued, would engender “a dead level of uniformity in the community which is one of the 
badges of totalitarianism, whether of the Fascist or Communistic type.”  The imposition of 
such uniformity was inappropriate for “a country of minorities” like Canada, and it would 
177 Noble and Wolf, OR at 597. 
178 Noble and Wolf v. Alley [1949] OR 503, 509-12. 
179 Noble and Wolf, OR at 509-12. 
180 Noble and Wolf v. Alley [1951] SCR 64.  
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render illegal a number of minority organizations, including St. George’s and St. Andrew’s 
Societies, the Knights of Columbus and B’Nai B’rith.181 A majority of the Court struck 
down the covenant, concluding that it was void for uncertainty, and the Court made no 
comment as to whether restrictive covenants advanced or abridged public policy. 
A Globe and Mail editorial embraced the decision in Noble and Wolf.182 It maintained 
that restrictive covenants did not involve the rights of minorities but rather involved the 
freedom of members of the majority group to choose their associates in their private lives, a 
freedom whose protection from governmental interference was as essential as the 
safeguarding of the rights of minorities.  It was at least partly through the erection of 
discriminatory barriers that members of the majority group had established the basis for 
harmonious relations between themselves and members of minority groups, the Globe and 
Mail contended.  A contrary decision by the Court, the newspaper concluded, would have 
damaged relations between different ethnic and religious groups rather than improved the 
situation of minorities.183 The paper’s views did not differ greatly from those expressed by 
the Windsor Herald in 1855.  Then, writing with regard to the city’s segregated housing 
patterns, the Windsor Herald suggested that if blacks were prohibited from living within a 
certain part of the city then “let them avoid it” and make their homes elsewhere.  If, 
however, “they endeavor to force themselves into positions where they are not wanted, 
under the idea that the British constitution warrants them in so doing, they may discover in 
the end that the privileges which they now enjoy will become forfeited.”184 Not all editorial 
boards in 1949 shared the Globe and Mail’s view, however.  A Toronto Daily Star editorial, for 
181 Noble and Wolf, SCR at 68. 
182 See “Tolerance and Law,” Globe and Mail, 11 June 1949; Bagnall, “The Ontario Conservatives and the 
development of anti-discrimination policy,” 126. 
183 See Bagnall, “The Ontario Conservatives and the development of anti-discrimination policy,” 127. 
184 Quoted in Daniel G. Hill, The Freedom Seekers (Agincourt:  Book Society of Canada, 1981), 105 
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example, asserted that the decision in Noble and Wolf contradicted Canada’s commitment to 
the UN Charter and to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.185 
New Zealand’s only reported common law case concerning a claim of racial 
discrimination involved a real estate transaction.  In Lempriere v Burghes [1921] NZLR 307, 
309, Chief Justice Stout held that it would be arbitrary and unreasonable for a lessor to 
refuse to consent to the assignment of a lease simply because the proposed assignee was 
Chinese.  His ruling, however, did not absolutely reject “racial” objections to assignments.  
Rather, it turned in part on his characterization of the nature of the Chinese people residing 
in New Zealand.186 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
The common law also failed to recognize racial discrimination in employment as a 
distinct legal wrong in and of itself.  The idea of contractual freedom implied an absolute 
right on the part of the employer to discriminate in his choice of employees.187 Lawyers 
representing a victim of discrimination were required to convince courts that “racial 
discrimination was the way in which some recognized wrong was committed.”  For example, 
Bob Hepple suggests lawyers would have had to show that an individual was deprived of 
employment as the result of actions taken by a group pf persons that “amounted to the 
vaguely defined civil wrong of ‘conspiracy to injury.’”  Victims were unlikely, in Hepple’s 
opinion, to prevail with such an indirect cause of action.188 
In Weinberger v. Inglis [1919] A.C. 606, the House of Lords refused to find that the 
London Stock Exchange had acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner when it denied 
185 See Bagnall, “The Ontario Conservatives and the development of anti-discrimination policy.” 
186 For a similar English case involving the transfer of a lease, see Mills v. Cannon Brewery Co. Ltd. [1920] 2 Ch. 
38.   
187 Allen v. Flood (1898) A.C.1. 
188 Hepple, Race, Jobs and the Law in Britain, 91. 
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Hugo Weinberger’s request to renew his membership, which he had continuously held for 
twenty-one years, for the reason that he had been born in Bavaria, Germany.  Anti-German 
sentiment was rampant and it mattered not that Weinberger had been a British subject for 
thirty years, had an English-born wife, and had children who were deeply involved in 
Britain’s war effort.  Their Lordships found that the Stock Exchange committee that 
rendered the decision possessed “wide and absolute discretion.”    
In Nagle v. Feilden [1966] 2 Q.B. 633 (C.A.), the Privy Council took a strikingly 
different position.  It explicitly considered public policy in deciding whether the refusal of 
the Jockey Club to grant a trainer’s license to a woman for reason that its policy was sexist 
was invalid because against public policy.  Lord Denning stated that as a general principle an 
individual “has a right to work at his trade or profession without being unjustly excluded 
from it at the whim of those having governance of it.  If they make a rule which enables 
them to reject his application arbitrarily or capriciously, not reasonably, that rule is bad.  It is 
against public policy.  The courts will not give effect to it.”  This case, however, applied only 
where a monopoly controlled access to a trade or profession; thus, it applied to licensing 
bodies, professional associations, or trade union control of a closed shop.189 The case was 
decided two years before Parliament enacted legislation prohibiting racial discrimination in 
employment and nine years before similar legislation prohibited sex discrimination in 
employment.  Anthony Lester and Geoffrey Bindman lauded this rare example of a court 
drawing upon changing social values in its development of the common law, but they 
cautioned that even the most creative jurists could not develop the common law in a way 
that would redress the most common forms of racial discrimination in employment.190 The 
common law could not, they observed, “compel an ordinary employer to recruit workers, or 
189 The Court of Appeal applied the principle articulated in Nagle to a case in which it found that a union’s 
power to withdraw a member’s union card essentially deprived that member of his livelihood, see Edwards v. 
Society of Graphical and Allied Trades [1971] Ch. 354.   
190 Lester and Bindman, Race and Law in Great Britain, 52. 
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to train or promote them, or to provide conditions of work for them, without racial 
discrimination.”191 
CRITIQUE OF THE COMMON LAW 
In liberal polities, the construction of rights and obligations owed between citizens 
was accomplished through the common law of contract, property, and torts.  Under these 
laws, commercial areas of life, such as theaters and taverns, could be regarded as private, and 
proprietors of such establishments could discriminate among their patrons.  In enforcing 
that right, courts indirectly gave such private acts of discrimination the force of law.192  With 
some exceptions, courts generally adhered to classic liberal values of property and contract, 
and they elected not to use their authority to develop the common law in an egalitarian 
direction through creative interpretations of public policy.  As counsel for various 
defendants argued, an individual’s right to freedom of association was also protected 
alongside the rights of property and contract.193 
Epstein notes that in the course of his research, no one was able to refer him “to any 
book or article that states in systematic terms the modern case for the antidiscrimination 
laws against their common law alternatives.”194 The common law was criticized for being 
too “passive.”195 According to its principles, New Zealand law professor Kenneth Keith 
observed, “nobody is under an obligation to enter a contract with another—whether the 
contract is to sell or let a house, to employ, to lend money, to insure.”196  Refusal to 
contract with an individual on account of race was thus not actionable.  This was especially 
191 Lester and Bindman, Race and Law in Great Britain, 52-53. 192 Lester and Bindman, Race and Law in Great Britain, 50. 
193 Kairys 2001:  1880. 
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lamentable, Keith suggested, in the “vitally important areas” of “employment and housing,” 
where “the common law provides virtually no help.”197  Either the individual accused of 
discrimination committed no legal wrong at all or, if he had, he could be held liable for 
damages but could not be obliged, in the case of employment, to continue to employ the 
aggrieved worker.  Anthony Lester and Geoffrey Bindman contended that this was too 
deferential to private contractual law-making.198 
Canadian commentators declared the human rights protections offered by the 
common law to be bankrupt.  Judges, it was argued, generally “chose the interest of 
commerce over human dignity.”199 And, they proved that the common law “could not deal 
adequately with problems of the unfair treatment of people on racial grounds.”200  Common 
law cases involving allegations of discrimination constituted a competition between the 
“philosophy of laissez-faire” and “historical and social realities” and, Henry L. Molot 
observed, judges chose the former.201  
The values of classic liberalism were embodied in the common law.  The common 
law presumes individuals to be “autonomous and interchangeable,” and thus equal.202 Not 
all individuals had equal access to common law rights.  As a result, the law failed to account 
for profound differences in power between institutions, groups, and individuals.  It was 
concerned with protecting the rights of property and contract,203 and by extension, freedom 
of association.204 It was unconcerned with the preferences that motivate individuals to 
exercise their property and contractual rights in particular ways.205 Enid Campbell and Harry 
197 Keith, “The Race Relations Bill,”  64 
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Whitmore characterized property rights as “negative,” meaning that individuals may do what 
they wish with their property to the extent that they are not prevented from doing so by the 
common law or statute.206 According to Cedric Thornberry, writing in 1965, “in principle, 
the common law has tended to favour the widest possible ambit of choice—‘freedom of 
contract.’”207 
The common law did not require special state institutions; rather, it relied upon 
ordinary courts.  However, the state could make its presence felt even if no claim was filed in 
court.  For example, individuals who refused to leave premises the owner of which 
maintained an exclusionary policy such as a color bar could be compelled to leave by police.  
Alternatively, the state could defer to the judgment of an individual theater owner if he 
calculated that his business was better served by a color bar.  In effect, common law regimes 
did not conceive of citizenship in citizen-to-citizen terms.  
Judges either took no notice of the exclusionary act, or they sanctioned it.  Any 
effort to determine the appropriate scope of anti-discrimination laws “requires a satisfactory 
reconciliation of the notion of equal opportunity with the concept of freedom of 
association[,]” which “is probably the most cherished value with which the advancement of 
the notion of equal opportunity may seriously conflict.”208 This is because there was a harm 
that the law did not recognize—a harm to individual respect.  Within the practices of liberal 
states and under the common law it was long held that “[p]rivate individuals were free to 
make their own decisions on any grounds.”209 
Under the common law, judges determined whether a refusal to serve was 
reasonable.  On occasion, a judge would find that discrimination on grounds of race or 
206 Enid Campbell and Harry Whitmore, Freedom in Australia (Sydney:  Sydney University Press,1966), 233. 
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religion was unreasonable, but for the most part judges deferred to private actors.  By the 
1940s, however, a growing number of social scientists were repudiating earlier conceptions 
of race and human nature.  According to them, racial and religious prejudice was irrational, 
in other words unreasonable.  Reformers, then, sought to codify a commitment to these new 
ideas, to legislate that prejudice was unreasonable and to thereby make discrimination 
unlawful.  Owing to the conservative record of the courts, reformers sought to empower 
state agencies to handle claims of discrimination.  Property and contractual rights were used 
to preserve illiberal prerogatives.  In characterizing the common law as “passive,” 
commentators were noting that it did not provide an active role for the state.  In the hands 
of conservative judges, property and contractual rights ignored the problem of 
discrimination.  The cases I have reviewed involved commercial settings, and they did not 
raise issues of freedom of association, or if they did those issues were not well-developed.  
In challenging discriminatory treatment through common law actions, plaintiffs placed 
judges in a position to choose between two conflicting sets of rights.       
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Chapter Three:  The Ideology of Antidiscrimination  
According to Ernst B. Haas, long term changes in human aspirations and institutions 
are linked to changes in the way in which “knowledge about nature and about society is 
married to political interests and objectives.”210 Our knowledge about nature and society, in 
other words, shapes the way in which we frame social problems and institutions.  This 
chapter illustrates how paradigm shifts in the social sciences and legal theory rendered 
antidiscrimination laws a feasible and practical policymaking tool.  It further shows how this 
shift converged with a post-World War II wave of democratic idealism that legitimated state 
intervention in society by way of antidiscrimination laws.  These developments were an 
important part of the process by which common law rights to contract, property, and 
freedom of association were reconsidered by legislatures and either circumscribed or 
supplanted through antidiscrimination laws, which introduced a new element of coercion 
into state-society relations.  I argue that new conceptions of race and human nature, of the 
power of law, and of the appropriate role of government may be understood as comprising 
an ideology—what I call the ideology of antidiscrimination—that significantly influenced the 
ways in which political actors in the Anglo-American countries perceived their political 
interests and determined their policy objectives.211 I show how international institutions 
were pivotal in disseminating these ideas, and I traces general patterns in the development of 
antidiscrimination laws across the U.S., Canada, and Great Britain. 
210 Ernst B. Hass, When knowledge is power:  three models of change in international organizations (Berkeley:  University 
of California Press, 1990), 11; see also King, In the name of liberalism, 292. 
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THE AMERICAN ANTECEDENT 
The first antidiscrimination laws were enacted by British and American governments   
during the nineteenth century.   When Parliament considered renewing the East India 
Company’s charter in 1833, the government of Earl Gray added a provision that prohibited 
racial and religious discrimination in the Company’s operations in India.212 This reform 
reflected the influence exercised by liberals, evangelicals, and humanitarians upon British 
policy towards India.213 At the behest of similarly progressive elites—abolitionists—the 
state of Massachusetts enacted the first antidiscrimination law in America in 1865.214  It 
prohibited discrimination on grounds of color or race in any licensed inn, public place of 
amusement, public conveyance, or public meeting, and it provided that violations be 
punished by a fine not to exceed fifty dollars.215 Massachusetts thereby introduced into 
American thinking “the notion that the state has the affirmative duty to assure to every 
person, without regard to race or color, equality of treatment in places of public 
accommodation or resort.”216 The statute’s scope was later broadened to include theaters, 
but an exception “for good cause” was added.217 No other states followed Massachusetts 
until New York218 and Kansas enacted similar laws in 1874.219  
During Reconstruction, Congress enacted a series of statutes, often over President 
Andrew Johnson’s veto, addressing racial discrimination and violence as part of its effort to 
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expand the national government’s authority and realize a new set of governing objectives, 
which included the integration of the newly emancipated slaves into society on more 
equitable terms.220 Important citizenship questions were the subjects of popular political 
debate:  Did citizenship encompass political equality and equality before the law, or did it 
also encompass social equality?   The Civil Rights Act of 1866 conferred upon all citizens, 
irrespective of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, full legal capacity, the equal 
benefit of the law’s protections, and equal punishments under the laws.221 Although it 
withstood two separate challenges in the federal circuit courts,222 the Act’s constitutionality, 
which rested upon a generous interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment,223 was 
questionable.  Two years later, the Republican Congress, fearing that its legislative handiwork 
might be undone by a hostile Supreme Court or subsequent Congress, amended the U.S. 
Constitution to prohibit states from denying citizens “equal protection of the laws.”224  
The Civil Rights Act of 1875 represented the last gasp of the Reconstruction effort 
to expand the citizenship rights enjoyed by African Americans.225 The Act prohibited 
discrimination on grounds of race, color, or previous condition of servitude in the use of 
inns, public conveyances, theaters, and other places of public amusement.  Violators were 
subject to criminal and civil penalties in the federal courts.226 In contrast to the 1866 statute, 
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224 See the U.S. Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment. 
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(New York:  Pantheon Books, 1965),  500-08. 
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On its enforcement, see S.G.F. Spackman, “American Federalism and the Civil Rights Act of 1875,” Journal of 
American Studies, 10 (December 1976):  313-28; John Hope Franklin, “The Enforcement of the Civil Rights Act 
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the 1875 Act explicitly regulated private actors.227 Theater owners had not previously been 
under a common law duty to serve.228 The 1875 Act, thus, went further than the 1866 Act 
in that it sought to ensure social as well as political equality.229 It constituted “an 
unprecedented exercise of national authority, and breached traditional federalist principles 
more fully than any previous Reconstruction legislation.”230 Proponents of the Act, such as 
Charles C. Fairchild, an abolitionist member of the faculty of integrated Berea College in 
Kentucky, argued that “’[t]he social standing and progress of the colored people [is] a matter 
of national importance.’”231 
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, found the Act unconstitutional in the Civil Rights 
Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).  In its view, neither the Thirteenth nor the Fourteenth Amendment 
provided a legitimate source of federal authority for the legislation.  The Court found that 
the Fourteenth Amendment empowered the federal government to protect citizens from 
state discrimination, but that it had not likewise empowered Congress to legislate against 
discrimination perpetrated by private actors.232 From this decision sprang the “state action” 
doctrine.233 The Court majority reached this result through what Justice John M. Harlan, the 
lone voice of dissent, described as a “narrow and artificial” interpretation of the 
of 1875,” Prologue, 6 (Winter 1974):  225-35; Leslie H. Fishel, Jr., “Repercussions of Reconstruction:  The 
Northern Negro, 1870-1883,” Civil War History (December 1968):  342-43. 
227 In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), the U.S. Supreme Court determined that 42 U.S.C. 
§1982, which was originally part of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, applied to private actors as well as to the 
government.  Justices Harlan and White vigorously dissented. 
228 See Chapter Two, infra. 
229 Richard Bardolph, The civil rights record: Black Americans and the law, 1849-1970 (New York:  Crowell, 1970), 
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232 According to §1 of the Fourteenth Amendment:  “….  No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
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Constitution.234  In Harlan’s opinion, African American access to basic citizenship rights was 
the driving purpose of the 1875 Act.  The need, Harlan observed, was to compel white 
Americans to recognize the legal right of blacks to be citizens, to enjoy the privileges of 
citizenship, and to be incorporated into the body politic.  He argued for a purposive reading 
of the Civil War Amendments that would enable the federal government to take actions 
necessary to realize these objectives.  In Harlan’s view, discrimination practiced by 
individuals exercising public or quasi-public functions constituted “a badge of servitude” 
that Congress could prevent by virtue of the Thirteenth Amendment.  The Court’s decision 
in the Civil Rights Cases stripped the Fourteenth Amendment of its power to authorize the 
legislative development of civil rights, although it did not foreclose federal authority from 
enacting similar legislation under another constitutional provision, such as the commerce 
clause.  By 1883, however, the political context had dramatically changed and Congress was 
no longer entertaining novel constitutional theories in pursuit of egalitarian ideas.  New 
legislation was, therefore, not forthcoming. 
Reconstruction came to an end with the political compromise that resolved the 
contested presidential election of 1876, and thereafter, the federal government abandoned 
issues of racial equality, shifting its nation-building efforts westward.  Over the ensuing 
decades, the South’s solidly Democratic, and racist, congressional delegation was able to 
thwart civil rights bills through control of key committee chairmanships and use of the 
filibuster in the Senate.  As a result, despite the introduction of numerous bills into 
Congress, no federal legislation prohibiting racial discrimination was enacted between 1875 
and 1957.  In the latter decades of the nineteenth century, the Southern states erected a 
system of laws—known euphemistically as Jim Crow—that mandated racial segregation in 
most areas of social life (Woodward 1955).  Those laws were enacted under the “police 
234 See 109 U.S. (1883). 
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powers,” which afforded states the authority to legislate for protection of the community’s 
“health, welfare, safety, and morals.”235 
In 1896, the U.S. Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether a Jim Crow 
statute abrogated the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection of the laws.  
In Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, it ruled that a Louisiana statute requiring racially segregated 
railway cars was a reasonable exercise of those powers and did not offend the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s equal protection clause.  Justice Henry B. Brown, who authored the majority 
opinion, reasoned that the clause “could not have been intended to abolish distinctions 
based upon color, or to enforce social as distinguished from political equality, or a 
commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either.”236 In the decades that 
followed, Southern states engaged in a wave of Jim Crow lawmaking, segregating everything 
from schools to cemeteries.237 In constitutional terms, the Court effectively rendered 
antidiscrimination legislation a prerogative of the states. 
Between 1884 and 1900, however, eighteen American states enacted various 
antidiscrimination laws comparable to the ill-fated federal law of 1875 (Table 3.1).  
Tennessee was the only southern state to enact an antidiscrimination law during this 
period.238 Just as the South’s Jim Crow laws had been construed as a permissible use of state 
police powers, courts likewise sanctioned antidiscrimination statutes.239  For the most part, 
these laws produced little social change; they were limited in scope and addressed 
235 The term “police powers” does not appear in the U.S. Constitution, but the Tenth Amendment reserves to 
the states those powers neither delegated to the federal government nor prohibited to the states.  
236 Plessy at 544.  Just as he had done in the Civil Rights Cases thirteen years earlier, Justice Harlan issued a 
vigorous and lone dissent in Plessy.
237 See Bardolph, The Civil Rights Record, 130-44. 
238 See Bardolph, The Civil Rights Record, 126-29. 
239 See Johnson v. Auburn & Syracuse Elec. R.R., 222 N.Y. 443 (1918); Jones v. Kehrlein, 49 Cal. App. 646, 194 Pac. 
55 (1920). 
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discrimination in specified public places.240 In terms of the laws’ enforcement, aggrieved 
individuals bore the financial burden of investigating and litigating civil claims, and local 
police and prosecutors were often reluctant, if not hostile, to enforcing claims filed under 
criminal provisions.241 These early antidiscrimination statutes, thus, generated relatively few 
cases.  Moreover, when courts were asked to enforce them, they often construed the laws’ 
provisions narrowly on the ground that they created new rights and obligations previously 
unknown to the common law.242 As Richard Bardolph observes, however, the cases pursued 
under early antidiscrimination laws were “significant nevertheless as expressions of 
contemporary legal doctrine and as auguries of change.”  Over time, northern courts grew 
increasingly receptive to state civil rights claims.243  
Table 3.1:  State Laws Prohibiting Racial Discrimination in Public Accommodations, 1865-
1897 
 
1865 1874 1884 1885 1887 1890 1895 1897 
 
MA NY CT CO PA WA WI CA 
 KS IA IL 
 NJ IN 




 TN   
240 Their terms varied by state Illinois, Michigan, and Minnesota had expansive laws that listed a number of 
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INTELLECTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWS 
By the middle of the twentieth century, reformers were prepared to turn again to 
antidiscrimination legislation.  This time, however, their efforts rested upon a newly forged 
set of interrelated intellectual trends that comprised the core of an “antidiscrimination 
ideology.”  First, the way in which social scientists conceptualized race changed from an 
emphasis on heredity to a focus on social conditions, thus yielding a more malleable 
conception of human nature under which racial animosities are shaped by social 
environments.  Second, social scientists and legal scholars became convinced that law could 
be effectively employed to shape human behavior.  This, however, involved an element of 
coercion that proponents of antidiscrimination laws had to rationalize as consonant with 
liberal democracy.  A third trend thus entailed the articulation of a more substantive 
conception of democracy and an emancipatory conception of liberalism, despite coercive 
elements.  In sum, these changes in beliefs about empirical facts, social causation, and liberal 
democratic rectitude made possible the articulation of new standards of behavior that were 
defined in terms of rights and obligations. 
Much earlier, the Enlightenment had undermined traditional thinking about social 
hierarchy, challenging feudal categories of serf and noble.  Yet, it also facilitated the 
development of new scientifically devised hierarchies based upon ascriptive characteristics.  
Elements of such “scientific” and racist thinking were expressed in the writings of Thomas 
Jefferson,244 and they maintained a presence throughout American history.245 Pseudo-
scientific theories that purported to identify innate racial differences and to associate non-
white races with negative characteristics abounded.  They were used to justify the exclusion 
244 William Peden, (ed.), Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia (Chapel Hill:  University of North 
Carolina Press, 1955), 137-43. 
245 See Rogers Smith, Civic ideals:  conflicting visions of citizenship in U.S. history (New Haven:  Yale University Press, 
1997) 
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of native peoples, portrayed as savages, from participation in democratic and capitalist 
institutions.246 Theories about the innate inferiority of blacks were used to justify slavery247 
and to support policies of racial segregation, like those found in the American South, as well 
as immigration policies that barred nonwhites.248 Democracy was thought to require a 
racially homogenous population.   
Inspired by the French Count Arthur de Gobineau and Englishman Houston 
Stewart Chamberlain, a number of respected American intellectuals generated a massive 
volume of scientifically stylized racist theory in the early decades of the twentieth century.  
They included Henry Fairfield Osborn, Madison Grant, Henry Pratt Fairchild, and Lothrop 
Stoddard, among others.249 Cumulatively, this body of work asserted that important and 
discernible differences distinguished the races from each other and that the survival of 
civilization depended upon the frank recognition of these differences.  In practical terms, it 
prescribed the exclusion of ostensibly inferior, non-white races through restrictive 
immigration policies and the physical segregation of blacks from whites in daily life.  As 
various scholars have shown, these prescriptions were frequently legislated into government 
policy.250  
The 1940s, however, witnessed an intellectual revolution in the understanding of race 
and racial difference.251 Franz Boas, an anthropologist at Columbia University, had begun 
challenging the tenets of scientific racism during the early decades of the twentieth century, 
246 Morton 1839. 
247 Nott and Gliddon 1854; Fitzhugh 1854. 
248 Charles A. Lofgren, The Plessy Case:  A Legal-Historical Interpretation (New York:  Oxford University Press, 
1987), chap. 5. 
249 See Madison Grant and Henry Fairfield Osborn, The Passing of the Great Race (New York:  Charles Scribner’s 
Sons, 1916); Henry Pratt Fairchild, The Melting-Pot Mistake (Boston:  Little, Brown and Company, 1926); 
Lothrop Stoddard, The Rising Tide of Color (New York: Scribner, 1920). 
250 See Andrew Markus, Australian  Race Relations, 1788-1993 (St. Leonards, N.S.W.:  Allen & Unwin, 1994); 
Smith, Civic Ideals; King, In the Name of Liberalism; Desmond S. King, Immigration, race, and the origins of the diverse 
democracy (Cambridge, Mass.:  Harvard University Press, 2000). 
251 Ashley Montagu , Man’s most dangerous myth: the fallacy of race (New York:  Columbia University Press, 1942). 
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suggesting that social conditions rather than heredity provided a better explanation of 
differences between the races.252 By 1938, Boas and his students had successfully lobbied 
the American Anthropological Association to pass its first resolution denouncing racism 
(Degler 1991:  203), just when Adolph Hitler was using eugenic theories to justify his polices 
against Jews and other minorities.  Other scholars, among them Thomas Russel Garth, a 
professor of experimental psychology, and Otto Klineberg, a social psychologist, analyzed 
the findings of the scientific racists and found no certain evidence of real racial differences in 
mental traits.253 Their research showed that behavioral patterns were fluid rather than fixed 
and were the product of environmental factors rather than natural laws.  As a result, the set 
of popular beliefs that had been used to rationalize America’s racial caste lost their 
intellectual respectability.  “It is significant today,” Gunnar Myrdal observed, “that even the 
white man who defends discrimination frequently … says that it is ‘irrational.’”254 
Klineberg acknowledged the practical implications of his work in a 1945 volume 
entitled The Science of Man in the World Crisis.  In his words, because the “behavior of 
large national communities is to be ascribed to environmental factors (in the largest sense) 
and not to germ plasm,” their behavior “may change with time and with new conditions.”  
Therefore, “any hope we have of making our own democracy broader and more efficient 
rests not so much on an improvement in our ‘stock’ as on making available to the whole 
community the educational and economic opportunities which pave the way for fuller and 
richer living.”255 Such arguments were disseminated through numerous books, including 
252 Franz Boas, The Mind of Primitive Man (New York:  Macmillan Company, 1911), 271-73; Franz Boas, 
“History and Science in Anthropology,” American Anthropology, 38 (1936):  140 
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Myrdal’s highly influential tome An American Dilemma,256 scholarly articles, and popular 
publications, such as Survey Graphic, which provided a consistent forum for discussion during 
the 1940s.      
Reacting against earlier biological models of human behavior, American sociologists 
developed a social-psychological model that attributed discriminatory behavior to prejudice, 
conceived of as a particular set of attitudes, feelings, and beliefs that derived from ignorance 
and misconception.    Prejudiced individuals were portrayed as “irrational” or “immature,” as 
opposed to non-prejudiced individuals, who were considered to be “enlightened.”257 
Accordingly, the former needed to be reeducated, but not necessarily punished.  Thus, the 
goal was not only to improve the condition of blacks, but also to transform the 
consciousness of whites.  Proponents of these ideas exuded a high degree of optimism, best 
captured in the words of sociologist Gordon Allport,258 who expressed his “faith … that the 
forces in society and in personality can be controlled if they are understood.”   In its 
landmark report, To Secure These Rights,259 the President’s Committee on Civil Rights made 
the impact of discrimination explicit, emphasizing that “’[d]iscrimination in employment 
damages lives, both the bodies and the minds, of those discriminated against and those who 
discriminate.’”260 
These new conceptions of race and racism were linked to broad issues of nation-
building in the new postwar political context.261 Columbia University sociologist Robert 
MacIver played a prominent role in disseminating the ideas through his work with the 
Institute for Religious Studies, a graduate school established at the Jewish Theological 
256 Myrdal, An American Dilemma, 1003. 
257 Allport, The Nature of Prejudice, 515. 
258 Allport, The Nature of Prejudice, 515. 
259 President’s Committee on Civil Rights, To Secure These Rights, (New York:  Simon and Schuster, 1947). 
260 President’s Committee on Civil Rights, To Secure These Rights, 53, quoting an unnamed source. 
261 See Allport, Controlling Group Prejudice.
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Seminary of America that maintained a keen interest in issues of prejudice and 
discrimination.262 MacIver served as editor of a series of books published by the Institute, 
the titles of which are indicative of its interests:  Group Relations and Group Antagonisms (1944), 
Civilization and Group Relationships (1945), and Unity and Difference in American Life (1947).   
Sociologists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, such as Herbert 
Spencer and William Graham Sumner,263 had espoused the idea that human behavior was 
guided by enduring customs and deeply rooted beliefs that were virtually impervious to 
planned social change through legal measures.  From their perspective, any attempt to coerce 
racial commingling would engender disharmony, resentment, and perhaps even a violent 
backlash.  Thus, legal action against discrimination would do more harm than good.  By the 
1950s, however, a number of studies purported to show that when individuals of different 
races were forced to coexist in some aspect of daily life, prejudice decreased and generally 
harmonious relations prevailed.  Laws prohibiting discrimination, it was contended, give 
support to those who do not wish to discriminate, but who feel compelled to do so by social 
pressure.   
By the mid-twentieth century, consequently, the law emerged as a favored instrument 
for accomplishing social engineering.264 Arnold Rose, another influential sociologist, argued 
that just as law and power can be used to increase social prejudice, so too the law can be 
used combat prejudice.265 In his opinion, researchers had to move forward to consider two 
new questions.  First, how can antidiscrimination laws be enacted in a democracy?   Rose 
262 The Institute operated with the cooperation of Catholic, Jewish, and Protestant scholars.  It was 
established through a gift from Lucius N. Littauer.   
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observed that the Fair Employment Practices Commission had been established by executive 
order and thus lay outside “typical democratic processes.”266 Second, “how can the laws be 
made most effective in reducing prejudice and least disruptive of other aspects of life?”267 
This was a relevant question because research seemed to show that authoritarian measures 
might provide an effective means of controlling prejudice.     
Rose observed that as “democrats in a country which has at least the ideal of 
democracy,” advocates of equality “do not like to think of using non-democratic methods to 
achieve our goals.”268 Yet, in Rose’s opinion, objectivity demanded consideration of all 
available approaches.  Three particular sets of studies showed the efficacy of what Rose 
called the “authoritative method.”  According to the first study, performed by the U.S. 
Army, American soldiers who were compelled to serve alongside African American soldiers 
in combat in France in 1945 demonstrated less prejudice than their counterparts who had 
not shared that integrated experience.269 A comparable study of 400 seamen in the U.S. 
Merchant Marine produced similar results.270 Another study showed that race relations in a 
Kansas City school parish proved to be amicable after the Catholic Bishop ordered its 
desegregation against the wishes of white parents.271 Still another study, which involved 
racially integrated housing projects, reported a reduction in racial animosity among 
individuals, including those with overtly racist views, after living together in an integrated 
community.272 These studies demonstrated the capacity of authoritarian institutions in 
266 He observes that in the absence of congressional support, President Franklin D. Roosevelt established a Fair Employment Practices 
Commission by Executive Order 8802 on 25 June 1941 in response to A. Philip Randolph’s threat to organize a massive march on 
Washington to protest racial discrimination in the war industries, see Rose, Race prejudice and discrimination, 550. 
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No. ETO-82 of the Research Branch, Information and Education Division, in the European Theater of 
operations of the Army. 
270 See Ira N. Brophy, Public Opinion Quarterly (winter, 1945-46). 
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American culture, such as the military and the Catholic Church, to reduce prejudice by 
compelling individuals of different races to work and live in close proximity to one 
another.273 They were frequently cited within the growing antidiscrimination literature, as 
well as within government reports, such as To Secure These Rights.274 
Rose also looked to the Soviet Union, with its self-professed record of social 
harmony, for insights into the management of interracial relations.  Empirically, however, 
Rose found the evidence in support of the Soviet model inconclusive.  Moreover, the Soviet 
experience could not apply to the U.S., he reasoned, because in contrast to the Russian 
people, Americans have an “independent spirit.”  Even if the Soviet model were effective, 
Americans would prefer to “take the longer route” and keep their “present liberties.”275 
Nevertheless, it was recognized that the “strong arm of the government” would need to be 
employed in order to address individuals’ acts of racial discrimination and injustice.276 
Scholars also recognized that in a liberal polity the extension of the sovereign’s coercive 
power into new areas of private life would require an intellectual justification.  Throughout 
much of the academic and popular literature of the period, therefore, we see individuals 
articulating supportive normative arguments for precisely this position.   
Two main types of normative arguments were developed in support of a stronger 
state effort to eliminate discrimination.  First, supporters of antidiscrimination laws advanced 
a more capacious conception of democracy, one which not only required democratic 
political institutions but which also required the democratization of social relations and the 
construction of democratic citizens.  Second, they appropriated ideas from the reform 
liberalism that had been developed by political thinkers such as John Stuart Mill, T.H. Green, 
273 Rose, Race Prejudice and discrimination, 546-48. 
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L.T. Hobhouse, and John Dewey to support the emergence of the welfare state.  Proponents 
of antidiscrimination laws invoked a positive conception of liberty, in which the state is 
assigned an activist role vis-à-vis society, as opposed to the negative conception of liberty 
associated with classical liberalism, in which the state is assigned a more passive “night 
watchman” role.   
With the end of World War II, progressives believed that the time was ripe to 
complete the “unfinished business of democracy.”277 But, what exactly was that business?  
Answering this question framed the politics of the period.  In a period of flux, the language 
that we use to describe the world often requires redefinition in order to accommodate new 
realities.  Political actors bent on change seek to redefine concepts in order to legitimate their 
preferred reforms.  In the introduction to the Report of the President’s Committee on Civil 
Rights, Charles E. Wilson, the Committee’s Chairman and President of General Electric, 
observed that the world in 1947 was “confused by differing and often contradictory uses of 
the language in which free men express their ideals.”278 The Committee’s report can be read 
as an effort to redefine the meaning of civil rights and support a more interventionist role 
for the federal government in protecting those rights.  It asserted that the term “civil rights” 
had been a malleable one in American history:  “The phrase, ‘civil rights,’ is an abbreviation 
for a whole complex of relationships among individuals and among groups.”279 
Among the four basic rights identified by the Committee was “the right to equality 
of opportunity.”280 That right encompassed the right to employment, the right to an 
education—which included both public and private institutions—the right to housing, the 
277 Those words are taken from a special publication by Survey Graphic, a progressive periodical published 
during the 1940s that advocated racial equality and antidiscrimination laws.  See Survey Graphic, Color:  The 
Unfinished Business of Democracy:  Negroes, U.S.A. The new world, the old world (New York:  Survey Associates, Inc., 
1942). 
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right to health service, and the right to public services and accommodations.281 The 
Committee asserted that “many privately-owned and operated enterprises should recognize a 
responsibility to sell to all who wish to buy their services.”  It continued: 
 
The Committee is not convinced that an end to segregation in education or in the enjoyment 
of public services essential to people in a modern society would mean an intrusion upon the 
private life of the individual.  In a democracy, each individual must have freedom to choose 
his friends and to control the pattern of his personal and family life, [b]ut we see nothing 
inconsistent between this freedom and a recognition of the truth that democracy also means 
that in going to school, working, participating in the political process, serving in the armed 
forces, enjoying government services in such fields as health and recreation, making use of 
transportation and other public accommodation facilities, and in living in specific 
communities and neighborhoods, distinctions of race, color, and creed have no place.282 
In an address delivered at the Lincoln Memorial in June 1947, President Harry S. 
Truman said that “[w]e must keep moving forward, with new concepts of civil rights to 
safeguard our heritage.  The extension of civil rights today means not protection of the 
people against government, but protection of the people by the Government.”283 To this 
the Civil Rights Committee added that America needed “more than protection of our rights 
against government;” America needed “protection of our rights against private persons or 
groups, seeking to undermine them.”284 Also in 1947, Robert K. Carr asked whether “it is 
desirable that government cease to be regarded as the chief oppressor of civil liberty and be 
made to play the role of chief protector.”285 Carr, who served as the Executive Director to 
the President’s Committee on Civil Rights, argued that “[w]e must continue to build and 
improve a social order conducive to freedom.”286 He asked, “what shall be done to protect 
civil liberty against the man who does not yet understand, or against the man who refuses to 
281 President’s Committee on Civil Rights, To Secure These Rights, 53-79 
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understand or is incapable of understanding?”287 Carr asserted that “the Civil Rights Section 
is a partial answer … until the day when long-term and intermediate efforts at improvement 
will have removed some if not all of these threats.”288 
This stance required not only the extension of full political equality to all citizens, but 
also the democratization of all areas of life.  Petegorsky, a union organizer, for example, 
argued that in “each area of our social life where democracy is incomplete, we must extend 
and then safeguard it.”289 A Canadian law professor Frank Scott likewise argued that 
“[d]emocracy contains a full doctrine of social responsibility, placing on the individual the 
obligation of caring for the freedom, security and well-being of others.”290 
This was not, however, simply a matter of social justice; rather, the psychological 
model of human behavior implied that antidiscrimination laws were imperative for the 
survival of democratic government itself.  Democracy, it was claimed, requires democratic 
citizens.  For example, according to Allport: 
 
Democracy, we now realize, places a heavy burden upon the personality, sometimes too 
great to bear.  The maturely democratic person must possess subtle virtues and capacities:  
an ability to think rationally about causes and effects, an ability to form properly 
differentiated categories in respect to ethnic groups and their traits, a willingness to award 
freedom to others, ….  All these qualities are difficult to achieve and maintain.  It is easier to 
succumb to oversimplification and dogmatism, to repudiate the ambiguities inherent in a 
democratic society, to demand definiteness, to ‘escape from freedom.’291 
One might counter, what if existing voters do not wish to bear that heavy burden; what if 
they refuse to support antidiscrimination laws, preferring, instead, their rights to property 
and freedom of association?  Rose responded that if a law conforms with democratic ideals, 
as he believed antidiscrimination laws did, then “its passage and enforcement might not be 
considered as a deprivation of the rights of the individual who was opposed to the law 
287 Carr, Federal Protection of Civil Rights, 192. 
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before its passage, but rather as a means of bringing him in closer conformity with his 
ideals.”292 
Proponents of reform recognized that they were doing nothing short of 
reconfiguring liberty.  Walter G. Muelder, for example, recognized that balancing competing 
conceptions of liberty poses a key problem for democracies.  He asserted that “[i]berty is not 
the mere absence of restraint,” but rather that “every liberty involves some restraint on 
someone and in some regard.”293 Similarly, the President’s Committee on Civil Rights 
argued that a new conception of freedom, beyond the negative conception set forth in the 
Bill of Rights, was warranted.  It articulated a relational freedom in which a man has a right 
to manage his own affairs as he sees fit up to the point where what he does interferes with 
the equal rights of others in the community to manage their affairs—or up to the point 
where he begins to injure the welfare of the whole group.294 This “new version of liberalism 
imposed on those who enjoy liberty an obligation to enlightenment, or self-realization, or 
affirmation of respect for the dignity of others.”295 Daniel Hill, Director of the Ontario 
Human Rights Commission, asserted that modern antidiscrimination legislation is 
“predicated on the theory that the actions of prejudiced people and their attitudes can be 
changed and influenced by the process of re-education, discussion, and the presentation of 
socio-scientific materials that are used to challenge popular myths and stereotypes about 
people.”296 Walter Tarnopolsky argued that discriminators should be “given an opportunity 
to re-assess their attitudes, and to reform themselves,” after being shown the damage caused 
by their actions.297 He recognized, however, that antidiscrimination laws “cannot eliminate 
292 1951:  555. 
293 1946:  13. 
294 President’s Committee on Civil Rights, To Secure These Rights, 5. 
295 Rosenblum 1989:  6. 
296 1965:  4. 
297 Tarnopolsky, “The Iron Hand in the Velvet Glove,” 573. 
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bigotry and prejudice,” but they can end discrimination, the public manifestation of those 
sentiments.298 
These new conceptions of democracy and liberalism were embedded in a rhetoric of 
enlightenment and modernization.  Frederick Douglass had a hundred years earlier 
condemned the Civil Rights Cases as “’a blow … struck against human progress.’”299 
Myrdal, adapted Franz Alexander’s idea that racial prejudice was a “cultural lag” from a pre-
industrial era.300 Prejudice was regarded as “unenlightened.”301 In the 1960s, the worry was 
“culturally distorted” citizens.302 Thousand’s of miles away, New Zealand’s Secretary of 
Justice, J.L. Robson, who was instrumental in that country’s first antidiscrimination law, later 
observed that both racial prejudice and ignorance had to be surmounted.  He suggested that 
the objective must be to “spread enlightenment.”303 
In its final report, a Notre Dame Conference on Civil Rights Legislation explicitly 
rationalized a more activist federal government.  In the past, which it characterized as 
“simpler days of industrial adolescence, abundant land, and scarce people,” society was able 
to regulate its ordering and a passive government was appropriate.  By contrast, the 
complicated society of the 1960s required a “modern” activist government.   Morroe Berger 
asserted that “the relationship of employer to worker” had become “devoid of personal 
sentiment under present conditions of large commercial and manufacturing enterprises,” 
298 Tarnopolsky, “The Iron Hand in the Velvet Glove,” 576. 
299 Quoted in McPherson 1965:  510. 
300 Myrdal, An American Dilemma.
301 MacIver 1945:  6. 
302 Notre Dame Conference on Congressional Civil Rights Legislation 1963:  438. 
303 Robson 1971:  v. 
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thus rendering it a purely “economic tie” and “a fit subject for legal control.”304 The idea 
was, in short, that enlightenment and modernity require action against discrimination.305 
THE POST-WORLD WAR II WAVE OF ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWMAKING IN THE 
U.S., CANADA, AND BRITAIN 
In the decades after World War II, several factors combined to place race relations 
and civil rights squarely on the political agenda.  Sonya O. Rose suggests that “[w]ar 
exaggerates the significance of the nation as a source and object of identity,” and provides 
elites with opportunities to “focus public attention on questions such as who ‘we’ are and 
what it is that ‘we’ stand for.”306 Between February 1942 and August 1946, eight major race 
riots had erupted across the U.S.  Except for the riot in Los Angeles, which involved whites 
and Latinos, the riots involved clashes between blacks and whites.  The Detroit riot, in June 
1943, resulted in 34 deaths, 461 injuries, and the U.S. army’s occupation of the city.  Lying 
behind the riots was the wartime expansion of defense manufacturing and the creation of 
many new jobs in cities like Detroit.  As one labor leader asserted at the time, “’[o]rganized 
labor has been called upon to make many sacrifices for defense and has made them gladly, 
but this [admission of blacks] is asking too much.’”307 However, defense needs, combined 
with increasing pressure from civil rights leaders, motivated governments to act.308 
The initial twentieth century battles over civil rights were waged in the U.S. at the 
state level.  Arguments about conflicting rights—rights to contract, property, and freedom of 
304 Morroe Berger, Equality by Statute:  legal controls over group discrimination (New York:  Columbia University 
Press, 1952), 168-69. 
305 “Racial discrimination has no place in modern Britain.”  Report submitted by the United Kingdom 
pursuant to Article 25, Paragraph 1 of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, 26 
July 1999 (ACFC/SR(1999)013). 
306 Sonya O. Rose, “Sex, Citizenship, and the Nation in World War II Britain,” The American Historical 
Review, 103(October, 1998):  1147-1176.1148. 
307 Union leader quoted in Michael Sovern, Legal restraints on racial discrimination in employment (New York:  
Twentieth Century Fund, 1966), 10. 
308 Krauss 1986:  5. 
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association—were hashed out during legislative debates and in a small number of court 
cases.  These state-level politics are largely ignored by contemporary students of civil 
rights,309 who tend instead to focus on the more dramatic developments at the federal level 
during the 1960s.  Whereas earlier antidiscrimination laws had been limited to discrimination 
that occurred in places defined as public in nature, such as theaters and barber shops, by the 
1940s, state-level reformers were training their sights on the more contentious issues of 
employment and housing discrimination (see Table 3.2).  Legislation prohibiting such 
discrimination, however, was considered a novel idea.310 
Table 3.2:  State Laws Prohibiting Discrimination in Public Accommodations, 1945 to 1961 
 
1953 1955 1957 1959 1961 
 
OR MT VT ME ID 
 NM   ND 
 WY 
 
The state of New York, a pioneer in this regard, merits close attention.  In 1909, it 
enacted a series of laws directed against employment discrimination on grounds of race in a 
limited number of areas, including the practice of law,311 state employment in 1918,312 
employment by utility companies in 1933,313 and all public works contracts in 1935.314  In 
addition, a 1932 New York law prohibited inquires about the religious affiliation of 
309 This was not, however, always the case.  State laws prohibiting discrimination have served as the subject of 
a number of books, including Leon H. Mayhew, Law and Equal Opportunity:  A Study of the Massachusetts 
Commission against Discrimination (Cambridge, Mass.:  Harvard University Press, 1968), see 75-101 for a 
discussion of the politics surrounding the passage of Massachusetts postwar statutes. 
310 See Paul Burstein, Discrimination, Jobs, and Politics:  the struggle for equal employment opportunity in the United States 
since the New Deal (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 19. 
311 Judiciary Law §460. 
312 Penal Law §514. 
313 Civil Rights Law §42. 
314 Labor Law§220-e. 
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individuals seeking employment in public education.315 And in 1938, upon the 
recommendation of the New York Constitutional Convention, voters approved insertion 
into the state constitution new language guaranteeing equal protection of the laws.316 
Specifically, this language stated that “[n]o person shall, because of his race, color, creed or 
religion, be subjected to any discrimination in his civil rights by any other person or by any 
firm, corporation, or institution,” as well as by agencies acting on behalf of the state.317 That 
language, however, was not self-executing,318 and between 1939 and 1943, a number of laws 
were enacted to give it effect.  These laws prohibited discrimination in public housing,319 in 
public relief and public work projects,320 and in the sale or delivery of alcoholic beverages,321 
as well as by labor organizations322 and firms engaged in defense work.323 In addition, a 
1941 statute made it a misdemeanor to violate Article 1, §11 of the New York State 
Constitution.324 
Also in 1941, New York Governor Herbert H. Lehman appointed a Committee on 
Discrimination in Employment to investigate and conciliate discriminatory practices in the 
war industries,325 and three years later Governor Thomas E. Dewey established the New 
York State Temporary Commission against Discrimination, which conducted public hearings 
around the state and issued a major report in January 1945.  In an atmosphere “charged with 
uncertainty, fear and hostility,”326 the Commission’s recommendations were embodied in the 
315 Civil Rights Law §40-a. 
316 Konvitz and Leskes, A Century of Civil Rights, 197. 
317 Art. I, §11. 
318 In other words, it remained inoperative until implemented through legislative enactment. 
319 Public Housing Law §223 (1939). 
320 Penal Law §772-a (1940). 
321 Alcoholic Beverages Control Law §65 (1943). 
322 Civil Rights Law §43 (1940). 
323 Civil Rights Law §44; Penal Law §514 (1941). 
324 Penal Law §§700, 701. 
325 In nearly three years of operation, it processed over one thousand cases, settling ninety-five percent 
primarily through conciliation and persuasion (Krauss 1986:  6). 
326 Girard and Jaffe 1964:  114. 
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Ives-Quinn Bill, which was subsequently enacted by the legislature as the Law Against 
Discrimination that same year.327 Business associations, among them the New York 
Chamber of Commerce, the Board of Trade, and the Real Estate Board, opposed the 
legislation,328 as did Nation publisher and cofounder of the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), Oswald Garrison Villard, who argued in favor 
of freedom of association and preferred a voluntarist approach to one of legal compulsion.  
A number of civil rights groups, including the American Jewish Congress (AJC) played an 
important role in the law’s enactment, and they continued to play a key role later with 
respect to its enforcement.329 In May 1948, the AJC established a Committee to Support the 
Ives-Quinn Law.   
In the text of the New York law the legislature expressly pronounced discrimination 
on grounds of race, creed, color or national origin to be a matter of state concern, asserting 
that such discrimination “threatens not only the rights and proper privileges of [state 
residents]” but it also “menaces the institutions and foundation of a free democratic 
society.”330 Presciently, the Young Men’s Christian Association published a booklet 
summarizing the debates, in which it expressed its conviction that “the story of this record 
holds a profound meaning for our time, far beyond the statutes themselves or beyond the 
borders of New York State.”331 
Moreover, the Law Against Discrimination created the New York State Commission 
against Discrimination, the first such state antidiscrimination agency, and other states then 
followed New York’s lead (Table 3.3).  By 1960, seventeen states had enacted laws that 
327 Laws of 1945, ch. 118. 
328 See Berger 1967, 181-82 
329 Krauss 1986:  15. 
330 New York Law Against Discrimination in Employment, Article 12, §125. 
331 Young Men’s Christian Association, 4. 
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prohibited discrimination, typically on grounds of race, color, or religion,332 and that 
empowered state agencies to enforce them.  In addition, Indiana and Kansas enacted fair 
employment practices laws in 1945 and 1953, respectively, although neither had provided for 
state enforcement by 1960.  State commissions were generally empowered to investigate 
complaints, conduct hearings, conciliate, issue cease-and-desist orders, and ultimately, to 
seek court enforcement of their orders.      
 
Table 3.3:  State Laws Prohibiting Discrimination in Employment and Providing for State 
Enforcement333  
1945 1946 1947 1949 1955 1957 1959 1960 
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Housing discrimination was the last major area of life in which discrimination was 
prohibited by the states.  In 1949, Connecticut amended its public accommodations statute 
to prohibit discrimination on grounds of race, color, or religion in public housing, and it 
empowered that agency charged with enforcing its fair employment practices law, the Civil 
Rights Commission, to enforce the law.  In 1949, New Jersey made another innovation by 
extending the jurisdiction of its enforcement agency to cover preventing discrimination in 
332 Eight of these states included age as a protected ground.  New Jersey also recognized military service as a 
protected ground. 
333 Table complied from information from Konvitz and Leskes, A Century of Civil Rights, 201-202. 
334 Wisconsin had enacted a fair employment practices law in 1945, but it did not empower a state agency to 
issue cease-and-desist orders until 1957. 
335 Colorado had enacted a fair employment practices statute in 1951, but did not empower an agency to 
enforce it until 1957. 
336 Alaska entered the Union as a state in 1959.  It had enacted an fair employment practices law and 
empowered an agency to enforce it in 1951. 
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places of public accommodations.337 Other states quickly followed suit:  Connecticut (1949); 
Massachusetts (1950); New York and Rhode Island (1952); Colorado, Oregon, and 
Washington (1957); and Pennsylvania (1961). 
The federal government enacted civil rights laws in 1957 and 1960, but those laws 
primarily addressed voting rights and did not attempt to recognize a new set of federal rights 
to nondiscrimination in employment, public accommodations, or housing.338 By 1963, 
however, the political context had changed significantly.  The U.S. government faced 
increasing scrutiny by newly independent Third World countries and the Soviet Union,339 
and grassroots protests and demonstrations had shifted the Civil Rights Movement into full 
swing.340 In the immediate wake of police brutalities committed against protestors in 
Birmingham, Alabama, President John F. Kennedy threw his support behind federal civil 
rights legislation.  A political breakthrough came when Republican Senator Everett Dirksen 
announced his support for legislation.  Borrowing a line from Victor Hugo, Dirksen said:  
“No army is stronger than an idea whose time has come.”341 As president after Kenney’s 
assassination, Lyndon B. Johnson capitalized on this Republican support. The Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 prohibited both racial and sex discrimination in employment342 and racial 
discrimination in public accommodations.343 In addition, it established a complicated system 
of enforcement that parceled out responsibilities to an array of federal bureaucracies, 
337 Laws of 1945, ch. 169. 
338 See Brian K. Landsberg, Enforcing Civil Rights:  Race Discrimination and the Department of Justice (Lawrence, 
Kan.:  University Press of Kansas, 1997). 
339 See Mary Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy (Princeton, N.J.:  Princeton 
University Press, 2000). 
340 On the Civil Rights Movement, see Robert Weisbrot, Freedom bound: a history of America’s civil rights movement 
(New York:  Plume, 1990). 
341 New York Times, May 20, 1964, at 1, col. 7 (19 May 1964). 
342 Civil Rights Act 1964, Title VII. 
343 Civil Rights Act 1964, Title II. 
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including the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission and the Office of Contract 
Compliance, as well as to the Attorney General and private parties.344 
Prior to World War II, with minor exceptions, little antidiscrimination legislation 
existed in Canada.345 As in the American case, after the war a wave of antidiscrimination 
lawmaking ensued.346 Owing to Canada’s federal system, these reforms were first 
accomplished at the provincial level, which has jurisdiction over civil rights under Canada’s 
constitution.347 In 1944, Ontario’s Conservative government enacted the first piece of 
modern antidiscrimination legislation, namely the Racial Discrimination Act, which banned 
the public display of discriminatory signs and notices.  Three years later, a Co-operative 
Commonwealth Federation (CCF) government in Saskatchewan enacted a Bill of Rights Act 
that protected against discrimination in employment, housing, workplace education, and real 
estate transactions, in addition to protecting traditional civil liberties.  But the Ontario and 
Saskatchewan laws both employed criminal sanctions, which made their enforcement 
difficult.348 In order to tighten enforcement, the provincial elites borrowed from the 
legislative developments in American states that were reviewed above. 
Ontario adopted Canada’s first Fair Employment Practices Act in 1951 and its first 
Fair Accommodation Practices Act in 1954, both of which were modeled on the State of 
New York’s legislation.  As Tables 3.4 and 3.5 show, during the 1950s other provinces 
quickly followed Ontario’s lead.  The federal government in Ottawa enacted fair 
employment practices legislation in 1953349 that applied to federal entities and business 
344 See Landsberg, Enforcing Civil Rights.
345 In 1932, Ontario amended its insurance legislation to prohibit racial and religious discrimination in the 
assessment of insurance risk, and British Columbia amended its unemployment insurance relief legislation to 
ban discrimination on grounds of race, religion, or political affiliation in relief work projects.  See Lita-Rose 
Betcherman, The Swastika and the Maple Leaf (Toronto:  Fitzhenry & Whiteside, 1975), 50. 
346 See Walter S. Tarnopolsky and William Pentney, Discrimination and the Law (Toronto:  Carswell, 1994). 
347 The Constitution Act, 1867, formerly known as the British North American Act. 
348 See Walter Tarnopolsky, “The Iron Hand in the Velvet Glove,” Canadian Bar Review 46 (1968), esp. 569-9. 
349 Canada Fair Employment Practices Act S.C. 1952-53, c.19. 
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sectors under federal jurisdiction, such as inter-provincial transportation and 
communications.  The reforms of the 1940s and 1950s were largely the product of pressure 
applied by Jewish and African Canadian organizations upon provincial cabinets paired with 
public relations campaigns that were waged through union locals and church groups.350 
During the 1960s, provinces began to consolidate their diverse fair practices laws into what 
were typically called human rights codes.  In 1961, Ontario again led the way by creating a 
Human Rights Commission that came to be charged with enforcing a Human Rights Code 
enacted one year later.  By 1977, every Canadian province, as well as the federal government, 
had established a special commission, called a “Human Rights Commission,” to enforce 
antidiscrimination laws (Table 3.6). In turn, these commissions began to exert influence on 
antidiscrimination policymaking processes.351 




1951  Ontario    
1953  Manitoba   
 Federal    
1955  Nova Scotia  
1956  New Brunswick  
 Saskatchewan 
 British Columbia 
1963  Yukon Territory 
1964  Québec 
 
350 Leon H. Mayhew, Law and Equal Opportunity:  A Study of the Massachusetts Commission against Discrimination 
(Cambridge:  Harvard University Press, 1968), 75-83; Walker, “Race,” Rights and the Law in the Supreme Court of 
Canada, 31; Howe and Johnson, Restraining Equality, 29 
351 Cynthia Williams, “The Changing Nature of Citizen Rights” in Alan Cairns and Cynthia Williams (research 
coordinators), Constitutionalism, Citizenship and Society in Canada (Toronto:  University of Toronto Press), 99-131. 
 1985: 107; Howe and Johnson, Restraining Equality, 12-36. 
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Table 3.5:  Fair Accommodation Practices Legislation in Canada, 1954-1960 
 
Year Jurisdiction 
1954  Ontario   
1956  Saskatchewan 
1959  Nova Scotia 
 New Brunswick 
1960 Manitoba 
 
Table 3.6:  Human Rights Codes in Canada, 1962-1987 
 
Year  Jurisdiction 
 
1962  Ontario352 
1963  Nova Scotia 
1966  Alberta 
1967  New Brunswick 
1968  Prince Edward Island 
1969  British Columbia 
1970  Manitoba 
1975  Québec 
1977  Federal 
1979  Saskatchewan353 
1987  Yukon Territory 
 
In contrast to the U.S. and Canada, Britain did not enact antidiscrimination 
legislation until the mid-1960s, although several MPs proposed such legislation earlier.  In 
1950 Reginald Sorenson, for example, introduced into Parliament a Colour Bar Bill that 
would have made it a criminal offense to discriminate on racial grounds in the provision of 
services and facilities in public places.  In addition, the Bill would have criminalized the 
publication or display of notices or advertisements that indicated a policy of racial 
352 Ontario established its Human Rights Commission in 1961, one year before enacting its Human Rights 
Code. 
353 Saskatchewan established its Human Rights Commission in 1972, seven years before enacting its Human 
Rights Code. 
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discrimination.  Sorenson’s Bill was never debated in the House of Commons, however.  Six 
years later, Fenner Brockway introduced a Racial Discrimination Bill that not only would 
have prohibited racial and religious discrimination in public places but also discrimination by 
large employers.  It, too, failed to come to a vote.  Nevertheless, Brockway subsequently 
introduced eight similar bills, although, as a consequence of trade union opposition, he 
omitted any reference to employment discrimination in those bills.   
It was not until the early 1960s that broader political support for antidiscrimination 
legislation developed.  A group of lawyers in the Labour Party examined the North 
American experience with antidiscrimination law for lessons in how to deal with Britain’s 
emerging racial problems.  The Race Relations Act was enacted in 1965, which prohibited 
discrimination in public accommodations. The 1965 Act was followed by the Race Relations 
Act of 1968, which expanded prohibition of discrimination in employment and housing.  
However, both laws prescribed a conciliatory approach to enforcement, allowing the courts 
to be used only as a last resort.  In 1975, the Sex Discrimination Act was passed.  It 
eliminated mandatory conciliation and provided for immediate adjudication of claims in 
preexisting industrial tribunals or county courts. One year later, a new Race Relations Act 
was passed that incorporated the Sex Discrimination Act’s enforcement measures.  The 
British antidiscrimination regime has since served as a model for European Union efforts. 
 
THE UNITED NATIONS   
Almost from its inception, the UN was a key disseminator of antidiscrimination 
ideology.  Two factors contributed to this UN role.  First, in lieu of creating strong UN 
bodies capable of enforcing UN measures, member states elected to create a number of 
advisory bodies that were charged with sponsoring research, collecting data from member 
states, and organizing conferences at which research findings and cross-national data could 
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be examined and discussed.  Second, as a result of decolonization, the size and tenor of the 
UN’s membership changed.  During the 1960s alone, thirty-two new African states, five new 
Asian states, and five new Latin American states were admitted to the UN.  For the newly 
independent African and Asian nations, race and racial discrimination were preeminent 
international issues.354 These new member states exploited their superior numbers to require 
UN advisory bodies, against the opposition of Western member countries, to sponsor 
research and organize conferences about race and racial discrimination.355 Furthermore, 
they initiated efforts to draft UN declarations and conventions that obligated signatories to 
commit to ideas of racial equality and undertake legal reforms to combat racial 
discrimination.  Once these measures were taken with regard to race, other groups sought 
similar UN and international measures against additional forms of  discrimination. 
It is worth noting that the word “discrimination” appears in neither the UN Charter 
nor the UDHR.   In 1949, however, the UN Secretary-General commissioned a 
memorandum entitled The Main Types and Causes of Discrimination.356  Its purpose was to 
explain a concept that was still unfamiliar to most member states’ citizenries.  Drawing upon 
intellectual developments in the U.S., the memorandum espoused the idea that prejudice and 
discrimination were caused by environmental influences, and it endorsed three types of 
antidiscrimination measures:  1) direct legal action; 2) administrative measures enforced 
through public agencies; and 3) educational action.357 The memorandum  acknowledged the 
tension between eliminating discrimination and protecting liberties, and it observed that 
individuals cannot be “forced to sympathize” and that “any attempt to influence ideas or 
354 See Paul Gordon Lauren, Power and Prejudice:  The Politics and Diplomacy of Racial Discrimination (Boulder, 
Col.:  Westview Press, 1988), 197-232 
355 See Lauren, Power and Prejudice:  The Politics and Diplomacy of Racial Discrimination, 225-26. 
356 (E/CN.4/Sub.2/40/Rev.1, 7 June 1949). 
357 1949:  7, ¶25 
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sentiments by coercive measures would constitute a violation of [freedom of thought and 
opinion], which are also recognized human rights” (1949:  40-41, ¶133).   
Under UN auspices, social and other scientists were convened on a number of 
occasions to issue pronouncements on race.  In 1950, the UN Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) assembled an international committee of eight experts—
including E. Franklin Frazier and Ashley Montagu, both of whom had collaborated with 
Myrdal on An American Dilemma—for the purpose of producing a an official statement on 
the issue of race.  UNESCO published a “Statement on the Nature of Race and Race 
Differences” one year later, along with other related materials, in a booklet entitled The 
Concept of Race. In 1964, it issued another such statement, this one entitled “The Race 
Question in Modern Science,” and it commissioned a number of studies that explored 
various issues pertaining to race that appeared in a series of books devoted to “The Race 
Question in Modern Science.”  In 1955, UNESCO organized a Conference on the 
Eradication of Prejudice and Discrimination in Geneva, and it drafted a Convention Against 
Discrimination in Education in 1962.  Five years later, UNESCO convened a committee of 
experts as part of its program to “disseminate scientific facts about race and to combat racial 
prejudice.”358  This committee espoused the idea that law is among the most important 
means of ensuring equality between individuals and fighting racism, and it advocated 
national legislation as a means of effectively redressing racial discrimination.  Although the 
effects of such legislation might not be immediate, the committee reasoned, such laws would 
set a moral example backed by the dignity of the courts that could, in the long run, change 
attitudes.  Governmental intervention was, therefore, essential.359 
358 Racial Discrimination:  1971 International Year for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination 
(New York:  United Nations Office of Public Information, 1971), pp. 16 (UNOPI 2/R11/2). 
359 Michael Banton, 1971:  10. 
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In 1965, the UNGA unanimously adopted the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD).  It obligated signatories to 
enact national antidiscrimination legislation.  According to Egon Schwelb, the ICERD 
represented “the most comprehensive and unambiguous codification in treaty form of the 
idea of the equality of races.”360 The ICERD entered into force, upon receiving the requisite 
number of signatures, on January 4, 1969.  Later that year, the UNGA designated 1971 as 
the International Year for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination.  This 
initiative arose, in part, from a proposal made at the International Conference on Human 
Rights, held in Tehran in 1968.  Later, 1973 was designated the beginning of a Decade for 
Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination. 
The UN and its bodies took comparable actions on behalf of women and the 
disabled.  After its creation in 1946, the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) 
worked to define and elaborate general guarantees of non-discrimination against women.  
Between 1949 and 1959, the CSW elaborated a Convention on the Political Rights of 
Women, which was adopted by the UNGA in 1952. Subsequently, the Convention on the 
Nationality of Married Women was adopted by the UNGA in 1957; the Convention on 
Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriage was adopted 
by the UNGA in 1962; and the Recommendation on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age 
for Marriage and Registration of Marriages was adopted by the UNGA in 1965. Those 
efforts were followed by the Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women, which was ultimately adopted by the UNGA in 1967.  1975 was proclaimed 
International Women’s Year and a world conference on women’s issues was held that year in 
Mexico City.  Delegates to the conference called for a convention on the elimination of all 
forms of discrimination against women. Consequently, in 1979 the UNGA adopted the 
360 Schwelb 1966:  1057 
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International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW), and this entered into force in 1981, faster than any previous human 
rights convention had done  
In 1971, the UN adopted the Declaration of the Rights of Mentally Retarded 
Persons,361 and in 1975, it adopted the Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons.362  
The year 1981 was proclaimed International Year of the Disabled Person, and it was 
followed by the World Program of Action Concerning Disabled Persons in 1982 and the 
International Decade of Disabled Persons, which began in 1983.  More recently, in 1993, the 
UN adopted the Standard Rules on the Equalization of Opportunities for Persons with 
Disabilities, and these rules actually constitute a convention on the rights of people with a 
disability.  In December 2001, the UNGA decided to consider proposals for a 
comprehensive and integral convention to promote and protect the rights and dignity of 
people with disabilities; at present, however, such a convention remains an unmet demand of 
nongovernmental organizations representing the interests of disabled persons. 
 
CONCLUSION 
As this chapter has shown, antidiscrimination legislation has a long history.  Once 
the province of state and provincial legislatures in the U.S. and Canada, today discrimination 
serves as the target of numerous international instruments.  Its diffusion rested upon a 
particular set of ideas about the malleability of human relations, the efficacy of law, and the 
requisites of democracy.  However, as this chapter has also amply demonstrated, the path 
followed by antidiscrimination legislation in the U.S., Canada, and Britain was a winding one, 
in which political circumstances and calculations played key roles. It is important to 
361 G.A.Res. 2856 26 U.N.  G.A.O.R. Supp. (No. 29), 99 U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971). 
362 G.A. Res. 3447, 30 U.N.  G.A.O.R. Supp. (No. 34192, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975). 
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comprehend the varying ways in which antidiscrimination regimes came to be erected. Close 
scrutiny of how ideology, conceptions of the law, and democratic politics conjoined in two 
other Anglo-American democracies, New Zealand and Australia, to create such regimes are 
illuminating, and the next two chapters undertake this scrutiny.    
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Chapter Four:  New Zealand 
New Zealand’s antidiscrimination regime today protects against discrimination on 
thirteen grounds.  Color, race, ethnic, and national origins were the first grounds of 
discrimination singled out for protection in the Race Relations Act 1971.  Six years later, the 
Human Rights Commission Act was passed, recognizing additional protected grounds—sex, 
marital status, and religious and ethical belief.  The Race Relations Act was amended in 1984 
to extend the definition of ethnic and national origin to include nationality and citizenship.  
In 1992, age was added to the list of protected grounds, but only within the context of 
employment.363 The following year, New Zealand’s antidiscrimination law underwent a 
major reform.  The Human Rights Commission Act was supplanted by the Human Rights 
Act 1993, which recognized five additional protected grounds—disability, employment 
status, family status, and political opinion.  In addition, the scope of the prohibition against 
age discrimination was extended beyond the context of employment to include all areas 
covered by the Act.364 
Important changes also occurred with regard to enforcement structure.  The Race 
Relations Act 1971 authorized the creation of an Office of the Race Relations Conciliator, 
the main tasks of which were conciliation and education.  Litigation was intended to occur 
only as a last resort.  As a result, the courts did not have occasion to consider a case under 
the Act until 1977, and that case involved a conviction under the controversial provision that 
363 Human Rights Commission Amendment Act 1992.  The Act also applied to several areas closely related to 
employment, namely partnerships, industrial unions and professional and trade associations, qualifying bodies, 
and vocational training bodies, §§8-11. 
364 These include access to public places, vehicles and facilities, education, employment , industrial and 
professional associations, qualifying bodies and vocational training bodies, partnerships, provision of goods and 
services, and land, housing and accommodation. 
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established “inciting racial disharmony” as a criminal offense.365 With the Human Rights 
Commission Act in 1977, two new institutions were established:  1) the Human Rights 
Commission (HRC), which was charged with enforcing the new law, and 2) the Equal 
Opportunities Tribunal (EOT), an ad hoc, quasi-judicial body charged with resolving 
complaints where conciliation, by either the Race Relations Conciliator or the HRC had 
failed.  In 1984, the Human Rights Commission Act was amended to increase the amount of 
damages available, and the post of Proceedings Commissioner was created.  The 
Proceedings Commissioner possessed the institutional authority and autonomy, separate 
from the HRC, to provide legal representation to complainants before the EOT and the 
courts.  With the Human Rights Act 1993, the Proceedings Commissioner was reconceived 
as the Director of Human Rights Proceedings, and the role of strategic litigation was 
expressly codified.  In addition, the EOT was replaced with a Complaints Review Tribunal 
(CRT).  Finally, the Office of the Race Relations Conciliator was merged in 2001 with the 
HRC, thereby centralizing the antidiscrimination enforcement power in a single institution.   
The New Zealand case presents several puzzles.  First, considering the transnational 
developments set forth in Chapter Three, why was there no antidiscrimination legislation 
until 1971?   Various domestic groups were aware of discriminatory treatment and brought 
their concerns before government, and the bureaucracy was fielding developments 
internationally.  A second puzzle concerns the political orientation of the party responsible 
for both creating New Zealand’s antidiscrimination regime and expanding it, namely the 
traditionally conservative National Party.  Why were all three of the country’s major pieces 
of antidiscrimination legislation enacted on its watch?    
365 See Race Relation Act 1971, §25.  King-Ansell was convicted in the Magistrate’s Court and his conviction 
was upheld by the Supreme Court.  Relying on the medieval use of the word “ethnic,” in the Court of Appeal, 
he argued that Jews were not a group having “ethnic origins.”  On 14 December 1979, the Court, however, 
flatly rejected that argument, concluding that it did not serve the interests of the law. 
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DISCRIMINATION IN POSTWAR NEW ZEALAND: 1945-1970 
Writing in 1971, Kenneth J. Keith, who in 2004 became a justice on the newly 
established New Zealand Supreme Court, wrote an article about the Race Relations Bill 
1971.  He began with this:  “Should the law impose restraints … on the freedom of the 
individual—land owner or landlord, banker or insurer, employer or trade union official—not 
to enter into a contract or to exercise some other legal power if the reason for his refusal is 
racial prejudice?”366 Keith did not dwell on this question, observing that “it appears to be 
generally accepted both in New Zealand and abroad that such laws are called for.”367 
Instead, he considered the form that an antidiscrimination law should take and the manner 
by which it should be enforced.  
The absence of antidiscrimination laws from New Zealand’s immediate postwar 
political agenda is curious for three main reasons.  First, the enactment and professional 
discussion of antidiscrimination laws was a highly salient topic within UN bodies, across 
North America, and even at “home” in Great Britain.  Between 1945 and 1970, 
antidiscrimination statutes had been enacted by every Canadian province, by many American 
states, as well as by the federal government, by the state of South Australia, and by Great 
Britain.368  During the 1950s, New Zealand’s Department of External Affairs received 
several UN requests to participate in seminars and conferences concerning legislation against 
discrimination.369 In 1966, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) opened the International 
366 Keith 1971:  57. 
367 1971:  57. 
368 See Chapter Three, infra. 
369 For example, in 1956, the UN Secretary-General contacted the New Zealand government on behalf of the 
UN Commission on Human Rights to inquire about its interest in hosting a seminar on one of three topics, 
one of which pertained to “techniques for preventing and combating racial discrimination.”  New Zealand 
officials opted, instead, to participate in a seminar on the “protection of human rights in the administration of 
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Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) for 
signature by Member States.370 New Zealand signed the ICERD on 25 October 1966, but it 
postponed ratifying the instrument for five years.  Ratification required transposing the 
terms of the Convention into domestic law.  In January 1969, the ICERD entered into force 
upon obtaining the requisite number of signatures from member states.  
Second, during this long period, New Zealand society underwent significant 
demographic changes.  The Maori population dramatically expanded and many Maori moved 
from rural areas to regional towns and cities.  Maori increased by 9% from 1926 to 1951, and 
in the first half of the 1950s they increased by 24%.371 Between 1945 and 1966, the Maori 
population more than doubled, from 115,646 to 249,236.372 Moreover, in 1960, 96% of all 
Maori lived in the North Island, with as many as 73% living in the Auckland Province.373 In 
1956, only one-fifth of persons of Maori descent lived in urban areas, compared to 40% ten 
years later.374 Maori migration to the cities was fueled by loss of land, declines in rural 
employment, policies that provided loans for urban housing, and job training programs in 
the cities.  During this same period, New Zealand’s Pacific Islander populations continued to 
grow, due primarily to heavy immigration.  Between 1956 and 1966, the number of Pacific 
Islanders rose from approximately 8,000 to 26,000.375 These changes brought an 
unprecedented level of daily contact between New Zealand’s racial minorities and Pakeha—
justice.”  MA 19/1/539 “Advisory Services in the Field of Human Rights” Memo from Director of Education, 
C.E. Beeby to the Secretary for Maori Affairs.  They concurred that the first would be of interest. 
370 The ICERD was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in resolution 2106 (XX) 2 of 21 
December 1965. 
371 See J.K. Hunn, Report on Department of Maori Affairs with Statistical Supplement (Wellington:  R.E. Owen, 
Government Printer, 1961), 19 [hereafter The Hunn Report]. 
372 See 2001 Census:  Maori (2001) – Reference Reports, “Table 1:  Maori Population Summary, 1858-2001” 
available at 
http://www.stats.govt.nz/domino/external/pasfull/pasfull.nsf/web/Reference+Reports+2001+Census:+Ma
ori+2001 accessed on 3 August 2004. 
373 The Hunn Report, 8. 
374 Colgan 1972:  21. 
375 Colgan 1972:  28. 
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white New Zealanders.  Maori often lacked the requisite skills for urban employment, and 
both they and Pacific Islanders faced discrimination by employers.  Some government 
officials recognized that these new demographic trends threatened to produce the types of 
social problems typically associated with an urbanizing but economically disadvantaged 
minority group.376 Attorney-General and Minister for Justice Josiah Ralph Hanan worried 
that the changes would create social strains, racial tension, and potentially social conflict.377 
Third, by the late 1950s, New Zealand’s government was encountering the new 
salience of race as an international issue.  New Zealand had enjoyed an international 
reputation for racial tolerance,378 a reputation that the political elite were eager to sustain.  
This reputation was threatened by a series of controversies surrounding South African rugby 
tours and by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that took instances of local racial 
discrimination to UN bodies.  In 1948 and again in 1959, South Africa had invited the All 
Blacks, New Zealand’s national rugby team, to tour the country and engage its national team, 
the Springboks, in a series of matches.  Public controversy erupted on both occasions, 
placing the issue of racial discrimination front and center.379 In 1950, New Zealand’s 
Permanent Delegation to the UN in New York received “charges of discrimination against 
Maoris” in employment and living standards that had been filed by the World Federation of 
Trade Unions (WFTU) with the UN’s Economic and Social Council.380 Eight years later, a 
New Zealand representative to the Special Political Committee of the UN stated, “in 
precept, in practice, and in fact, all New Zealand’s people enjoy equally, full political, 
376 Harré 1964:  10. 
377 1968:  193; Hazlehurst 1993:  12. For references by Government Ministers to “the problems associated 
with having large segments of its population coming from different racial origins,” see New Zealand Hansard, v. 
363, 23 September 1969, pp. 2958-2960.  For examples of debates over New Zealand’s racially discriminatory 
immigrations policies, see 369 Hansard pp. 3602-3607.  
378 Thompson 1961:  29. 
379 “Decision Reaffirmed:  Exclusion of Maoris from N.Z. Rugby Team for South Africa,” Southern Cross (2 
October 1948). 
380 MA 36 1/21 Inward Telegram, 26 January 1950. 
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economic, social and civil rights.  We could never contemplate a departure from these 
conditions.”381 New Zealand was also sensitive to negative publicity about New Zealand 
race relations in the foreign press.382 
Before antidiscrimination laws could be perceived as an appropriate solution, 
discrimination had to first be perceived as a problem.  New Zealand’s national self-
perception as a racially egalitarian country shaped the way in which political elites, as well as 
the public, interpreted reported instances of discrimination against Maori.  Such 
discrimination was customarily regarded either as an aberration or as the product of 
socioeconomic rather than racial differences.383 Despite receiving numerous complaints of 
racial discrimination that were committed by private as well as state actors throughout the 
1950s and 1960s, the Department of Maori Affairs refused to frame the problem in terms of 
race.  For example, the Department of Maori Affairs files384 contain numerous complaints of 
discrimination against Maoris by the Federated Farmers and by the Railways Department, 
which was accused of replacing Maori workers with Dutch immigrants.385 Yet, the 
prevailing bureaucratic view was that racial discrimination was not a problem.  Nor did 
politicians perceive racial discrimination, or any other kind of discrimination for that matter, 
as a pressing problem.  In response to a questionnaire distributed to candidates of all parties 
381 External Affairs Review, October 1958, Vol. VIII, No. 10, p. 22. 
382 MA 36 1/21, Memorandum for the Secretary of External Affairs, Wellington.  Allegations of Racial and 
Social Tension in New Zealand (9 January 1953).  The files showed concern over material that appeared in a 
publication produced by the Indian Embassy.  In addition, the Departments of External Affairs and of Maori 
Affairs worked with New Zealand Deputy High Commissioner in London to address an editorial entitled “The 
Long Black Cloud” that appeared in the Manchester Guardian in 1960.  See MA  B.60/28/- “New Zealand Race 
Relations” (12 October 1960). 
383 See McKean 1971a:  viii 
384 In 1989, the Department of Maori Affairs was disbanded and a Ministry of Maori Development, Te Puni 
Kokiri, was established. 
385 See Letter from Rakaumanga Tribal Committee to Department of Maori Affairs, MA 36 1/21 (15 
December 1952), and departmental memorandum in reply MA 21/8/11 (15 December 1952). 
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running in the 1966 election, for example, no candidate identified discrimination, race 
relations, or women’s issues as one of the “most important” issues in the campaign.386 
Of the numerous instances of discrimination against Maori contained in the files of 
the Department of Maori Affairs, one in particular garnered significant public attention.  In 
1955, Donald Hiki, a Maori, alleged that he had been denied employment with the Huntly 
Branch of the Bank of New Zealand (BNZ) on account of his race.  Huntly is a small town 
in the Waikato region of the North Island.  Hiki’s accusations garnered national media 
attention.387 At the time, the BNZ did not have any “male Maori officers” but did employ 
“two Maori girls.”388 According to a Department of Maori Affairs memorandum, the Bank’s 
representatives asserted that “they have no rule debarring Maoris as such from employment” 
and that “[t]hey try to treat all cases on their merits.”389  A handwritten note accompanying 
the memo stipulated that the BNZ’s rule held that an employee “must not be of a dark 
colour” because “some of their depositors were a bit fussy.”390 However, BNZ officials 
indicated that they “would not be keen, …, on employing any Maori of pronounced Maori 
physical or temperamental characteristics.”  In the memo, Hiki, presumably a man, was 
referred to as a “boy.”391 It was thought it would not be advisable to employ him in a “small 
town or district locality” and that if he were alternatively placed in “a bigger district 
headquarters” he might be unable to obtain board.392 Representatives from the Department 
of Maori Affairs stressed to BNZ officials that “in the national interests it was necessary that 
everyone realize that one of the most important considerations we could have in this country 
386 See Austin Mitchell, “The 1966 General Election:  The Candidates and Their Campaigns” 21 (1) Political 
Science (September, 1969):  3-23, 18. 
387 “No job at bank for Maori,” New Zealand Herald, 29 April 1955. 
388 MA 36 1/21 19/1/539 Placement of Donald Hiki (8 March 1955). 
389 MA 36 1/21 19/1/539 Placement of Donald Hiki (8 March 1955). 
390 MA 36 1/21 19/1/539 Placement of Donald Hiki (8 March 1955). 
391 MA 36 1/21 19/1/539 Placement of Donald Hiki (8 March 1955). 
392 MA 36 1/21 19/1/539 Placement of Donald Hiki (8 March 1955). 
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was the fitting of the Maori people fully and usefully into this community.”393 Further, “[i]n 
facing this national task, it was really necessary for all representative employers to try to do 
their share of what was involved.”394 Bank officials assured the Department that they would 
take these “national considerations” into account.395  
Hiki’s allegations were also addressed in Parliament.  E.T. Tirikatene, a Maori MP 
who held one of the four seats reserved for Maori, asked Prime Minister Sidney Holland 
whether he had seen an article in the New Zealand Herald covering the BNZ’s 
discrimination against Hiki, whether he would take steps to prevent further discrimination 
against Maori by the Bank, and whether he would “introduce legislation into Parliament this 
session making it an offense to discriminate against worthy citizens of New Zealand on 
account of race or colour?”396 The Maori Women’s Welfare League also picked up on Hiki’s 
allegations.  At their 1955 conference, the League presented a resolution “[t]hat the racial 
discrimination experienced in the Waikato region be investigated.”397 Attention to the 
growth of the Maori population generated an editorial that appeared in The Taranaki Daily 
News in October 1956.398 Also that month, Reverend G.I. Laurenson addressed the 
Pahiatua Rotarians concerning the growth of the Maori population and its implications for 
race relations.399 The specter was one of segregation, he said.400 
393 MA 36 1/21 19/1/539 Placement of Donald Hiki (8 March 1955). 
394 MA 36 1/21 19/1/539 Placement of Donald Hiki (8 March 1955). 
395 MA 36 1/21 19/1/539 Placement of Donald Hiki (8 March 1955). 
396 Order Paper, House of Representatives, 11 May 1955. 
397 It was Resolution 17.  See MA 36 1/21 Response to Resolution from Maori Women’s Welfare League 
Conference, p. 3 
398 “Maori Progress and Problems,” The Taranaki Daily News (4 October 1956), MA 19/1/539. 
399 “Average Person does not Realize that Segregation could become a N.Z. Problem:  Minister’s Appeal to 
Employers to Give Maoris Fair Chance; Not Condemn Failure,” Manawatu Daily Times (5 October 1956).  See 
MA 19/1/539. 
400 See the comments of Acting Secretary of Maori Affairs, J.K. Hunn in “Maori Isolation or Integration?” The 
Gisbourne Herald (12 November 1960). 
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In May 1958, the Rotary Clubs of New Plymouth and Waitara, on the western coast 
of North Island, conducted their own inquiries into the employment of Maori within their 
districts.  One unnamed government department responded that they employed Maori 
“’with the qualification that Maori applicants would not be considered for posts involving 
meeting the general public.’”401 In April 1960, the Department of Maori Affairs prepared a 
memorandum on “Non Legal Discrimination” in response to a request for such information 
from the Department of External Affairs.  The memorandum concluded that for positions 
that involved “face to face” service with the public “there was a strong tendency to deny 
entry to Maori because of possible adverse and customer re-action.”402 In addition, it 
documented discrimination against Maori in housing, hotels, theaters, employment, 
barbershops, private bars, and lounges.  The government contended that “integration” was 
the solution and suggested that “[e]very successful Maori-European marriage is a step 
towards it.”403  
In 1958, the New Zealand Rugby Union, a privately operated and very powerful 
business organization, again decided to exclude Maori players from the national team that 
would tour South Africa in 1960.  This decision, in Richard Thompson’s words, plunged the 
country “into what was perhaps its most vigorous controversy since the prohibition issue at 
the end of the last century.”404 In this context, Maori-Pakeha relations were reassessed and 
the country was reawakened to their importance.  New Zealand’s churches initiated public 
protests against the Rugby Union, and a new group, the Citizens’ All Black Tour Association 
(CABTA), was formed.  Rolland O’Regan, CABTA’s leader, made clear that his group did 
not seek any form of civil rights legislation because it believed that such legislation would 
401 “Employment of Maoris in the Public Service” MA Folio 202 36 1/21 (1 August 1958). 
402 “Non Legal Discrimination” (1 April 1960) MA 36 1/21, p. 1. 
403 “Relations between Maori and European People in New Zealand,” MA 19/1/539 (10 May 1960), p. 2. 
404 Thompson, 1961:  28 
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stigmatize New Zealand’s reputation.  Nor did CABTA seek executive action to stop the 
tour.  Instead, it and the church groups opposing the tour sought an end to the caucus ban 
on MPs expressing their personal opinions on the issue, and they wanted the prime minister, 
Walter Nash, to persuade the Rugby Union to abandon the tour.  In contrast to protests 
during the 1970s, O’Regan saw the rugby tour as a purely domestic issue.405 
Nash, however, asserted that the issue was one for the Rugby Union to decide and 
said that the government could not interfere in the activities of a private organization.  He 
expressly noted his lack of “legal power to intervene in the conflict.”406 The opposition 
leadership also agreed that the issue of discriminatory player selection was not one for 
Parliament.407 In May, Tirikatene (MP) presented a formal petition to Parliament on behalf 
of the Bishop of Aotearoa,408 among others, that asked for a “‘full, formal and solemn 
statement’ on New Zealand’s race relations.”409 The petition specifically rejected anything in 
the way of civil rights legislation.  In fact, it recognized that “personal acts of discrimination 
were ‘beyond the legislative influence of the government unless that influence were to be 
dangerously extended.’”410 As the general election of November 1960 approached, neither 
party proposed antidiscrimination legislation nor sought to make race an election issue.  
Rather, they each made symbolic gestures.  The Labour Government, for example, secured a 
knighthood for Maori MP Tirikatene, and the National Party made a tentative reference to 
possibly incorporating the Treaty of Waitangi into some kind of bill of rights.  The Treaty 
had been signed between representatives of the Crown and Maori in 1840.  It served as a 
405 Richard Thompson, Retreat from Apartheid:  New Zealand’s Sporting Contacts with South Africa (London:  Oxford 
University Press, 1975), 86-87.  
406 Richard Thompson, “Community Conflict in New Zealand:  A Case Study” Race, III (November, 1961), 
28-38, 37. 
407 Thompson, “Community Conflict in New Zealand:  A Case Study,” 33. 
408 Aotearoa is the Maori word for New Zealand.  It means “land of the long white cloud.” 
409 “Relations between Maori and European People in New Zealand,” MA 19/1/539 (10 May 1960), p. 1. 
410 Quoted in Harré 1963:  20. 
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rallying point for Maori who resented the subsequent confiscation of their lands, allegedly in 
violation of the terms of the Treaty.411 
Within the bureaucracy, attention to issues of discrimination continued.  In 1960, 
J.K. Hunn, the Deputy Chairman of the Public Service Commission and Acting Secretary for 
Maori Affairs, found there were still eighty-two subjects on which there were legal 
distinctions between Maoris and Europeans.412 In his report, Hunn made several 
recommendations about Maori employment;413 however, he did not call for 
antidiscrimination legislation.  His report recommended that statutory “differentiation” 
between Maoris and Europeans be “reviewed at intervals and gradually eliminated.”414 
Regarding societal discrimination, the Hunn Report, as it is known, stated: 
 
Endeavors have been made to elicit what the Departments know about racial discrimination 
in everyday life, as distinct from the differentiation to be found in statute law.  Very little 
evidence has come to light either from the files or from the knowledge of senior officers.  A 
few instances have been cited but they are isolated and extend over many years.  They relate 
almost entirely to employment or accommodation and, even there, are quite noticeably on 
the wane.  Such discrimination as may exist is obviously not racial but social and applies 
between different groups of society, whether Maori or European.  Social distinctions, in all 
countries, will last as long as the human race; the faint traces of them in New Zealand are 
truly minimal and nothing to worry about.415 
This, however, represented an overly optimistic interpretation of the evidence.  The Hunn 
Report was significant because of what Richard Thompson described the “paucity of 
411 The Treaty of Waitangi has become the subject of a large body of literature.  See Andrew Sharp, Justice and 
the Māori:  The Philosophy and Practice of Māori Claims in New Zealand since the 1970s, 2nd ed. (Auckland:  Oxford 
University Press, 1997); Mason Durie, Te Mana, Te Kāwanatanga:  The Politics of Maori Self-Determination (Auckland:  
Oxford University Press, 1998); Ken S. Coates and P.G. McHugh, eds., Living Relationships:  The Treaty of 
Waitangi in the New Millennium (Wellington:  Victoria University Press, 1998). 
412 The final report was produced on 24 August 1960, but it was not published until 1961.  In the interim, 
there was a change of government, and the National Party assumed power.  J.R. Hanan decided to publish the 
Hunn Report for the public.  See J.K. Hunn, Report on Department of Maori Affairs with Statistical Supplement 
(Wellington:  R.E. Owen, Government Printer, 1961), 3.   
413 The Hunn Report, 31-32 
414 The Hunn Report, 78. 
415 The Hunn Report, 78. 
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empirical research” available in the early 1960s.416 Thompson further observed that much of 
the extant work consisted of graduate theses, and thus were of dubious value in his 
estimation.    
David P. Ausubel, an American professor of educational psychology at the 
University of Illinois, entered into this research in the early 1960s.  He offered a bleak 
assessment of New Zealand race relations.417 During the 1960s, he garnered headlines in 
New Zealand about his books, Maori Youth:  a psychoethnological study of cultural deprivation (1961) 
and The Fern and the Tiki (1965),418 the latter of which amounted to an exposé of the 
country’s racial problems.  Within the Department of Maori Affairs, Ausubel’s claims were 
characterized as “polysyllabic pyrotechnics.”419  J.R. Hanan responded by asserting that the 
scholar “resent[ed] New Zealand’s good name for race relations and [was] bent on refuting 
it.”420 He suggested that although “many Pakehas have wrong ideas about Maoris that tend 
to colour their attitude” and although “[u]nhappy incidents do occur from time to time,” 
Maoris nevertheless “know that the general feeling towards them is tolerant and friendly.”421 
PRESSURE FOR A LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 
In response to the Hunn Report, in 1962 the Maori Welfare Act established the New 
Zealand Maori Council, a body was charged with implementing the report’s 
416 Richard Thompson, Race Relations in New Zealand (Christchurch:  National Council of Churches, 1963), 53. 
417 David P. Ausubel, “Race relations in New Zealand:  Maori and Pakeha:  an American view,” 12 Landfall 
(Sept., 1958); David P. Ausubel, “Acculturative stress in modern Maori adolescence,” 31 Child Development 
(Dec., 1960); David P. Ausubel, “The Maori:  a study in resistance acculturation,” 39 Social Forces (March 1961). 
418 David Ausubel, Maori Youth:  a psychoethnological study of cultural deprivation (North Quincy, Mass.:  Christopher 
Pub. House, 1961); “American Scholar’s Accusation:  ‘Deep Race Prejudice against the Maori in N.Z.,” Evening 
Post, 21 April 1961; “Dr. Ausubel Attacks Again,” Taranaki Daily News 24 April 1961.  See also  David P. 
Ausubel, The Fern and the Tiki:  an American view of New Zealand national character, social attitudes, and race relations 
(New York:  Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965). 
419 MA 36/1/21 Part 3 (24 April 1961). 
420 “Race Relations Minister’s Comments,” MA 36/1/21 Part 3 (24 April 1961), p. 1. 
421 “Race Relations Minister’s Comments,” MA 36/1/21 Part 3 (24 April 1961), p. 1. 
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recommendations.  That same year, the Sale of Liquor Act was amended to prohibit racial 
discrimination in hotels with regard to the provision of accommodations, meals, and 
liquor.422 Discrimination against Maori also garnered the attention of opposition MPs.  In 
July 1963, a Labour MP, Matiu Rata, brought before Parliament a report of housing 
discrimination in the town of Whangarei; and the in following year, Walter Nash, another 
Labour MP and former prime minister, consulted the Department of Maori Affairs about a 
covenant in a lease that prohibited its assignment to Maori, Hindu, Chinese or other colored 
persons.  The Minister of Maori Affairs replied that “’most instances of racial discrimination 
cannot be successfully dealt with by legislation,’” but that this particular matter “’could be 
dealt with by an amendment to the Property Act.’”423 The Property Law Act was 
subsequently amended in 1965 in order to prohibit restrictive covenants directed against 
individuals of a particular color, race, or ethnic or national origin.  It did not, however, 
constitute a “general rule against discrimination” because the amendment did not address a 
“total refusal to enter into any assignment or contract relating to property on blatantly 
discriminatory grounds.”  Instead, it simply prevented one person from compelling another 
to discriminate.424 Under an amendment to the Hire Purchase Act of 1971, withholding 
consent on racial grounds to the transfer of hire-purchase agreements was prohibited.425 No 
vendor could refuse a purchaser the right to assign his interest under a hire purchase 
contract if the refusal stemmed only from the color, race, or ethnic or national origins of any 
person. 
422 See Sale of Liquor Act 1962, s. 199.  According to R.G. Lawson (1970:  241), as of 1970, only a single 
prosecution under this section had been recorded, that in Police v. Bonner [1965] 11 M.C.D. 345.  There a hotel 
manager and licensee were fined for refusing to serve liquor to a Maori on the basis of past bad behavior by 
Maoris. 
423 Memorandum from B.E. Souter, Deputy Secretary of Maori Affairs, to the Minister of Maori Affairs 
concerning the Contracts (Racial Equality) Bill (24 September 1964), 36/1/21, Part 9, p. 1, quoting from the 
Minister’s answer to Nash in Parliament. 
424 Ryan 1972:  85. 
425 Hire-Purchase Act §17(5). 
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In September 1964, a Contracts (Racial Equality) Bill was introduced into Parliament 
by a Labour MP.  It sought to make void any contract, defined very broadly, that in any way 
had discriminatory provisions.  The government consulted the Department of Maori Affairs 
for advice on the bill.  The Department’s leadership believed that any sort of 
antidiscrimination legislation would “tarnish” the “favourable opinion” held by “people in 
most countries” concerning New Zealand’s race relations.426 Moreover, it believed that 
discrimination was sporadic and that it could not be “cured or prevented by legislation.”427 
Rather, “the economic and social causes of discriminatory attitudes” would “wither away” 
with improvements in “the Maori standard of living and hygiene.”428 
The Minister of Justice, Hanan, was also called upon by the government to provide 
an opinion on the Bill.  He thought that as drafted the bill was “in some respects uncertain 
and in others dangerously wide.”429  It might, for instance, be used against special 
provisions designed to aid and assist Maori.  Hanan suggested that the Bill suffered from 
several weaknesses.  First, it did not address instances where parties voluntarily abided by a 
restrictive covenant, although any attempt to control such behavior “would hardly be likely 
to be effective.”430 Second, it did not cover refusals to enter into contractual relations, but 
again he implied that this would not be practicable.  And, third, the Bill failed to address 
refusals to admit individuals to public functions or gatherings, such as movie theaters.  
Hanan suggested that “[i]n the case of quasi-public places it might be possible to do 
426 Memorandum from B.E. Souter, Deputy Secretary of Maori Affairs, to the Minister of Maori Affairs 
concerning the Contracts (Racial Equality) Bill (24 September 1964), 36/1/21, Part 9, p. 2. 
427 Memorandum from B.E. Souter, Deputy Secretary of Maori Affairs, to the Minister of Maori Affairs 
concerning the Contracts (Racial Equality) Bill (24 September 1964), 36/1/21, Part 9, p. 2.   
428 Draft Memorandum for Members of Cabinet on Legislation on Racial Discrimination (March 1965), 
36/1/21, Part 9, p. 3. 
429 Memorandum on Contracts (Racial Equality) Bill prepared by the Minister of Justice (6 October 1964), 
36/1/21, Part 9, p. 5. 
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something about this if there is to be legislation on the subject at all.”431  Further, if there 
was to be such legislation, he suggested that it ought to be of the type that forbade courts 
from enforcing “covenants, conditions, stipulations or transactions that discriminate on the 
ground of race,” rather than the type that made discrimination per se an offense.432 
Hanan acknowledged that racially discriminatory contracts were being drawn up in 
New Zealand.  In his opinion, by legislating before the “evil” became too serious Parliament 
might preempt arguments that such legislation constituted “interference with existing 
rights.”433 He advised that under the existing state of the law, contracts and dispositions of 
property containing discriminatory provisions on grounds of race or religion might be valid.  
Although under the common law certain contracts could be ruled void or illegal on grounds 
of public policy, in Fender v. St. John Mildmay [1937] 3 All E.R. 302, the court had precluded 
itself from creating new public policy.  However, in Lempriere v. Burgess [1921] N.Z.L.R. 307, 
Hanan observed, the court invalidated a refusal to consent to the assignment to a Chinese 
fruit merchant of an agreement to lease.  The lease agreement provided that consent should 
not be withheld arbitrarily or without good cause.   Because the particular merchant involved 
in the case was adjudged respectable by the Court, good cause was not found.  Hanan 
observed that some of the Court’s remarks suggested that a refusal based upon race would 
always be regarded as unreasonable, but he was not convinced that other judges would 
431 Memorandum on Contracts (Racial Equality) Bill prepared by the Minister of Justice (6 October 1964), 
36/1/21, Part 9, p. 4. 
432 Memorandum on Contracts (Racial Equality) Bill prepared by the Minister of Justice (6 October 1964), 
36/1/21, Part 9, p. 4. 
433 Memorandum on Contracts (Racial Equality) Bill prepared by the Minister of Justice (6 October 1964), 
36/1/21, Part 9, p. 1. 
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follow suit.434 He further noted that an Ontario court had rendered void a restrictive 
covenant directed against Jews.435 
Hanan proposed that “[a] more limited measure, directed at specific objectives, does 
however appear practicable and likely to be reasonably effective.”  Although none of its 
details had been worked out, such a law could address discriminatory conditions or 
covenants in contracts or conveyances relating to real or personal property , excluding wills 
and family settlements, as well as discriminatory consents and discretions in contracts and 
conveyances.  Further, a law could also address denial of admission to places where the 
public is ordinarily admitted.  He suggested considering both race and religion, noting that 
Canadian provincial laws addressed both and that with respect to Jews “it might be hard to 
say whether a discrimination was based on race or religion.”436 Cabinet, however, decided 
not to take any action.437 
The matter was considered again during 1965 because it was anticipated that another 
bill similar to the Contracts (Racial Equality) Bill would again be introduced into Parliament 
by an opposition MP.  Cabinet, therefore, debated whether it should act preemptively by 
introducing its own more limited bill.  It was believed that with the introduction of 
Contracts (Racial Equality) Bill in the preceding session the issue of racial discrimination had 
been brought “out into the open” and, therefore, could “no longer be ignored.”438 Although 
the Department of Maori Affairs continued to object, other factors now overweighed its 
434 Memorandum on Contracts (Racial Equality) Bill prepared by the Minister of Justice (6 October 1964), 
36/1/21, Part 9, p. 2. 
435 Memorandum on Contracts (Racial Equality) Bill prepared by the Minister of Justice (6 October 1964), 
36/1/21, Part 9, p. 2.  He was referring to Re:  Drummond Wren [1945] OR 778. 
436 Memorandum on Contracts (Racial Equality) Bill prepared by the Minister of Justice (6 October 1964), 
36/1/21, Part 9, p. 6. 
437 Draft Memorandum for Members of Cabinet on Legislation on Racial Discrimination (March 1965), 
36/1/21, Part 9, p. 1. 
438 Draft Memorandum for Members of Cabinet on Legislation on Racial Discrimination (March 1965), 
36/1/21, Part 9, p. 2. 
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objections.  It was felt that the government could not prevent cases of discrimination from 
being publicized.  Allegations that the government had refused to act “could harm our image 
overseas much more than the passing of legislation would.”  Moreover, because “[m]any 
countries attach much greater importance than we do to legislative declarations of policy,” 
the enactment of such legislation before serious problems emerged “might well enhance 
rather than damage our relations with other countries.”439  Finally, the “withering away” of 
discrimination might take too long, especially considering the urbanization of Maori and the 
potential for racial discrimination to be directed against “Islanders, Indians and Chinese.”440 
For his part, the Deputy Secretary for Maori Affairs felt that the proposed legislation would 
have little practical effect, and feared that it might facilitate demands “for more legislation to 
deal with other kinds of discrimination.”441 
In October 1965 the Attorney General, Hanan, sent a copy of the draft ICERD to 
the Department of Maori Affairs.  He noted that “[t]he question of racial discrimination has 
occupied a great deal of United Nations effort in the last year or so” and that the Attorney-
General’s Office had every reason to believe that “it will be treated as a question of first class 
political importance” in the coming session.442 Hanan observed that “the pressures for a 
compelling statement of rights and obligations on this subject have led to a rather far-
reaching text.”  Communications with other “Western governments” indicated that the 
existing draft ICERD was probably “about the best that can be hoped for” and “will have to 
be given general support,” although New Zealand would try to work with other Western, 
439 Draft Memorandum for Members of Cabinet on Legislation on Racial Discrimination (March 1965), 
36/1/21, Part 9, p. 3. 
440 Draft Memorandum for Members of Cabinet on Legislation on Racial Discrimination (March 1965), 
36/1/21, Part 9, p. 3. 
441 Memorandum on Legislation on Racial Discrimination by Secretary for Maori Affairs to the Secretary of 
Justice (17 March 1965), 36/1/21, Part 9. 
442 Draft ICERD and Memorandum from the Attorney General to the Department of Maori Affairs (11 
October 1965), 36/1/21, Part 9, p. 1. 
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and especially Commonwealth, governments in order to moderate it.443 Politically, Hanan 
expected both international pressure as well as pressure “from a responsible section of New 
Zealand opinion” for the government to become a party to the ICERD.444  In assessing the 
draft, Hanan felt that an article requiring states to provide effective legal protection and 
remedies against acts of racial discrimination would cause particular problems for common 
law countries “whose systems provide legal safeguards regarding incidents of discrimination 
only when they happen to fall under ordinary actionable legal categories or under such 
limited legislative provisions as happen to deal especially with racial discrimination.”445 
Hanan wrote that “to a degree” he did not share the view expressed by the Deputy Secretary 
of Maori Affairs.446 He suggested that the introduction of the Contracts (Racial Equality) 
Bill might have “changed the tactical situation.”447 The leadership within the Department of 
Maori Affairs, by contrast, remained opposed to any antidiscrimination legislation. 
In March 1966, the Secretary of Labour wanted to avoid using the term 
“discrimination” at all, preferring the term “integration” instead.448 He concluded that there 
was “little or no discrimination based on colour” with regard to employment.449 J.M 
McEwen, then Secretary for Maori Affairs, was “alarmed” in 1967 at the suggestion that 
“special judicial machinery” designed to consider allegations of racial discrimination should 
443 Draft ICERD and Memorandum from the Attorney General to the Department of Maori Affairs (11 
October 1965), 36/1/21, Part 9, p. 1. 
444 Draft ICERD and Memorandum from the Attorney General to the Department of Maori Affairs (11 
October 1965), 36/1/21, Part 9, p. 1. 
445 Draft ICERD and Memorandum from the Attorney General to the Department of Maori Affairs (11 
October 1965), 36/1/21, Part 9, p. 2. 
446 Memorandum on Contracts (Racial Equality) Bill prepared by the Minister of Justice (6 October 1964), 
36/1/21, Part 9, p. 2, 6. 
447 Memorandum on Contracts (Racial Equality) Bill prepared by the Minister of Justice (6 October 1964), 
36/1/21, Part 9, p. 6. 
448 Letter concerning Draft International Convention on Racial Discrimination from the Secretary of Labour 
to the Secretary and Maori Trustee (29 March 1966), 36/1/21, Part 9, pp. 2, 8. 
449 Letter concerning Draft International Convention on Racial Discrimination from the Secretary of Labour 
to the Secretary and Maori Trustee (29 March 1966), 36/1/21, Part 9, pp. 2, 8. 
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be established in New Zealand.  He asserted that “[i]f we are forced by virtue of being a 
party to the [ICERD] to enact totally unnecessary legislation providing for a judicial 
procedure for the investigation of complaints of racial discrimination in public life, then let it 
be brought within the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts of the land or perhaps the 
Ombudsman,” a post that had been created in 1960.450 
In 1968, Hanan, still Attorney-General and Minister of Justice, observed that New 
Zealanders did not “look with much favour” upon antidiscrimination statutes due to their 
skepticism that discrimination can be stopped “by fiat of Parliament” (1968:  187).  
Nevertheless, he publicly indicated that such legislation would be forthcoming, “partly 
because nowadays we rightly regard any form of discrimination on grounds of race as a 
social evil and moral affront, but mainly for international reasons.”  It was “necessary” that 
New Zealand ratify the ICERD, even though ratification required legislation “previously 
considered undesirable” because failure to do so would leave the country vulnerable to 
charges of hypocrisy.451 
Unlike Australia, Canada, and the U.S., New Zealand did not confront any issues 
arising from a federal system or a written constitution.  Moreover, because the Parliament’s 
upper chamber, the Legislative Council, had been abolished in 1950,452 proponents of 
antidiscrimination legislation did not face a potentially hostile second chamber, as it did in 
Australia’s Senate in 1975.  New Zealand governments thus enjoyed a strong institutional 
position from which to legislate against discrimination, but the political parties were largely 
apathetic about antidiscrimination legislation and there was no strong coalition of societal 
interests demanding antidiscrimination legislation and interested in the specific form that 
450 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 36/1/21, p. 3.  Memo 
to the Secretary of External Affairs, dated 7 August 1967. 
451 Hanan 1968: 188. 
452 The Legislative Council Abolition Act was enacted under a National Party government. 
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such legislation should take.  A number of New Zealand MPs continued to question whether 
such legislation was necessary and whether it might exacerbate rather than ameliorate racial 
tensions.453 
THE RACE RELATIONS ACT 1971 
Support for legislation prohibiting racial discrimination emerged within the 
Department of Justice as early as 1964, and instances of racial discrimination were brought 
before Parliament throughout the 1960s.  The issue of antidiscrimination legislation was on 
the governmental agenda for a number of years, yet Cabinet repeatedly rejected proposals 
for pursuing such legislation in Parliament.  This changed in 1971.  I argue that the National 
Party Government of Keith J. Holyoake pursued race relations legislation in 1971 for two 
reasons.  First, New Zealand was increasingly drawing criticism from international and 
domestic sources for its sporting contacts with South African teams.454 In 1970 and 1971, 
two groups, Halt All Racist Tours (HART) and Citizens Association for Racial Equality 
(CARE), were fully mobilized as part of an effort to sever the sporting links between the two 
countries.455 Unlike CABTA, the organization dating from the 1950s, the membership of 
these new groups was younger and more open to aggressive and confrontational tactics.  It 
was also more connected to transnational NGOs opposing apartheid and South African 
rugby tours in other countries, as well as to the UN.  For example, the UN Special 
Committee on Apartheid expressed its moral support for the New Zealand protest 
453 See the remarks of Sir Leslie Munro, 377 NZPD 5114; David Thomson, 377 NZPD 5304; Dr. Finlay, 377 
NZPD 5310.  This view was also put forth by Maori representatives; see Matui Rata, 377 NZPD 5316; Reweti, 
377 NZPD 5320. 
454 Alley 1991: 174-175; Thompson, Retreat from Apartheid, 119. 
455 Thomas Oliver Newnham, Apartheid is not a Game:  The Inside Story of New Zealand’s Struggle against Apartheid 
Sport (Auckland:  Graphic Publications, 1975). 
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movement.456 The UN had also designated 1971 as the International Year against Racial 
Discrimination, creating an opportunity for the Holyoake government to make an important 
symbolic statement by finally transposing the terms of the ICERD into domestic law.  
Indeed, the international imperative dominated parliamentary debates over the race relations 
bill.   
The second reason for governmental action in 1971 derived from domestic politics.  
A new generation of Maori leadership was emerging.  It was more aggressive than its earlier 
counterparts, and it challenged the very legitimacy of the New Zealand state.  The Holyoake 
government had held power since 1960.  By 1970, “there were murmurings of 
dissatisfaction” with the government, and it was suggested by some that Holyoake “’was out 
of step with the times.’”457 Pakeha were also participating in organizations focused on the 
issue of race.  In February 1970, the New Zealand Race Relation Council was formed from 
numerous church, trade union, university and CARE groups across the country.  It pressed 
the government to ratify the ICERD and implement its provisions into law.  Domestically, 
therefore, the enactment of race relations legislation allowed the government to portray itself 
as responding to new developments within New Zealand, namely the emergence of a new 
generation of more aggressive leaders.  The Holyoake government had not consulted with 
civil society organizations in drafting the Bill.458 At the same time that it responded to new 
political demands, however, the government also had to take care not to alienate its 
traditionally-minded constituency.  The cautious nature of its bill was intended to prevent 
that from happening.   
In May 1970, Prime Minister Holyaoke advised the House that he had instructed 
officials to study the legislative provisions or amendments that would have to be introduced 
456 Thompson, Retreat from Apartheid, 89. 
457 Wood 1997: 43. 
458 See 377 NZPD 5308-09, 5339 
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prior to ratification of the ICERD.  He expressed his government’s commitment to 
ratification on two subsequent occasions.459 In the Governor-General’s Speech on 25 
February 1971, Holyoake’s National Party government formally announced its intention to 
introduce a Race Relations Bill as part of its observance of the UN’s International Year 
against Racial Discrimination.460 Three months later, the Labour Party’s conference 
“’urged’” the government to ratify the ICERD “’this year,’” and expressed its support for 
“’race relations legislation’” to prohibit racial discrimination in facilities and services, 
accommodation, employment, and places of public resort.461 
In July 1971, the Holyoake government presented Parliament with a Bill that 
prohibited discrimination on grounds of color, race, and national or ethnic origins and was 
enforced through the conciliation of individual complaints.  Table 4.1 presents the timeline 
from the Bill’s introduction to its enactment.  The Bill’s long title, “A Bill to affirm and 
promote racial equality in New Zealand and to implement the International Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,” indicated the explicitly international 
context within which it was being considered.  So, too, did the arguments expressed by 
members on both sides of Parliament.  For example, in introducing the Bill, D.J. Riddiford, 
who had become Minister of Justice in 1969, emphasized the “international pressures on 
States to take positive measures to combat racial discrimination,” and he observed that other 
Western European democracies were parties to the ICERD.  Internal documents of the 
Department of Justice explicitly stated that the Bill’s “principal purpose” was “the limited 
459 The first was in a November 1970 press statement, discussed at 377 NZPD 5342, and the second was on 
29 January 1971, in a statement concerning New Zealand’s commemoration of 1971 as the UN’s International 
Year for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination.   
460 371 NZPD 4. 
461 See 377 NZPD 5339. 
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one of enabling New Zealand to ratify the [ICERD],” noting that it was “essential” to 
understand the Bill in that context.462 
Table 4.1:  Race Relations Act Legislative Timeline 
 
Race Relations Bill    9 July 1971 
introduced into Parliament  
 
Race Relations Bill referred  9 July 1971 
to Statutes Revision Committee 
 
Statutes Revision Committee   7 December 1971 
reports back to Parliament  
 
Race Relations Act enters   1 April 1972 
into force 
 
New Zealand ratifies the  22 November 1972 
ICERD 
 
Rather than engaging in philosophical arguments about the appropriate role of the 
state in society, most of the parliamentary debate consisted of political potshots and point 
scoring, although Labour’s Allan M. Finlay asserted that “this is a Bill of considerable 
complexity which deals with a question that goes deep into our social roots.”463 A few MPs 
did perceive the Bill’s broad significance.  Thomson, for example, asserted that it would 
reaffirm “the commitment of Parliament and the New Zealand people to complete and 
genuine racial equality” and serve as “a formal statement of a fundamental policy.”464 Hugh 
C. Templeton saw ratification of the treaty as a “moral imperative” and a need to show that 
462 “Race Relations Bill, Report of Department of Justice,” Office of the Clerk of the House of 
Representatives, ABGX, W3706/28, p. 1. 
463 Finlay, 373 NZPD 1702 
464 377 NZPD 5305. 
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NZ is “committed to a multi-racial society.”465 He further argued that in their effort “to 
make a nation,” the Bill will act as “a norm and a guide for every Minister and every civil 
servant, every teacher, and every person concerned with the development of our nation.”466 
The bipartisan support expressed for antidiscrimination legislation was not deeply 
felt on either side of the House.  Both parliamentary debates and submissions to the Statutes 
Revision Committee revealed significant apathy among MPs regardless of party affiliation.  
No Members advocated the creation of a strong antidiscrimination law.  In the opinion of 
Sir Guy Powles, who was subsequently named the Race Relations Conciliator, the period of 
debate on the Bill revealed “considerable opposition to and misunderstanding about the 
Act.”467 After the Bill’s first reading, it was sent to the Statutes Revision Committee, and the 
proceedings of that Committee were opened to the public and the media. 
The government had proposed the bare minimum necessary for ratifying the 
ICERD, and this shaped the terms of the parliamentary debate.  Even National Party MPs 
who wholly supported the Bill showed no inclination to create a policy that facilitated a 
wider legal mobilization against discrimination.  The Bill protected against discrimination by 
reason of the color, race, or ethnic or national origins of persons or of any of their relatives 
or associates.  During the course of the parliamentary debate, several Labour MPs suggested 
adding additional protected grounds, including sex,468 religion,469 creed,470 and economic 
status.471 In light of those proposals, Tirikatene-Sullivan suggested that the proposal be 
465 373 NZPD 1704. 
466 377 NZPD 5324, 5363. 
467 Office of the Race Relations Conciliator, Annual Report (Wellington:  A.R. Shearer, Government Printer, 
1973), 4. 
468 This was suggested by Rata, see 371 NZPD 163;  373 NZPD 1702-03; and, by Tirikatene-Sullivan, see 373 
NZPD 1705.   
469 This was suggested by Norman Kirk, see 373 NZPD 1708. 
470 This was suggested by Tirikatene-Sullivan, see 373 NZPD 1705.  The Minister of Justice also expressed his 
personal desire to include creed, see 373 NZPD 1706-07. 
471 This was suggested by Kirk, see 373 NZPD 1704-05. 
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renamed the “Antidiscrimination Bill.”472  The Minister of Justice contended that that these 
other grounds were excluded because they were not addressed by the ICERD.473 However, 
this was something of a false argument, for the government was not strictly limited to 
legislating the terms of the ICERD, as was Australia under its constitution.  Rather, the 
inclusion of other groups would have taken the Bill beyond the narrow political consensus 
within the government’s ranks.  As enacted, no additional protected classes were added. 
In terms of its scope, the Bill covered access to public places, vehicles, and facilities; 
the provision of goods and services; employment; land, housing and other accommodation; 
and, advertisements.474 The employment provision contained several exemptions, including 
one for “work involving national security” and employment on non-New Zealand ships or 
aircraft where that employment was sought outside New Zealand.475 In addition, it 
contained a loosely worded exemption for employment “for any purpose for which persons 
of a particular ethnic or national origin have or are commonly found to have a particular 
qualification or aptitude.”476 In contrast to American and British legislation, the housing 
provision did not contain an exemption for “Mrs. Murphy’s” boardinghouse, or in British 
terms, “close communities—premises in which the owner shares part of the facilities with 
tenants; nor did the Bill apply to trade unions, which were believed to operate in a racially 
nondiscriminatory manner in New Zealand.477 It permitted racial distinctions in certain 
charitable instruments.478  
472 See 373 NZPD 1705.   
473 373 NZPD 1706-07, 1708. 
474 See Race Relations Act 1971, ss. 3-7.  In addition, s. 27 voided restraints on marriage based upon race, 
color, or ethnic or national origins. 
475 See Race Relations Act, s. 5(4) and (5). 
476 See Race Relations Act, s. 5(3). 
477 Thomson, 377 NZPD 5306. 
478 See Race Relations Act 1971, s. 36. 
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The government’s ambivalence and low expectations for the Bill were evident in the 
parliamentary debate.  The Minister of Justice, for example, acknowledged that it was already 
against the law to refuse to sell or let a house to a person on the grounds of race.  Yet, in 
spite of that and provisions within the Race Relations Bill that prohibited discrimination in 
property transactions, he nevertheless suggested that “a person retains the right to decline to 
sell his house to someone whom he does not like, whether he be black, white or brown.”479 
The Department of Justice observed that a number of witnesses before the Statutes 
Revision Committee failed to “grasp” the limited purpose of the Race Relations Bill.480 
Rather than seeing the measure as an instrument to satisfy international commitments, 
witnesses viewed it as a broader social charter.  In all, thirty-four submissions were made to 
the Committee.  Seven were made by individuals, including university lecturers, priests, and 
two Maori.  Submissions were also made by several Maori groups, including Nga Tamatoa 
(the “Young Warriors”), the Maori Graduates Association, and the New Zealand Maori 
Council.  There were no submissions from any representatives of New Zealand’s Pacific 
Island community, nor from any members of the small Chinese, Indian, Greek, or Slavic 
communities resident in the country.  The New Zealand Race Relations Council, HART, and 
CARE made supportive submissions, as did the National Council of Churches and the 
Public Service Association.  In his submission to the Statutes Revision Committee on the 
Race Relations Bill, Guy Powles, in his capacity as Ombudsman, made a submission in 
which he said it would be “administratively practicable to combine the offices of 
Ombudsman and Race Relations Conciliator provided a full deputy was appointed on each 
side.”481 He citied research commissioned by the UN Institute for Training and Research in 
479 373 NZPD 1710. 
480 “Race Relations Bill, Report of Department of Justice,” Office of the Clerk of the House of 
Representatives, ABGX, W3706/28, p. 1.  
481 Office of the Race Relations Conciliator, Annual Report (Wellington:  A.R. Shearer, Government Printer, 
1973), 4. 
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support of the idea that racial discrimination should and could be adequately redressed 
through legal means, a point that was revisited during parliamentary debate.482 
Maori groups attacked the government for failing to consult with them.  The Maori 
Graduates Association worried that the law could be used to dismantle Maori institutions 
and organizations, such as the four parliamentary seats reserved exclusively for Maori.  The 
advantages of conciliation over harsher methods of law enforcement were accepted by most 
organizations.  But, the New Zealand Law Society thought that it might appear “to some 
complainants that the Act lacks certain and effective means of enforcement.”483 Many of 
the submissions on the Race Relations Bill questioned the Attorney-General’s role in the 
bringing of civil proceedings.  The Ombudsman, Guy Powles, who would also serve as the 
first RRC, stated that he could not see “any real need for the interposition of the Attorney-
General.”  Rather, he suggested, if conciliation fails, the Conciliator “ought to be able to 
exercise his own judgment about the need for court proceedings, and he should therefore be 
able to initiate them in appropriate cases.”484 The New Zealand Law Society thought the 
procedure “unduly cumbersome” and “likely to deter complaints being taken to court in all 
but the most flagrant or serious cases of discrimination.”485 Nga Tamatoa argued that for the 
legislation “to have any meaning at all, [it] must bind the Crown, its servants and all its 
departments.”486 
The issue of who may file a complaint constitutes an important element of 
antidiscrimination legislation.  Witnesses appearing before the Statutes Revision Committee 
encouraged an amendment to allow persons other than the aggrieved to file a complaint.  
482 Submission of Guy Powles on the Race Relations Bill, p. 2.  See also See 377 NZPD 5328. 
483 Submission of the New Zealand Law Society on the Race Relations Bill, p. 3.  Copies of all submissions are 
on file with the author. 
484 Submission of the Ombudsman on the Race Relations Bill, p. 2. 
485 Submission of the New Zealand Law Society on the Race Relations Bill, p. 6. 
486 Submission of the Nga Tamatoa Council on the Race Relations Bill, p. 3. 
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David Thomson remarked that this question gave the committee “a great deal of difficulty” 
because the “last thing” they wanted to do was “encourage the interfering busy-body or the 
person or organization that for its own purposes wishes to foment complaints and 
grievances.”  Yet, he observed, “as the New Zealand Law Society pointed out, some people 
who may be subjected to racial intolerance may not themselves lay complaints with the 
conciliator simply because they may be inarticulate or ignorant of their rights…”487 No 
amendments were made, but the language of the Bill was, itself, ambiguous, providing that 
the Conciliator was authorized to investigate a “complaint made to him by any person.”488 
At the same time, the Bill accorded him discretion to refuse to investigate where the 
“complainant has not a sufficient interest in the subject-matter of the complaint.”489  Such 
decisions by the Conciliator were not subject to judicial review.490 
The Statutes Revision Committee ultimately made three main amendments in 
response to concerns expressed by witnesses who came before it.  First, it eliminated what it 
feared to be a “loophole” from the legislation.491 Originally, the Bill provided that race or 
color had to be the only reason for the discriminatory treatment, but at the suggestion of 
Committee witnesses that word was stricken from the Bill.  Representatives from the 
Department of Justice suggested that the proper test would be whether or not the 
discriminatory act or practice complained of would have occurred but for the race or color 
of the aggrieved person and further that, regardless of the phrase used, the plaintiff still bore 
the burden of showing a discriminatory motive.492 Second, the Bill was amended to extend 
487 Thomson, 377 NZPD 5307. 
488 Race Relations Act 1971, §13(a). 
489 Race Relations Act 1971, §14(1)(c). 
490 Race Relations Act 1971, §19. 
491 See Thomson, 377 NZPD 5307; and Wilkinson, 377 NZPD 5335 
492 See Wilkinson, 377 NZPD 5335. 
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its reach to employment agencies, real estate agents, and accommodation agencies.493 And 
third, the Crown was made subject to civil proceedings that could be initiated by an 
individual complainant.  Originally, the Crown had been exempt from such proceedings.  
The Minister of Justice had asserted that this change was unnecessary “because obviously the 
Crown will take administrative steps to see that the law is complied with.”494 Although some 
submissions did not support the Attorney-General’s role in bringing civil proceedings on 
behalf of individuals, his role was not changed because it was thought “proper that, as a 
matter of social justice, the State should intervene on behalf of a person discriminated 
against on racial grounds rather than place on him the burden and expense of bringing 
proceedings himself.”495 
Aside from these changes, the Race Relations Act 1971 closely resembled the Bill as 
it had been introduced into Parliament, with only minor changes being made by the Statutes 
Revision Committee. The Race Relations Act 1971 prohibited racial discrimination in:  
public places, vehicles, and facilities;496 the provision of goods and services,497 employment, 
including employment agencies, but excluding national security workers on grounds of 
national origin and workers on non-NZ ships or aircraft;498 land, housing, and other 
accommodation;499 and, in advertisements.500  According to the Minister of Justice, religion 
493 See 377 NZPD 5307. 
494 See 373 NZPD 1701. 
495 Thomson, Acting Minister of Justice, 377 NZPD 5307.  See also “Race Relations Bill, Report of 
Department of Justice,” Office of the Clerk of the House of Representatives, ABGX, W3706/28. 
496 Race Relations Act 1971, §3. 
497 Race Relations Act 1971, §4. 
498 Race Relations Act 1971, §5. 
499 Race Relations Act 1971, §6. 
500 Race Relations Act 1971, §7. 
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was not included as a protected ground because it did not appear in the ICERD.501 There 
were, however, no institutional barriers to extending the legislation to encompass religion.502 
With one exception, complaints of discrimination were not to be directly actionable 
in the courts, but rather they had first to undergo a process of conciliation administered by 
the Race Relations Conciliator,503 a newly created post.  The exception was complaints of 
discrimination with regard to access to public “places, vehicles, and facilities,” for which 
criminal proceedings could be initiated.504 The Conciliator was authorized to investigate 
alleged instances of discrimination either in response to a complaint made by “any person” 
or upon “his own motion.”505  It was understood, however, that although the Conciliator 
possessed the power to act on his own motion, he would nevertheless “await a complaint 
made to him before he takes action.”506 Complaints of discrimination could be brought 
against private actors as well as against the Crown.507 “If convinced that a breach of the law 
had occurred, the Conciliator was authorized to secure a “settlement” between the parties 
and assurances against any future discrimination.508 
If conciliation failed, there were two different processes depending upon whether the 
claim had been brought against the state or against a private actor.  If the latter, the Race 
Relations Conciliator was required to report to the Attorney-General and make a 
recommendation that the Attorney-General institute civil proceedings against the alleged 
501 See 377 NZPD 1708 
502 New Zealand had a history of discriminating against Jehovah’s Witnesses.  During World War II, the 
Jehovah’s Witnesses were declared a subversive organization because of their views on the war, and many 
adherents of the faith were incarcerated.  As late as the 1950s, they suffered discrimination in gaining access to 
public meeting halls.  There is no record of New Zealand lawyers taking up their cause. 
503 Race Relations Act 1971, §10-20. 
504 Race Relations Act 1971, §24. 
505 See Race Relations Act 1971, §13. 
506 Finlay, 373 NZPD 1702. 
507 Race Relations Act 1971, §2. 
508 See Race Relations Act 1971, §17(a). 
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discriminator in the Supreme Court.509 The law provided that the “aggrieved person” was 
not to be an original party to those proceedings; nor was he to “join or be joined in” those 
proceedings unless otherwise ordered by a court of law.510 The Attorney-General could 
decline to initiate suit, despite the Conciliator’s recommendation.  In that event, he was 
required to issue a certificate to the aggrieved person, who was then authorized to initiate 
court proceedings in his own name.511 If the complaint was against the Crown and 
conciliation failed, the Conciliator could issue the aggrieved person a certificate thereby 
authorizing the private pursuit of court proceedings.  For such cases, “the reasonable costs 
and expenses of the aggrieved person, including costs incurred between solicitor and client” 
were to be “taxed by the Court and paid by the Crown,” unless the Court ordered 
otherwise.512 
Assigning this role to the Attorney-General was controversial in the parliamentary 
debates.  Because courts operated through a public process, Labour MP Rata thought that it 
should be left to them rather than the Attorney-General to determine whether charges were 
frivolous or trivial.513  Rata suggested that “[m]inorities must seek redress on the same 
grounds that majorities must seek redress.  An accused person must have the same right as 
anybody else to appear before a judicial body;” he wanted matters to go directly to the 
courts.514 This did not mean that he liked the legislation, for he said that given the violations 
of the Treaty of Waitangi he had “never been impressed with paper guarantees.”515 Norman 
509 Race Relations Act 1971, §17(2).  The Bill also provided for the refusal of licenses and registration on 
grounds of a violation of §§3-7 of the Bill, see Race Relations Act 1971, §23. 
510 Race Relations Act 1971, §21(2).  In the event that costs were awarded against the Attorney-General, they 
were to be paid by the Attorney-General without any right to indemnification by the aggrieved person, Race 
Relations Act 1971, §21(6). 
511 Race Relations Act 1971, §21(4). 
512 Race Relations Act 1971, §21(7). 
513 See 373 NZPD 1709; and Faulkner, 373 NZPD 1710. 
514 373 NZPD 1702-03. 
515 March 4, 1971, 371 NZPD 162. 
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Kirk, also of the Labour Party, feared that the decision to prosecute would be dictated by the 
politically-driven decision making of Cabinet rather than an objective assessment of the 
merits of a case.516 Thomson countered that the Attorney-General’s role was appropriate 
because “as a matter of social justice, the State should intervene on behalf of a person 
discriminated against on racial rounds rather than place on him the burden and expense of 
bringing proceedings himself.”517 MP Riddiford added that the Attorney-General’s function 
was appropriate and not unusual and that it was hoped he would be “distinguishing between 
a political action and a purely legal one.”518 
Thomson, a National Party MP who would later play a key role in the enactment of 
legislation prohibiting sex discrimination, acknowledged the alternative modes of 
enforcement, namely, establishing “a series of criminal offenses” or giving “complainants the 
initial right to bring a civil action in the ordinary courts.”  He argued against those adversarial 
approaches, suggesting that they might exacerbate race relations and create animosities, as 
opposed to facilitating mutual understanding and “the patient removal of grievances 
between people of different races or origins.”  Litigation was thus to be “a last resort when 
all else has failed.”519 
In its initial years of existence, the Office of the Race Relations Conciliator was 
severely understaffed.  Sir Guy Powles was named as the first Race Relations Conciliator on 
23 December 1973, and at that time he was also serving as the country’s first Ombudsmen.  
Those two positions were considered part-time, and they were thought to be sufficiently 
similar to warrant having the same person in each.  However, the workload quickly proved 
too much and Ken H. Mason, a non-lawyer, was appointed as a part-time Deputy 
516 373 NZPD 1708. 
517 377 NZPD 5307. 
518 373 NZPD 1706. 
519 377 NZPD 5306. 
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Conciliator in 1972.  Race Relations Offices were located in Auckland and Wellington; 
although the Wellington office was closed in 1973.520 Powles subsequently resigned in April 
1973, and by the end of February 1974, the new Labour Government had still not replaced 
him.  This left the Deputy Race Relations Conciliator working one day per week and the 
Executive Officer doing all of the rest of the work,521 which indicated the low priority 
accorded to the work of the Race Relations Conciliator by the government.  In 1973, Powles 
was asked whether he thought the government’s inattention to his former post was 
attributable to an expectation that a human rights commission would be created like those 
existing in Canada.  He expressed doubt as to whether there would be “’much enthusiasm 
for [that] in the present political climate.’”522 
Before his departure, Powles took great pains to persuade Maori leaders that the 
Race Relations Act 1971 could be a force for positive action, and he tried to assuage their 
fears that it would be used to undermine special arrangements for Maori.  He convened a 
meeting with the New Zealand Maori Council in 1972, in order “to dispel misconceptions 
and to give information on how the Act might work.”  Duncan MacIntyre, Minister of 
Maori Affairs, also addressed the Council.523 At that meeting, Maori leaders expressed 
concern “about the possible effects of the Race Relation Act on some of the established 
practices and institutions particularly prized by the Maori people as significant of their racial 
520 Following that closure, the number of complaints filed in the Wellington/South Island area fell from 
twenty-five in 1972-73 to fourteen for the year 1973-74.  Meanwhile, 78.3% of all complaints filed in 1973-74 
originated in the Auckland area, Office of the Race Relations Conciliator, Annual Report (Wellington:  
Government Printer, 1974), 4. 
521 Dominion (Wellington), 20 February 1974. 
522 Correspondence from Sir Guy Powles to Timothy McBride (5 December 1973), quoted in Tim McBride, 
“Anti-discrimination legislation in the provinces of Canada and in New Zealand:  a comparative study” (LLM 
Thesis, Dalhousie University Canada, 1974), 169, n. 154. 
523 Office of the Race Relations Conciliator, Annual Report (Wellington:  A.R. Shearer, Government Printer, 
1973), 4. 
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identity.”524 They feared the loss of separate Maori representation in Parliament, the 
existence of Maori boarding schools, and the concept of the Maori marae.  The Council 
requested a clear statement by the prime minister on such matters.  Prime Minister John R. 
Marshall did so in a letter addressed to the Council, which he also released to the press in 
order to document the government’s attitude on the matters.  Marshall felt that such a letter 
was not wholly warranted because the Race Relations Act did not override any other existing 
statutes and because it expressly exempted from the Act’s operation anything directed 
towards helping particular groups to achieve equality in the community.  Nevertheless, he 
pledged that the government would not “promote or introduce legislation affecting the 
existence of any currently accepted Maori institution or organization whether authorized by 
statute or stemming from tradition, without having full consultation with the New Zealand 
Maori Council.  Further, if it appeared that the Act in any way threatened Maori institutions 
or organizations, the Council would be consulted and the Act amended if necessary.   
Although Race Relations Commissioner Powles tried to cultivate support among 
Maori organizations, those organizations never really saw the Race Relations Act as 
providing a mechanism for mobilizing actions.  New Zealand courts had never constituted 
an avenue for mobilization by discontented groups.  Thus, in contrast to African Americans, 
Maori had no history of mobilizing court actions.  Maori organizations were not legally 
oriented.  Moreover, Maori did not want equal rights; they wanted land rights and autonomy.  
At the time, Maori were busy mobilizing around the longstanding issue of land rights and the 
Treaty of Waitangi.  In 1975, a coalition of groups formed Te Ropu o te Matakite to combat 
further alienation of Maori land.  In September and October of that year, Whina Cooper, a 
former leader within the Maori Women’s Welfare League, led a Maori Land March to 
524 Letter from Prime Minister J.R. Marshall to New Zealand Maori Council, dated 5 May 1972.  Reproduced 
in Appendix C, Office of the Race Relations Conciliator, Annual Report (Wellington:  A.R. Shearer, Government 
Printer, 1973), 40.   
121
Wellington in order to focus attention on Maori grievances.  The march culminated with the 
arrival of approximately 5,000 marchers in the Parliament’s grounds, whereupon Cooper 
presented to Prime Minister Bill Rowling a list of rights from two hundred Maori elders and 
a petition supporting the objectives of the march signed by 60,000 people.  Acknowledging 
the centrality of land rights issues, a Waitangi Tribunal was established by act of Parliament 
on 10 October 1975.   Within academic writing, the Treaty of Waitangi served as an 
increasingly popular subject of analysis,525 while the Race Relations Act was largely neglected 
by Maori groups.  
Before long, however, a few new organizations referred complaints to the Race 
Relations Conciliator.  According to the annual report for 1973, in that year three different 
organizations referred complaints to the RRC.  These included the Southland Council for 
Racial Harmony (complaint about housing discrimination against a Maori couple); the 
Nelson Race Relations Action Group (complaint about the refusal of boarding house 
accommodations to a Maori girl); and the Auckland Action Committee to Combat Racism 
and Racial Discrimination, which referred two complaints to the Conciliator.  No similar 
complaints were recorded in the annual reports until 1978, when the Conciliator received a 
complaint from the New Zealand Freedom from Discrimination Group.  During the 1970s, 
the Auckland Committee on Racial Discrimination was also operating.  It occasionally made 
representations to the Race Relations Conciliator,526 but at times it took a more adversarial 
approach to race relations that the Conciliator eschewed.527 
525 See Claudia Orange, The Treaty of Waitangi (Wellington: Allen & Unwin/Port Nicholson Press, 1987); I.H. 
Kawharu (ed.), Waitangi:  Maori and Pakeha perspectives of the Treaty of Waitangi (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1989); and, Paul G. McHugh, The Maori Magna Carta: New Zealand law and the Treaty of Waitangi (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1991). 
526 See Office of the Race Relations Conciliator, Annual Report (Wellington:  Government Printer, 1980); 
Office of the Race Relations Conciliator, Annual Report (Wellington:  Government Printer, 1981); Office of the 
Race Relations Conciliator, Annual Report (Wellington:  Government Printer, 1983). 
527 See Office of the Race Relations Conciliator, Annual Report (Wellington:  Government Printer, 1976). 
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ANTIDISCRIMINATION LEGISLATION FOR WOMEN 
Even before the Holyoake government had committed itself to race relations 
legislation in 1971, it was confronting the issue equal employment rights for women.  In 
1968, the government established a National Advisory Council on the Employment of 
Women.  Women’s consciousness as “a separate political force,” however, only began to 
form in 1969, although the initial cries for women’s liberation fell upon deaf ears among 
male-dominated leftist groups.528 The first women’s liberation groups appeared in 1970; 
they included the Wellington Women’s Liberation Front, the Auckland Women’s Liberation 
Front, and the Women’s Movement for Freedom.  By a year later, six more organizations 
had been established across the country, including in the regional centers of Palmerston 
North and Dunedin.  Throughout the early 1970s, these groups increased in number and 
proliferated across both the north and south islands.  In 1972, a National Organization for 
Women (NOW) was established.  Like its American counterpart, it was created in order “to 
pursue traditional women’s rights goals in conventional ways.”529 That same year, two 
hundred women attended New Zealand’s first women’s liberation conference, held in 
Wellington, and the following year, 1,500 attended the United Women’s Convention in 
Auckland.530  Women’s groups were demanding an array of social policy reforms, including 
equal pay for women in the private sector.531  Their efforts to desegregate men’s-only pubs, 
528 Christine Dann, Up From Under:  Women and Liberation in New Zealand (Wellington:  Allen & Unwin/Port 
Nicholson Press, 1985), 3-4. 
529 Dann, Up From Under, 9. 
530 Maud Cahill and Christine Dann,  “Introduction” in Maud Cahill and Christine Dann (eds.), Changing our 
lives:  women working in the women’s liberation movement, 1970-1990 (Wellington:  Bridget Williams Books, 1991), 1-9, 
2. 
531 In 1960, the Labour Government of Walter Nash had enacted the Equal Pay Act for State Services, which 
established the principle of equal pay for women within the public services. 
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however, garnered more publicity.532 By 1973, there was talk of establishing a Women’s 
Electoral Lobby (WEL), like that in Australia, in order to try to influence elections.533  New 
Zealand’s WEL was formed just prior to the 1975 election.  Pressure from women’s groups 
became a key element of subsequent campaigns throughout the 1970s as both of the main 
political parties tried to position themselves on an array of controversial social issues. 
The National Advisory Council on the Employment of Women published its first 
report on the eve of the December 1972 election.  The National Party pledged in the course 
of the 1972 election campaign that if returned to power it would incorporate into a proposed 
Industrial Relations Bill a provision outlawing discrimination against women in employment; 
and Prime Minister Holyoake reminded voters that it was a National government that had 
legislated against racial discrimination.  The Labour Party, led by Norman E. Kirk, made 
tepid assurances concerning legislation against sex discrimination.  Its connections with the 
trade unions made employment discrimination against women a sensitive issue.  After twelve 
years of National Party rule, voters proved ready for a change, and Labour won the 1972 
election with a surprising landslide.  It carried fifty-five seats to National’s thirty-two and 
received 48.37% of the vote.534 
Legislation prohibiting discrimination against women was not forthcoming from the 
new Labour government, however, because of its strong ties to the unions, most of which 
vehemently opposed ideas of gender equality.  The government abandoned a plan to 
incorporate a nondiscrimination provision into an Industrial Relations Bill because, 
according to Prime Minister Kirk, separate, more comprehensive legislation was being 
532 Women began entering those pubs and seeking service in Auckland and Wellington in 1970, see Dann, Up 
From Under, 6. 
533 Sonja Davies, “I’ll have to ask my husband” in Brian Edwards (ed.), Right out Labour victory '72: the inside story 
(Wellington:  A. H. & A. W. Reed, 1973), 133-46, 144. 
534 Brian Edwards, Brian, “There’s always next time” in Brian Edwards (ed.), Right out Labour victory '72: the 
inside story (Wellington:  A. H. & A. W. Reed, 1973), 3-15, 3; Barry Gustafson, His way: a biography of Robert 
Muldoon (Auckland:  Auckland University Press, 2000), 130. 
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considered.535  This inaugurated a period of governmental delays that the opposition sought 
to exploit for political gain.  In March 1973, the National Party proposed amendments to the 
government’s industrial relations legislation that would prohibit discrimination against 
women in employment, but those amendments were effectively killed by the Labour 
government.  In 1972, David Thomson introduced a private member’s bill, the “Women’s 
Rights of Employment Bill,”536 and the day following that bill’s introduction, the Minister of 
Labour responded by giving notice that he was convening a special select committee on 
women’s affairs.537 That committee, known as the Women’s Rights Committee, was 
established on 13 September 1973, and its work was described as evaluating “the attitude the 
nation took towards women in general, and their rights in every sphere of society.”538  
Thomson’s bill was promptly referred to that committee, where it sat as the committee 
engaged in protracted deliberations.539 In 1974, Thomson again introduced a similar bill,540 
which the Minister of Labour again referred to the Women’s Rights Committee, and W.L. 
Young—a National Party MP serving on the Women’s Rights Committee—introduced a 
“Women’s Rights of Employment Bill” into Parliament.  The latter would have provided for 
a remedy by way of civil proceedings,541 which prompted a negative reaction from Dorothy 
Jelicich.  She observed that women should not be required to take a private civil action to 
obtain justice at their own expense, but rather they should be able to use a process similar to 
535 Norman Kirk responded to a question from David Thomson, 7 November 1977, 387 NZPD 4914. 
536 Thomson, 389 NZPD 641. 
537 Thomson, 389 NZPD 641. 
538 Hugh Watt, 389 NZPD 643.  The Committee was due to report back to the House on 5 March 1974, by 
which time it had received seventy-one items of evidence and heard three witnesses, with arrangements to hear 
a further twenty-seven witnesses.  On that date, however, the Labour Government moved to extend the 
reporting date by nine months, to 30 November 1974. 
539 The Committee was originally required to report back to Parliament on 5 March 1974.  However, on that 
date, the government moved that it be accorded an additional nine months to continue its deliberations.   
540 Thomson’s second private member’s bill differed from his previous measure in that would have bound the 
Crown and the State services, and it used different technical terms with regard to employment law, see 389 
NZPD 642.   
541 See Young, 401 NZPD 4787. 
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that set forth in the Race Relations Act.542 Ironically, the only women in Parliament, Jelicich 
and Mary Batchelor, sat on the Labour benches and thus found themselves arguing the party 
line against these bills. 
The Women’s Rights Committee finally reported back to Parliament on 12 June 
1975.543 Publication of its report, The Role of Women in New Zealand Society, coincided 
with the International Women’s Year conference in Mexico City.  The Report recommended 
that a Women’s Rights Commission be established to enforce antidiscrimination 
legislation.544 As a result of the Labour government’s delay, such legislation was again an 
election issue in 1975.  Hoping to score votes among women and points with the newly 
established WEL, the National Party’s 1975 manifesto promised the creation of a Human 
Rights Commission.545 In a speech on 4 November 1975 that kicked off the 1975 election 
campaign, Robert Muldoon promised a Human Rights Commission, and the party’s 
Manifesto pledged to “’introduce legislation to remove existing legal discrimination relating 
to women, and to prohibit discrimination against any person by reason of sex.’”546 The 
Nationals prevailed at the election, but once in office they apparently lost their zeal for 
antidiscrimination legislation, for no such legislation was introduced for twelve months.  As 
evidence of its own ambivalence towards such legislation, Labour Party MPs failed to bring 
542 401 NZPD 4796. 
543 The Committee ultimately received 128 submissions from a variety of organizations and individuals and 
heard 143 witnesses (see Young, 401 NZPD 4786). 
544 The Role of Women in New Zealand Society, Report of the Select Committee on Women’s Rights (Wellington:  
Government Printer, 1975), 102. 
545 Specifically, it provided:  “’The National Party … intends to establish a Human Rights Commission—
extending the office of the Ombudsman originally introduced by a National Government—to investigate 
complaints of inefficiency, maladministration and discrimination, and ensure that the exercise of power remains 
under continuous scrutiny.  The HRC will be a body of Ombudsmen and will have the overall authority to 
investigate complaints laid against the Government departments and organizations, local organizations, 
industrial associations and unions, and complaints of discrimination on the grounds of race, sex or religion….  
The HRC will include the present Ombudsman’s jurisdiction and the currently proposed extensions to cover 
local government.  Further, it will include investigation of malpractices in the management and conduct of 
industrial unions and associations’” (quoted by Finlay, 412 NZPD 2292). 
546 Gustafson, His way: a biography of Robert Muldoon, 170. 
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this neglect to the public’s attention in Parliament.  Finally, on 9 December 1976, the 
National government introduced its Human Rights Commission Bill, and a Select 
Committee was established to study the bill 
 
Table 4.2:  Human Rights Commission Act Legislative Timeline 
 
First Reading and referred   9 December 1976 
Select Committee 
 
Second Reading   29 July 1977 
 
Royal Assent    21 November 1977  
 
Act enters into force   1 September 1978 
 
Ratification of ICCPR   28 December 1978 
 
The government’s conception of a human tights commission was heavily influenced 
by its earlier institutional innovation, the Office of the Ombudsman, which it had established 
in 1960.547 As a result, the proposed commission was described as a “body of ombudsmen” 
authorized to investigate complaints of inefficiency, maladministration, and discrimination 
lodged against central as well as local governments and industrial associations and unions.548 
In terms of its scope, it was to have jurisdiction to investigate complaints of unlawful 
discrimination and breaches of human rights on grounds of sex, marital status, and religious 
beliefs in such fields as public access to places, vehicles and facilities, the provision of goods 
and services, land, housing accommodation and financing the same, advertisements, 
547 See Larry B. Hill, The Model Ombudsman:  Institutionalizing New Zealand’s Democratic Experiment (Princeton, 
N.J.:  Princeton University Press, 1976). 
548 Wilkinson, 396 NZPD 652. 
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employment, equal pay, inciting disharmony, and the membership of industrial unions or 
associations.   
The Select Committee received more than 127 submissions, many of them from 
concerned individuals and academics.549 Thirteen different women’s groups filed 
submissions,550 as did the United Nations Association of New Zealand and a group calling 
itself the Citizens Commission on Human Rights.  In addition, four religious organizations 
appeared before the Committee.551 Most of the submissions focused to some degree on the 
recognition of new protected grounds.  In its original form, the Bill defined “marital status” 
to mean “the status of being single, married, married but separated, divorced, widowed, or 
living in a de facto marriage.”  It also included an exception that would have permitted 
landlords to refuse accommodations to couples that were living in de facto relationships.  
These provisions were the result of a compromise hatched within the National Party caucus.  
Both the definition of marital status and the exception generated considerable opposition 
from religious organizations on the one hand, and feminists and homosexual activists on the 
other.  The former argued that the institution of marriage would be undermined by 
extending protection against discrimination to de facto couples and expressed concern that 
the language may be construed to accord legal protection to homosexual relationships.  
Liberal groups supported the broad definition of marital status, but they condemned the 
549 Between 23 February and 8 June, the Committee held thirteen meetings, taking a total of forty-five hours 
to hear fifty-five oral submissions.  
550 These included Amnesty Aroha, Feminists for Life (Auckland), Hamilton Organisation for Women, WEL 
(Waikato), Women’s Electoral Lobby (Auckland), Committee of Women, National Advisory Council on the 
Employment of Women, Women’s Rights Policy-Working-Group of the New Zealand Values Party, Hamilton 
Feminists, National Organisation of Women (Auckland), Women’s Electoral Lobby (Rotorua), Women’s 
Electoral Lobby (Christchurch), Council for Equal Pay + Opportunity, and the Maori Women’s Welfare 
League. 
551 These included the Catholic Education Council for New Zealand, the Public Questions Committee of the 
Methodist and Presbyterian Churches of New Zealand, Presbyterian Social Service Association, and the Bible 
Society in New Zealand Inc.   
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exception.  At this time, male homosexual conduct remained a criminal offense,552 one that 
the state had a recent record of prosecuting.553 
The Select Committee ultimately sought to appease conservative and liberal groups 
by removing both the definition of marital status and the exception from the Bill.554 By 
omitting the definition, Thomson suggested that New Zealand was “following the Canadian 
precedent” and leaving it to the Human Rights Commission and the courts to resolve the 
issue.555 Finlay, however, argued that failure to define the concept would create uncertainty, 
and require the courts to make law rather than simply interpret it.556 In addition, the issue of 
religion also raised questions, such as whether the law’s protections should apply to atheists 
and agnostics.  In the interest of protecting these groups, “ethical belief”—defined as the 
absence of religious belief—was added as a prohibited ground of discrimination.  The 
Committee rejected suggestions by some witnesses that gays and lesbians and individuals 
with learning disabilities be added as protected grounds.557 
Likewise, suggestions that the Race Relations Act and the Human Rights 
Commission Act be consolidated were rejected.  The Human Rights Commission Act was, 
however, “closely modeled on the complaint and conciliation procedures in the Race 
552 After years of lobbying, in 1974 Venn Young introduced into Parliament a private member’s bill that 
would have decriminalized male homosexual behavior.  It was considered by a select committee and underwent 
various amendments, but the Bill was denied a second reading on 8 July 1975 by a majority of five, see 399 
NZPD 2829.  In 1985, a private member’s Bill introduced by Labour MP Fran Wilde would have 
decriminalized male homosexual conduct and amended the Human Rights Commission Act 1977 to add sexual 
orientation as a protected class with regard to employment, accommodation, and the provision of goods and 
services.  As it was finally enacted, the Homosexual Law Reform Act 1986 decriminalized homosexual conduct 
between men over the age of sixteen, but did not recognize sexual orientation as a protected ground within the 
Human Rights Commission Act.   
553 Between 1970 and 1974, thirty-three persons were convicted of sodomy, and 279 were prosecuted for 
“indecency between males,” see 406 NZPD 2715. 
554 See Finlay, 411 NZPD 1249. 
555 411 NZPD 1476. 
556 412 NZPD 2293. 
557 See Submissions of the Intellectually Handicapped Children’s Society and the Specific Learning Difficulties 
Group on the Human Rights Commission Bill.  
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Relations Act.”558 Unlike the Race Relations Act, it included two novel enforcement 
features.  First, the commission was authorized to bring a class action on behalf of a group 
of persons allegedly suffering unlawful discrimination.559 Finlay speculated that the Bill 
might prove “a powerful weapon against oppression” or it may prove “to be a charter for 
mischief-makers and stirrers—or for both.”560 
The creation of a special tribunal, called the Equal Opportunities Tribunal (EOT), to 
adjudicate discrimination complaints was a second innovation.  Some Labour MPs 
considered the EOT an unnecessary bureaucratic development.  During parliamentary 
debate, Jonathan Hunt, for example, argued that the tribunal represented “a serious 
departure from the fundamental constitutional principles” and threatened to erode “the 
independence and prestige of the judicial process.  In his opinion, the interests of both 
parties to litigation would be best protected by allowing courts to adjudicate complaints, and 
public awareness of the new law would be better advanced if it were enforced through the 
courts rather than through a tribunal.561 During its deliberations, the Select Committee 
sought to tie the tribunal into the court system through several proposed amendments.  
First, it limited the jurisdiction of the tribunal to hearing claims for damages of $3,000 or 
less, the same figure that applied to magistrates’ courts.  A second amendment provided for 
appeals to the Supreme Court on matters of fact as well as law, including the right to a 
complete rehearing of the issues.  The latter change, Thomson suggested, meant that there 
would be comprehensive judicial supervision of the EOT’s rulings,562 but Hunt countered 
that it constituted needless duplication of tasks and therefore wasted expenditures.  The 
courts also offered their own suggestions with regard to the new tribunal.  Through a 
558 Thomson, 408 NZPD 4688. 
559 Thomson, 408 NZPD 4688.  Human Right Commission Act 1977, §38(2). 
560 408 NZPD 4689. 
561 Hunt, 413 NZPD 2391. 
562 Thomson, 411 NZPD 1476. 
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submission to the Select Committee, the Royal Commission on the Courts proposed that 
where a court hears an appeal on the facts against a decision of the EOT, the judge should 
be assisted by two members of the Tribunal who did not participate in the decision against 
which the appeal is sought.  The government adopted the proposal, believing that it would 
ensure that complaints of discrimination were heard by persons with expert knowledge in 
antidiscrimination law.   
More controversial was the National Party’s proposal to empower the Human Rights 
Commission to investigate industrial disputes.  The party had a longstanding antipathy 
towards New Zealand’s powerful trade unions.  Prime Minister Robert Muldoon knew that 
Labour would oppose this part of the Bill on grounds that it undermined the existing regime 
governing employment relations and posed a threat to the unions.  He included it in order to 
complicate Labour’s position on the Bill.  Labour MP Allan M. Finlay said that he could 
“think of nothing more dangerous than setting an Ombudsman-like character loose on the 
industrial scene.”563 He argued that industrial mediators were better suited to resolving these 
types of workplace disputes.  As a result, Labour could only support the Human Rights 
Commission in part. 
To a lesser extent, MPs debated the appropriate relationship the Human Rights 
Commission Bill should have, once enacted, to other statutes.  Labour MP Finlay, for 
example, faulted the Bill because it failed to limit or affect the provisions of any other Act.564 
Barry Brill, however, noted that a schedule appended to the Act identified legislation that the 
Act would affect.  If there was other legislation, then Finlay should bring it to Parliament’s 
attention, “rather than contending that the Bill could override every Act on the statute 
book.”565 Towards the goal of ending de jure discrimination, the Bill authorized the HRC to 
563 396 NZPD 668. 
564 415 NZPD 4128. 
565 415 NZPD 4130; see also Thomson, 408 NZPD 4688. 
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work towards and report to the prime minister from time to time on progress being made 
towards the repeal or amendment of provisions in any enactment that conflict with the Act’s 
prohibitions against discrimination and the elimination of discriminatory laws and practices 
that infringe the spirit and intention of this Act.566 Finlay unsuccessfully moved that those 
reports be issued to Parliament rather than the prime minister.567 
Several participants in the debates recognized, to varying degrees, that they were 
engaged in an effort of fundamental importance that was fraught with trade-offs.  National 
MP Edward G. Latter, for example, acknowledged the inherent difficulty in legislating “to 
create equal rights for all,” for in do doing, “the so-called or assumed rights of other people 
are invariably taken from them.”  He, therefore, cautioned that Parliament should “proceed 
slowly with this legislation.”568 Nevertheless, a self-described “stodgy righty,” Latter  
supported the Bill, alongside the “‘trendy lefties’” and “‘trendy lawyers,’” because he thought 
it was “inevitable” and part of a global trend.569 Labour MP David Lange disapprovingly 
observed that various “right-wing” groups had appeared before the Select Committee, 
explicitly seeking to preserve a right to discriminate.  According to Lange, these groups 
argued that “any protection against discrimination meant that we were placing a fetter on 
those who would wish to have the license to discriminate, and to pick and choose, on the 
basis of prejudice or bias.”570 Brill expressed concern that many New Zealanders 
misunderstood the legislation, and so he reassured them that they would “still be entitled to 
cherish their favorite prejudices,” such as those “against persons with red hair, persons with 
certain mannerisms, persons without hair, and people who do not appeal for one reason or 
another.”  The Bill is not, Brill explained, “an overall abrogation of the right of people to 
566 Human Rights Commission Act 1977, §5(e). 
567 415 NZPD 3978. 
568 412 NZPD 2295. 
569 412 NZPD 2295; 411 NZPD 1255. 
570 411 NZPD 1253. 
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have likes and dislikes, to have prejudices, or to cherish their own views,” for only “[a] 
narrow range of grounds” was proscribed.571 Chief Ombudsman and former Race Relations 
Conciliator, Powles noted that the Bill “covered a very sensitive area and, by its nature, 
would impinge on the rights of individuals, there being no strong and clear consensus on 
what those rights actually are.”572 MP Colleen E. Dewe, of the National Party, 
acknowledged that the Bill required the suppression of “people’s natural prejudices … so 
that there can be a greater consciousness of the need for concern for others,” but she asked, 
“how far can any government go in restraining and restricting people’s prejudices?”  She was 
particularly “troubled” by that prospect because many were advocated that the Bill should 
protect against discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation, which she felt was “still alien 
to the way of life of most of us.”573 
As it was finally enacted, the Human Rights Commission Act, like the Race Relations 
Act, provided for litigation as a last resort if efforts at conciliation failed.  Education served 
as the primary role of the Commission in its daily operations.  As a result, the introduction 
of class actions and the creation of the EOT, although innovations, were of little 
significance.  During the 1980s, the Muldoon government revisited the legislation on two 
occasions, the first time to create a new exception for discriminatory conduct and the second 
time to restructure the lines of authority within the Human Rights Commission.  It was 
motivated by a desire to constrain rather than expand the country’s antidiscrimination 
regime. 
 
571 412 NZPD 2290. 
572 412 NZPD 2301. 
573 412 NZPD 2301. 
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AMENDMENTS TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION ACT    
In 1981, the EOT heard the case Robinson v. Eric Sides Motors, Ltd. There, a business 
advertised in The Press and the Christchurch Star for a “keen Christian person” to fill a vacancy 
for a petrol station attendant, and an applicant claimed that he had been denied the position 
on account of his religious beliefs.  Two issues were presented for determination. First, had 
the newspapers breached the Human Rights Commission Act’s prohibition against 
discriminatory advertising?  And second, had Eric Sides Motors engaged in employment 
discrimination as alleged?  The case drew considerable media attention and raised a public 
outcry because it was well-known that freezing companies were permitted to hire Muslims 
exclusively as mutton slaughterers for the Iranian market in order to satisfy Islamic 
requirements.574 The HRC’s hoped that a decision against the newspapers would convince 
recalcitrant editors, many of whom regarded the Human Rights Commission Act as an 
unreasonable infringement on their operations, to stop printing discriminatory 
advertisements.575 
The EOT issued an uncharacteristically lengthy opinion in the case, finding that both 
Eric Sides Motors and the newspapers had breached the Act’s provision against 
discriminatory advertising.  Although a restraining order was issued against Eric Sides 
Motors to refrain for future discriminatory advertising and costs were awarded against all 
three defendants, a restraining order against the newspapers was not considered necessary in 
light of their assurances that they would abide by the law.576 This was hardly a 
demonstration of strength by the EOT.  With regard to the employment decision, the 
Tribunal decided that while the religious issue was a factor in the decision, it may not have 
574 See Human Right Commission, Annual Report (Wellington:  Government Printer, 1980), 24. 
575 See Human Right Commission, Annual Report (Wellington:  Government Printer, 1980), 20, 25. 
576 See Human Right Commission, Annual Report (Wellington:  Government Printer, 1981), 53. 
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been “’a substantial and operative factor.’”577 It gave “the benefit of the doubt’” to Eric 
Sides Motors, and found against the plaintiff.578 
Despite the outcome of the case, four months later Attorney-General and Minister 
of Justice J.K. McLay introduced the Human Rights Commission Amendment Bill into 
Parliament.  He argued that New Zealanders clearly wanted an employer to have “at least 
some capacity to prefer his co-religionists as employees when particular circumstances make 
it reasonable to exercise such a preference.”579 Rather than rescind the words “religious or 
ethical belief” from the employment section, which McLay believed might be interpreted to 
mean that the Government no longer opposed discrimination on those grounds, a new 
exception was created.  The amendment provided that if an employer could show special 
circumstances governing the way in which an employee was required to execute the duties of 
a particular position, and if those special circumstances made it reasonable for the employer 
to prefer an employee of the same beliefs as himself, then it would not be unlawful for the 
employer to advertise for, and employ, such a person in preference to applicants.580 
Notably, the government pursued this amendment without consulting the HRC’s Chief 
Commissioner, Pat Downey.581 
Labour MP Mary Batchelor empathized with McLay.  She stated that since sitting on 
the Select Committee that considered the Human Rights Commission Act she had 
recognized the difficulty in giving “one section of the community its human rights without 
affecting the human rights of other sections of the community in some way.”582 Noting that 
the National Party was purportedly committed to guarding against the expansion of the state 
577 Human Right Commission, Annual Report (Wellington:  Government Printer, 1981), 53 
578 Human Right Commission, Annual Report (Wellington:  Government Printer, 1981), 53 
579 440 NZPD 3032. 
580 440 NZPD 3032. 
581 Evening Post (25 August 1981), p. 5. 
582 440 NZPD 3032. 
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vis-à-vis society, Batchelor questioned why the government was not using this as an 
opportunity to reexamine the Human Rights Commission Act on this point.583 She 
suggested that the HRC be given “greater powers to investigate the expansion of 
governmental and administrative powers.”584 No such action was taken, however, and the 
proposed amendment was adopted. 
Two years later, the government sought further amendments to the Human Rights 
Commission Act.  Prime Minister Muldoon was dissatisfied with the way in which the HRC 
had been run under the leadership of its Chief Commissioner, Pat Downey.  Downey had 
opposed New Zealand’s continued sporting contacts with South Africa, bringing it into 
direct conflict with government policy.  In addition, he had taken a hard line against the 
newspapers, insisting on nondiscriminatory employment advertisements with regard to 
gender.  This, of course, was consonant with the law.  Downey’s position nevertheless riled a 
number of editorial boards, which used their position to publicize any trivial complaints 
pursued by the Commission and generate considerable bad press.  Until the 1983 
amendments, the Commission had lacked the power to dismiss trivial complaints without an 
investigation, and this involved it in many issues that it might not have otherwise pursued.   
Muldoon wanted to bring respectability to the Commission and also curb what he 
perceived to be its radical tendencies.  He sought to accomplish this by appointing John 
Wallace, a respected High Court judge and former head of the EOT, to serve as the 
Commission’s new Chief Commissioner.  Wallace, however, wanted to keep his judicial 
appointment.  This posed a problem, for as Chief Commissioner, Wallace would participate 
in deciding which complaints to pursue before the EOT and ultimately the courts.  In order 
to avoid the appearance of impropriety, creation of a Proceedings Commissioner was 
583 440 NZPD 3033. 
584 440 NZPD 3033. 
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proposed.585 According to the amendments, if conciliation of a complaint failed, the 
complaint could be referred to the Proceedings Commissioner, who possessed sole authority 
to determine whether civil proceedings would be pursued.586 This would severe the Chief 
Commissioner from any decision making concerning litigation in the courts.  The 
Proceedings Commissioner was also given new litigation powers.  First, he was empowered 
to seek declaratory judgments, pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act 1908, from the 
High Court.587  And second, the Proceedings Commissioner was empowered to appear, with 
a right to adduce evidence and cross examine witnesses, in any proceedings before the EOT 
or any proceedings that had at one time been before the EOT.588 By exercising that 
prerogative, the Proceedings Commissioner could obtain a costs award either for or against 
him.589  Although the 1983 amendments were born of an effort to reign in the HRC, they 
created a new position that at least had the potential to make greater use of the courts. 
 
THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1993 
From the very inception of New Zealand’s antidiscrimination regime in 1971, there 
has been pressure to expand its protections to additional groups.  Various organizations 
claiming to represent the interests of gays and lesbians and the disabled lobbied for such 
legal protection over the ensuing decades.  In the early 1990s, Parliament grappled with the 
issue of including those groups and with the application of antidiscrimination to government 
activities.  
585 Personal interview with a former member of the Human Rights Commission, 1 October 2004. 
586 Human Rights Commission Amendment Act 1983, §11.  If the Proceedings Commissioner declined to 
proceed to the EOT, then the aggrieved person could initiate his own proceedings, see Human Rights 
Commission Amendment Act 1983, §12. 
587 Human Rights Commission Amendment Act 1983, §3. 
588 Human Rights Commission Amendment Act 1983, §13. 
589 Id. 
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In 1979 and again in 1980, an organization calling itself the National Gay Rights 
Coalition approached the Human Rights Commission about securing protection against 
discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and the decriminalization of male 
homosexual conduct.590 The Coalition argued that “being a homosexual amounted to 
having a ‘status’ in terms of international instruments on human rights,” but the 
Commission rejected the analogy between homosexuals and other groups, such as those 
identified in terms of race, color, sex, language, or other terms used in international 
instruments.  The Human Rights Commission did, however, accept that there was a need to 
amend the criminal law as it applied to gay men.  It recommended amending the criminal law 
but leaving the antidiscrimination legislation intact.591 
By the mid-1980s, disability groups were also pressing for law reform.  In 1985, a 
Task Force on the Revision of Mental Health Legislation was found that the mentally 
disabled were one of the “poorest and most powerless groups in the country.”592 In that 
same year, the New Zealand Parliament was considering adopting a bill of rights. The 
original proposal did not recognize disability as a protected ground because it was believed 
that inclusion would involve too great a cost.  Various disability rights groups, including the 
Advisory Council for the Community Welfare of Disabled Persons and the New Zealand 
Society for the Intellectually Handicapped (Incorporated), argued before the Select 
Committee on the proposed Bill of Rights, that any bill of rights should include disability as 
a protected ground.593 They also argued that the Human Rights Commission Act be 
590 Human Rights Commission, Annual Report (Wellington:  Government Printer, 1981), 10. 
591 Human Rights Commission, Annual Report (Wellington:  Government Printer, 1981), 11. 
592 Task Force on the Revision of Mental Health Legislation, A Bill of Rights for New Zealand—Submissions to the 
Justice and Law Reform Committee (December, 1985), 4. 
593 Advisory Council for the Community Welfare of Disabled Persons, Submissions on the Proposed Bill of Rights to 
the Justice and Law Reform Committee (December, 1985), p. 6; New Zealand Society for the Intellectually 
Handicapped (Incorporated), Submissions on the Proposed Bill of Rights to the Justice and Law Reform Committee 
(December, 1985), p. 6. 
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amended to include disability.  Neither of their demands was met.  A statutory bill of rights 
was adopted in 1990,594 but it did not protect individuals against state discrimination on 
grounds of disability. 
The National Party government of Prime Minister James Bolger introduced the 
Human Rights Bill into Parliament on 15 December 1992.  National Party MP Katherine 
O’Regan, who served as the Associate Minister of Health and Minister of Consumer Affairs, 
successfully moved to amend the Human Rights Bill to add sexual orientation as a protected 
ground as well as individuals afflicted with “organisms in the body capable of causing illness 
as grounds.”  Thereafter, the Bill was promptly referred to the Justice and Law Reform 
Committee.  Over the course of the next six months, the Committee received 700 
substantive submissions, 640 of which dealt solely the issue of recognizing sexual orientation 
as a protected ground.  Of those, 497 supported the addition of sexual orientation and 142 
were opposed.  The Committee also received over two thousand form submissions in 
support of adding both controversial grounds.  Because the two main political parties were 
as divided as New Zealand society, both Labour and National agreed to allow their members 
a conscience vote on the inclusion of these two new grounds.   
 
Table 4.3:  Human Rights Act Timeline 
 
First Reading and referred  15 December 1992 
to the Justice and Law Reform  
Committee 
 
Justice and Law Reform Committee 22 July 1993 
reported back to Parliament 
 
Entered into Force   1 February 1994 
594 See the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. 
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For some, such as Labour MP Steve Maharey, the Human Rights Bill was about 
citizenship.  He argued that citizens of New Zealand ought to enjoy “a series of rights,” 
including “the rights to have a job, to rent a house, and to have access to public places.”595 
The Minister of Justice, Douglas Graham also emphasized the Bill’s symbolic functions.  
Antidiscrimination laws were, he reasoned, not really punitive but rather constituted an 
effort “by Parliament to send a signal that certain behavior is unacceptable.”  Graham 
accepted that “there will always be cases in which people feel that [antidiscrimination] laws 
impinge on their own individual rights,”596 but he countered that the Bill would be 
“instrumental in the effort towards achieving a fully integrated, harmonious, and just 
society.”597 By contrast, John Robertson, also a National Party MP, conceived of the 
legislation in terms of a struggle over the issue of the appropriate role of the state in society 
and the very concept of liberty.598 He argued that New Zealand did not need to legislate 
further in order to prevent the prejudice of a few individuals, and contended that there was 
no evidence that antidiscrimination laws change attitudes.  Invoking the thinking of John 
Locke and John Stuart Mill, Robertson sought: 
 
to remind members that this Parliament in its appetite to legislate is in danger of replacing 
the disciplines and the standards that healthy societies can and do naturally develop, with, 
instead, the heavy hand of the State as represented by the law and its accompanying costly 
bureaucracy.599 
The Human Rights Act was enacted into law in February 1994, over a year after its 
introduction into Parliament.  It made several changes in the regime’s enforcement structure.  
The EOT was renamed the Complaints Review Tribunal (CRT).  The Proceedings 
595 536 NZPD 16746. 
596 537 NZPD 16961. 
597 532 NZPD 13204. 
598 536 NZPD 16745. 
599 536 NZPD 16921 
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Commissioner retained the powers set forth in the 1984 amendments and received several 
others.  The Proceedings Commissioner could apply to the CRT for an interim order,600 and 
he could issue a summons requiring a person to attend a conciliation conference convened 
by the Complaints Division.601 In addition, he could decide whether to institute proceedings 
against a party to a previous settlement who has not lived up to the terms of that 
settlement.602 The Race Relations Conciliator continued to administer the provisions against 
racial discrimination, but he became a member of the HRC, “principally to provide collegial 
support.”603 The Conciliator’s responsibilities were brought into line with those of the 
Human Rights Commissioners in that he was charged with educating, conducting inquiries, 
making public statements, producing guidelines, and reporting to the prime minister.  These 
changes, the Conciliator suggested, “more clearly and formally recognized the importance of 
education in promoting positive race relations for the first time.”604 Reflecting the 
importance of international considerations, the Conciliator was also given the right to 
comment on New Zealand’s performance on race matters to international forums.     
Both the Race Relations Act and the Human Rights Commission Act contained 
provisions that rendered them subordinate to other statutes.  Thus, courts could not declare 
legislation invalid on grounds that it contravened these laws.  The Human Rights Act of 
1993 contained a similar provision, as well as a provision that exempted the government 
from compliance with the new protected grounds that were introduced in the Act.  This 
latter provision was subject to a sunset clause, thus it would lapse on 31 December 1999.  It 
was expected that the government would ensure that existing laws and policies complied 
with the Act by that date.  In furtherance of that goal, the Human Rights Commission was 
600 Human Rights Act 1993, §§82(1)(a), 95(2). 
601 Human Rights Act 1993, §§80(3), 82(1)(b). 
602 Human Rights Act 1993, §§82(1)(b), 81(2). 
603 Office of the Race Relations Conciliator, Annual Report (Wellington:  Government Printer, 2001), 5. 
604 Office of the Race Relations Conciliator, Annual Report (Wellington:  Government Printer, 2001) 8. 
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charged with examining all government acts, practices, and policies and identifying any 
conflicts, which the government was expected to rectify.  This audit, however, proved so 
costly and time-consuming that the Bolger government proposed making the exemption 
permanent, for which it drew heavy political fire from Labour and human rights groups.  As 
a compromise, the exemption was extended for an additional two years, until 31 December 
2001.   
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Chapter Five:  Australia 
Australia’s federal antidiscrimination regime today protects against discrimination on 
eight different grounds.  They are: race, color, national and ethnic origins, sex, marital status, 
pregnancy or potential pregnancy, disability, and age.  The state of South Australia enacted 
the first law prohibiting racial discrimination in 1966.  The federal government followed suit 
in 1975, but it used an administrative approach rather than the criminal one used by South 
Australia.  No further antidiscrimination legislation was enacted at the federal level until the 
Sex Discrimination Act in 1984.  Two years later, the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity 
Commission was created, and it was assigned responsibility for enforcing both federal 
antidiscrimination laws.  In 1992, the federal government enacted the Disability 
Discrimination Act.  In contrast to New Zealand, the Labor Party pioneered 
antidiscrimination laws in Australia, and four of the country’s five main federal laws were 
enacted under its stewardship.   
The political development of antidiscrimination laws in Australia was complicated by 
two main factors.  First, and most importantly, Australia is a federal system governed by a 
written constitution that prescribes the authority belonging to the state and federal 
governments.  Historically, the states have jealously guarded their constitutional powers and 
prerogatives against federal encroachments.  Australia, like the U.S., has a bicameral 
parliament with an upper chamber in which representation is allocated by state.  In 1949, 
proportional voting for the Senate was introduced by a Labor government that believed the 
new system would favor its electoral fortunes. In fact, the change never worked to the 
party’s benefit, and as I will show, it has had significant consequences for the political 
system, as well as for the adoption of antidiscrimination legislation.  
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Second, Australian thinking about law and liberty was heavily influenced by 
“liberalism’s focus on the individual’s freedom from government action,”605 and thus, it was 
believed that the best law was the least law.606 It was thought by many political elites—
particularly those belonging to Australia’s two main conservative parties, the Liberal Party 
and the National Party—that the common law offered all  the legal protection that was 
needed.  Robert Menzies, who served as prime minister from 1949 through 1966, exalted the 
common law, as did Sir Owen Dixon, Chief Justice of the High Court.607 By the early 1970s, 
however, a sole reliance on the common law was under attack.  C.G Weeramantry describes 
the conflict as “a cultural and ideological clash” between “the methods and values of the 
British constitution and the methods and values of the international human rights 
discourse.”608 
Before Australia’s constitution took effect in 1901, its framers had considered and 
rejected the inclusion of various rights-protection provisions.  At the Constitutional 
Convention in Melbourne in 1897-98, Andrew Inglis Clark proposed the following 
amendment:  
 
a state shall not make or enforce any law abridging any privilege or immunity of citizens of 
the Commonwealth, nor shall a state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without 
due process of law, or deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its 
laws.609 
605 Williams, Human Rights under the Australian Constitution, 6. 
606 Campbell and Whitmore, Freedom in Australia, 1. 
607 See Robert G. Menzies, Central power in the Australian Commonwealth : an examination of the growth of 
Commonwealth power in the Australian Federation (London:  Cassell, 1968); Sir Owen Dixon, Jesting Pilate and other 
papers and addresses (Melbourne:  Law Book, 1965). 
608 C.G. Weeramantry, “Cultural and Ideological Pluralism and Contemporary International Public Law” in 
Law and Australian Legal Thinking in the 1980s:  A Collection of the Australian Contributions to the 12th International 
Congress of Comparative Law. Held at the Law Schools of the University of Sydney and Monash University, 
Melbourne, 18-27 August 1986, 405-475, 445. 
609 Convention Debates 1891-1898: commentaries, indices and guide. Official record of the debates of the Australasian Federal 
Convention (Sydney: Legal Books, 1986 ),Vol. 4 (Melbourne, 1989), 667.  See also J.A. La Nauze, The Making of 
the Australian Constitution (Melbourne:  Melbourne University Press, 1972). 
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This amendment and others like it were decisively rejected as a result of the framers’ beliefs 
about the efficacy of common law and the institutions of responsible government in 
protecting citizens’ civil and political liberties.  In addition, the framers were motivated by 
their desire to create and maintain a white Australia.610 To that end, they drafted 
constitutional provisions that would enable the States to maintain their racially 
discriminatory laws towards Australia’s indigenous populations.611 Section 51 (xxvi) of the 
Australian Constitution—known as “the races power”—permitted the federal parliament to 
pass laws with respect to “the people of any race, other than the aboriginal race in any State, 
for whom it is deemed necessary to make special laws.” Section 51 was not amended until 
1967.612 Section 127 provided that Aboriginals were not to be counted as part of Australia’s 
population.  A restrictive immigration law was among the new Parliament’s first acts.  Mark 
McKenna thus contends that “federation was contingent upon racial discrimination,” for 
“the racial superiority of white British stock” served as a unifying force.613 Moreover, as 
Peter Bailey observes, it was not “only a belief in the potential of democracy that prompted 
the founders to eschew broad statements of rights.  As participating politicians, many were 
aware of the potential dangers of provisions preventing discrimination on grounds of race 
and promoting equality.”614  
610Marilyn Lake, “White Man’s Country:  The Tran-National History of a National Project,” 34 Australian 
Historical Studies 34 (October, 2003), 346-364. 
611 Williams, Human Rights under the Australian Constitution, 41-43; McKenna 1996-97.  For examples of racial 
motives, see Official Record of the Debates of the Australian Federal Convention:  1891-1898 [hereafter Convention 
Debates], vol. 5, Melbourne 1898 (Legal Books, 1986), p. 1784, 1752 and Convention Debates, vol. 4, pp-665-688 
(debate on clause 110). 
612 It was amended by a referendum on 27 May 1967 at which 89.34% of voters supported it.  See B. Attwood 
and Andrew Markus, The 1967 Referendum, or When Aborigines Didn’t Get the Vote (Canberra:  Aboriginal Studies 
Press for the Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies, 1997). 
613 McKenna 1996-97:  15.  For a flavor of these sentiments as expressed during the constitutional debates, 
see Official Record of the Debates of the Australian Federal Convention:  1891-1998 [hereafter Convention Debates], Vol. 5, 
Melbourne 1898 (Legal Books, 1986), pp. 1784, 1752; and, Convention Debates, Vol. 4, pp. 665-688. 
614 Peter Bailey, Human Rights:  Australia in an International Context (Sydney:  Butterworth’s, 1990), 51. 
145
1945-1975:  WHY NO FEDERAL ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWS?
The Australian Labor Party (ALP) controlled the Commonwealth Parliament from 
1941 through 1949.  It was a social democratic party with deep roots in the trade union 
movement.  Ideologically, the ALP was committed to consolidating political power at the 
Commonwealth level for purposes of economic control and social reform, which often 
placed it at odds with a federal system designed to limit the Commonwealth Parliament’s 
powers vis-à-vis the states.  In addition to the prevailing racialist zeitgeist, the ALP’s close ties 
to organized labor translated into strong support for racially exclusionary immigration 
policies—commonly known as “White Australia”—which were intended to preserve honest 
wages for white working men.  Those policies also rested upon racist ideas about white 
superiority.  Consequently, despite the participation of high-ranking ALP officials in various 
UN bodies—most notably H.V. “Doc” Evatt, who served both as Attorney-General and 
Minister for External Relations during the late 1940s—there was no federal effort to pursue 
antidiscrimination laws during Labor’s postwar rule.615 
In 1949, the newly formed Liberal Party, led by Robert Gordon Menzies, gained 
control of the House of Representatives.  Thereafter, a coalition of the Liberal and the 
Country Parties616 (hereafter “the Coalition”) governed federally until 1972, and Menzies 
remained prime minister until his retirement in 1966—an astounding seventeen year tenure.  
The Coalition captured control of the Senate in 1951 and it controlled a majority of that 
chamber’s seats until the 1970 election.  Between 1959 and 1965, the Liberal and Country 
parties held power in four of the six states, thus “it appeared to be a Liberal era throughout 
615 Evatt played an active role at the UN conference in San Francisco in 1945 he led Australia’s UN delegation 
between 1946 and 1948, and he served as President of the UNGA between 1948 and 1949.  See David Day, 
ed., Brave New World:  H.V. Evatt and foreign policy, 1941-1949 (St Lucia, Qld.:  University of Queensland Press, 
1996); Ken Buckley, Barbara Dale & Wayne Reynolds, Doc Evatt: p atriot, internationalist, fighter and scholar 
(Melbourne : Longman Cheshire, 1994). 
616 The Federal Country Party changed its name to the National Country Party of Australia on May 2, 1975.  It 
underwent another name change on October 16, 1982, when it became the National Party of Australia.   
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most of the nation.”617 Between 1966 and 1972, the year that the Coalition lost its hold on 
the federal government, four of Australia’s six states continued to be controlled by the 
coalition parties; and, for a brief period between 1969 and 1970, all of them were.  This is 
not, however, to imply that organizationally the coalition parties were tightly controlled from 
the center, for the Liberal Party has historically been known for its decentralized structure.618 
Rather, the Coalition’s electoral dominance demonstrated the salience of a particular set of 
values and a dearth of institutional opportunities for reformers to pursue.  
Menzies personified Australia’s white, British identity, and his leadership embodied 
the prevailing 1950s and 1960s ethos.  According to Arthur Calwell, who served as federal 
leader of the ALP from 1960 until 1967:   
 
Sir Robert Menzies’ importance to the Liberal Party cannot be overestimated.  He founded 
the Liberal Party.  He wrote its platform.  He moulded its attitudes and philosophies.  He 
was the Liberal Party.619 
Together, the Coalition parties represented Australia’s principal conservative interests, 
namely, mining companies and pastoralists.  The Liberal Party, in particular, has been “the 
self-professed champions of individualism, suspicious of state power and defenders of the 
federal system.”620 The Country Party, a product of political mobilization among farm 
organizations in the early 1900s, dominated the rural electorates.  Like the ALP, both parties, 
endorsed White Australia and there was, thus, a cross-party consensus that lasted through 
the late 1960s.  In addition to trade union concerns, Australians generally feared the large 
617 Dean Jaensch, The Liberals (St. Leonards, NSW:  Allen & Unwin, 1994), 38.  Queensland was governed by 
the Country Party from 1957-1988; South Australia was governed by a non-Labor party until 1965; Victoria 
was governed by a non-Labor party from 1955-1982; and Western Australia was governed by a non-Labor 
party from 1959-1971.   
618 K. West, Power in the Liberal Party (Melbourne:  Longman, 1965), 261; Jaensch, The Liberals, 9, 40 
619 Quoted in Jaensch, The Liberals, 37-38; see also West, Power in the Liberal Party, 17. 
620 Brian Galligan, A Federal Republic:  Australia’s constitutional system of government (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), 136. 
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Asian populations located to their north  This fear had been made concrete by Japanese 
bombings of Darwin in 1942 and 1943, which killed over two hundred people.   
With Menzies’ retirement in 1966, the Liberal Party entered a period of instability, 
manifested in the succession of five different leaders during the next ten years.  Harold Holt, 
Menzies’ immediate successor, disappeared in the surf at Cheviot Beach, Victoria in 
December 1967.621  The three Coalition ministries of Holt, John Gorton, and William 
McMahon have been described as “unhappy, unsuccessful and responsible for a decline in 
Liberal Party support not seen since the party’s foundation.’”622  When Menzies had become 
prime minister in 1949, Australia’s links to Britain were strong, and the newly created UN 
was dominated by Western powers. But by the time of his retirement in 1966, the UN’s 
membership had swelled as a consequence of decolonization, and race had become an 
increasingly vexed international issue.623 In that context, Australia’s position as a white 
nation situated on the edge of Asia became a source of discomfort instead of pride, and 
Australian diplomats feared that international attention to the dismal state of the country’s 
indigenous populations would result in the country being treated, as was happening to South 
Africa.624 
As a result of these developments and fears, plus the Coalition’s new leadership, in 
October 1966, only ten months after Menzies’ retirement, the Holt Government signed the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(ICERD), which had been opened for signature by the UN in March of that same year.  
621 Country Party Leader, John McEwen, took over as Prime Minister in December 1967. When the Liberal 
Party elected John Gorton as its Leader, McEwen relinquished the Prime Ministership. The first 
McEwen/Gorton Ministry was sworn in from 10th January, 1968. 
622 James Jupp, Party Politics:  Australia 1966-1981 (Sydney:  Allen & Unwin, 1982), 49; see also Weller and 
Smith 1977:  52-54. 
623 See Chapter Three, infra. 
624 Jennifer Clark, “’The Wind of Change’ in Australia:  Aborigines and the International Politics of Race, 
1960-1972,” 20 The International History Review 89-117. 
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Signing the convention, however, was only half the battle because the Australia’s treaty-
making process is governed by two unwritten rules.  According to the first rule, which was 
initiated by Menzies in 1961, the texts of treaties must be tabled in both houses of 
Parliament for at least twelve sitting days before the executive can ratify or accede to them.  
The second rule is that any changes to domestic law that are required in order to ensure 
treaty compliance must be made, usually by Parliament, before executive ratification.625 
Despite signing the ICERD, a series of Coalition governments were unable, or unwilling, to 
ratify it.   
This failure may be attributed to a combination of constitutional and political 
considerations.  The Australian Constitution accords the federal government a limited set of 
powers, and the power to enact laws prohibiting race discrimination was not among them in 
1966.626 The government could enact antidiscrimination legislation that applied to federal 
entities, but legislation that applied to the states could only be based upon the “external 
affairs power,” found in Section 51(xxix).  Apart from amending the Constitution, which is 
extraordinarily difficult,627 the external affairs power presented one potential source of 
federal action against discrimination.628 However, use of that power to enact 
antidiscrimination legislation would have constituted an expansion of federal power vis-à-vis 
the states.  Given the coalition’s commitment to states’ rights, it was naturally reluctant to 
625 Kinley 1995: 62-63. 
626 It was not until 1967 that the language in §51(xxvi) was repealed (see note 495).  Moreover, according to 
George Williams it remains “unclear” whether the 1967 referendum “gave the federal Parliament the power to 
legislate for the benefit as well as the detriment of Aboriginal people.”  Although this very point was presented 
to the High Court in Kartinyeri v. Commonwealth (1998) 152 ALR 540, the Court failed to resole the issue, see 
Williams, Human Rights Under the Australian Constitution, 252-53. 
627 The Australian Constitution provides only one means by which the document may be amended.  
According to §128, a referendum proposal must first be passed by an absolute majority of both Houses of the 
Federal Parliament, or by one House twice.  Then, it must be approved by a majority of voters, and by a 
majority of voters in a majority of the States (in other words, in at least four of the six States).   As a result of 
this onerous process, of the forty-two proposals put to the Australian people, only eight have been passed. 
628 Australian Constitution, §51(xxix). 
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take such action.  The government instead negotiated with recalcitrant state representatives 
on several occasions, but to no avail.  In order to rationalize this failure to enact national 
legislation, Coalition members articulated a strained interpretation of the ICERD.  Although 
the terms of the convention expressly stated that signatories would enact legal protections 
against racial discrimination, they insisted that compliance simply required the repeal of 
racially discriminatory laws and policies.  This interpretation appeared in subsequent debates 
on race discrimination legislation in 1975.  Senator Ivor Greenwood, for example, argued 
that previous Liberal governments had interpreted ratification of the ICERD as merely 
imposing a “duty” upon all signatories to ensure that their laws were “not contrary to its 
broad principles.”  In Greenwood’s words, 
 
Liberal governments following the acceptance of this Convention in 1966 sought to 
have adopted by the States laws which were consistent with the broad principles and 
sought to remove from the statute book laws which were inconsistent with its 
principles, and in that respect there was a great measure of success.  I think it has to 
be recognized today that there are few, if any, laws still remaining in this country 
which could be regarded as laws which involve racial discrimination.629 
Considering the states’ general intransigence on the issue, this was a politically expedient 
interpretation.   
Within the ALP a new generation of members joined the federal caucus after the 
1961 elections.  Throughout the late 1960s, a growing cadre of reformers – E. Gough 
Whitlam, Lionel Murphy, and Don Dunstan foremost among them – assumed greater 
influence in the party.  In 1963, Cyril Wyndham became the party’s first full-time federal 
secretary and head of its new permanent secretariat in Canberra.  He replaced F.E. 
Chamberlain, who had epitomized the “backward-looking, machine-dominated and trade-
union-based party” of the 1950s and early 1960s.630 Wyndham and Whitlam led the reform 
629 Race Discrimination Bill 1975, Second Reading Speech, Senate Hansard, May 15, 1975, pp. 1516-17. 
630 Brian Galligan, A Federal Republic, 147. 
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effort against old stalwarts like Arthur Calwell, who was party leader from 1960 until he was 
replaced by Whitlam in 1967.  Organizational reforms within the party in 1964 ultimately 
translated into an array of new policies that were accepted at the Federal Labor Conference 
in 1965.631 By 1969, the party had amended its platform in order to support the enactment 
of federal anti-discrimination legislation and the implementation of international human 
rights instruments. 
Under Whitlam’s leadership, the ALP deliberately used Parliament, in particular 
questions on notice, as part of its strategy to highlight the shortcomings of the Coalition 
government.  Labor MPs invoked international ideas and standards in order to portray the 
Government as parochial and out of step with the times.  In September 1971, for example, 
Senator Lionel Murphy questioned the government on its plan for addressing racial issues in 
light of the International Year for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination.  
Senator R.C. Wright responded that the government interpreted its responsibility under the 
ICERD to require the removal of discriminatory legislation from state and federal statute 
books, as opposed to enacting antidiscrimination laws.   
During the 1960s, elements of civil society also clamored for reform.  Borrowing 
from the tactics of American civil rights activists, in 1963 Aboriginal activist Charles Perkins 
orchestrated “freedom rides” through outback New South Wales towns, targeting clubs and 
swimming pools with racially discriminatory policies.632 Aboriginal Australians, often in 
conjunction with non-indigenous allies, had a long history of seeking reforms, but by the late 
1960s changes in the international context and within the ALP crated new political 
631 See Paul Kelly, Paul, “Caucus under Whitlam:  1967-75” in Faulkner, John and Stuart Macintyre (eds.), True 
Believers:  The Story of the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party (Crows Nest, NSW:  Allen and Unwin, 2001), 105-121. 
632 See Charles Perkins, A Bastard Like Me (Sydney:  Ure Smith, 1975), and Ann Curthoys, Freedom Rides:  a 
freedom rider remembers (Crows Nest, NSW:  Allen & Unwin, 2003). 
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opportunities.633 New and more aggressive indigenous organizations emerged.634 
Reminiscent of developments in the U.S., by the 1970s Aboriginal activism acquired a more 
militant tone.  In January 1972, for example, the Sydney Morning Herald characterized a local 
“Black Power organization” as “a loose grouping of radical Aborigines who have introduced 
a new note of impatience to Aboriginal rights protests in recent months.”635 That same year, 
Aboriginal protestors set up an “Aboriginal embassy” on the grounds of Parliament House 
in order to protest the federal government’s failure to recognize traditional native land rights.  
This, according to the Sydney Morning Herald, “undoubtedly signal[led] the emergence of 
Australia’s black minority as their own pressure group.”636 
Some indigenous activists spoke out in favor of antidiscrimination legislation.  For 
example, Black Power member Michael Anderson indicated that though his group had not 
yet worked out a list of demands, “’one of them might be for an anti-discrimination law,’” 
which he added, “’most white people can’t see the need for.’”637  More confidently, activist 
Paul Coe asserted that Sydney’s Aboriginal population needed “some sort of civil rights bill 
to be put through Parliament.”638 Such a law would constitute an important advance, he 
suggested, because “it could change the attitudes of a lot of people, particularly in 
government,” convincing them that Aboriginals have the same “rights” and privileges” as 
whites, including “the right to walk the street without victimization, the right to get a job, the 
right to ensure that government agencies do not arse you around all the time.”  Moreover, it 
633 See L.  Lippman, Generations of Resistance:  The Aboriginal Struggle for Justice (Sydney and Melbourne:  Longman 
Cheshire, 1981); Markus, Andrew (ed.), Blood from a Stone:  William Cooper and the Australian Aborigines League 
(Melbourne:  Monash Publications in History, 1986); John Maynard, John, “Fred Maynard and the Australian 
Aboriginal Association.”  21 Journal of Aboriginal History (1997) 21. 
634 See Faith Bandler, Faith, Turning the Tide:  a personal history of the Federal Council for the Advancement of Aborigines 
and Torres Strait Islanders (Canberra:  Aboriginal Studies Press, 1989). 
635 “Aborigines act to win council and Parlt. Seats,” Sydney Morning Herald, January 9, 1972, p. 3. 
636 “The grassroots protest,” Sydney Morning Herald, February 12, 1972, p. 7. 
637 “Aborigines act to win council and Parlt. Seats,” Sydney Morning Herald, January 9, 1972, p. 3. 
638 1975:  103. 
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could have “a terrific effect on black identity as a whole,” and for the first time turn the law 
into “a positive weapon” to be wielded for the benefit, rather than the detriment, of 
Aboriginal people.639 Nevertheless, by the early 1970s, most indigenous activists were 
primarily seeking land rights and some degree of political or cultural autonomy. 
Within academia, greater attention was also being paid to issues of race.640 In 1969, 
physical scientist A. Barrie Pittock delivered a lecture entitled “Towards a Multi-Racial 
Society” that was subsequently hailed as “a classic statement of racial humanism in the 
Australian context” and “the most convincing presentation of the liberal position on the 
question of race tolerance which has been produced in Australia.”641 In the lecture, Pittock 
expressed regret that thus far South Australia had been the only Australian jurisdiction to 
legislate against racial discrimination.642 Academics increasingly publicized the plight of 
Australia’s Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander populations and explored the terms upon 
which a more equitable society could be built.643 They undertook a series of studies of 
Australian racism in the early 1970s.644 The legal academy, historically a conservative 
639 Coe 1975:  103.  Coe delivered these remarks in 1974, one year before the federal government had enacted 
the Racial Discrimination Act. 
640 For earlier work, see A.P. Elkin, Citizenship for Aborigines:  A National Aboriginal Policy (Sydney:  Australasian 
Publishing Co., 1944). 
641 Barrie A. Pittock, “Toward a Multi-Racial Society” in Frank.S. Stevens (ed.), Racism:  The Australian 
Experience, A Study of Race Prejudice in Australia, Vol. 3 Colonialism (Sydney:  Australian and New Zealand Book 
Co., 1972), 240-63. 
Frank S. Stevens (ed.), Racism:  The Australian Experience, Vol. II (Sydney:  Australian and New Zealand Book 
Co., 1972), 9. 
642 Pittcok, “Towards a Multi-Racial Society,” 243. 
643 Colin Tatz (1963, 1966), Ian G. Sharp and Colin Tatz (eds., 1966), Frank Stevens (1968).  C.D. Rowley, 
“The Background to the Cultural Clash” in We the Australians:  What is to follow the Referendum? (Proceedings of 
the Inter-Racial Seminar, Townsville, December, 1967), 12-15; C.D. Rowley, The Remote Aborigines (Canberra:  
Australian National University Press, 1971); C.D. Rowley, Outcasts in White Australia. Canberra:  Australian 
National University, 1971); Peter Biskup, Not Slaves Not Citizens:  The Aboriginal Problem in Western Australia 1898-
1954 (St. Lucia:  University of Queensland Press, 1973); R. Chamberlain, Stuart Affair (Rigby:  Adelaide, 1973); 
Tatz, Colin and K. McConnochie, eds., Black Viewpoints:  The Aboriginal Experience (Sydney:  Australian and 
New Zealand Book Co., 1975); Elizabeth M. Eggleston, Fear, Favour or Affection:  Aborigines and the Criminal Law 
in Victoria, South Australia and Western Australia (Canberra:  Australian National University, 1976). 
644 Taft 1970; Gale 1972; McConnochie 1973. 
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institution in Australia, was slower to respond.  In 1966, for example, Enid Campbell and 
Harry Whitmore, law professors at the University of Sydney and Australian National 
University, respectively, coauthored a book entitled Freedom in Australia.645 In the book’s 
Preface, they observed that “[l]ittle is known of the actual operation of the laws and 
principles which secure our freedom.”646 Campbell and Whitmore observed that “[t]here is 
now common agreement that government and law can and should play a positive and 
constructive role in the maintenance of the good and free society,” thus overcoming 
objections to “interferences with private ‘rights,’ such as rights of property.”647 
Nevertheless, they dismissed proposals for antidiscrimination laws, believing that such laws 
“might result ultimately in deeper divisions between aborigines and their neighbors.”648 As 
an alternative, they suggested that society would get a better return on its investment if 
money expended on campaigns for constitutional and legal reform was reallocated to 
practical matters as housing, education and technical training.649 
During the 1960s and 1970s, the United Nations Association of Australia (UNAA) 
played an important role in disseminating ideas about race, formulating the problem of racial 
discrimination, and actively lobbying the Commonwealth and State governments for a legal 
response to that problem.650 In 1970, it established a national Committee to Combat Racism 
and Racial Discrimination (CARRD),651 and similar committees were subsequently 
645 Sydney:  Sydney University Press.  
646 Campbell and Whitmore, Freedom in Australia, vii. 
647 Campbell and Whitmore, Freedom in Australia, 2. 
648 Campbell and Whitmore, Freedom in Australia, xii. 
649 Campbell and Whitmore, Freedom in Australia, xii. 
650 See UNAA (Victoria Division), Annual Report for the Year 1971-72 and Balance Sheet as at March 31, 1972,
Melbourne, Australia.  Available at the National Library of Australia, Canberra, Australia.  Author’s interview 
with Burt Coleman, 3 September 2003. 
651 UNAA (Victoria Division), Annual Report and Balance Sheet 1965-66, Melbourne, Australia, p. 8. 
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established in every state.652 Through those committees, the UNAA urged the ratification of 
the ICERD and the creation of “Race Relations Boards on the lines of the British 
Boards.”653 Perhaps its most tangible effort was a three-volume study that it sponsored in 
1972.  Contributors to Racism:  The Australian Experience, A Study of Race Prejudice in Australia 
included academics, politicians, religious leaders, and activists.654 This collective effort was 
significant due to the paucity of educational and research programs on race relations or 
Aboriginal studies in Australian schools and universities at the time.  Finally, in 1974, in the 
midst of the parliamentary battle over antidiscrimination legislation, the UNAA convened a 
conference in Sydney at which it expressed its support both for that legislation and a federal 
legal aid scheme.  These burgeoning societal demands found a receptive audience with the 
election of the Whitlam government in 1972. 
 
THE PUSH FOR RACIAL DISCRIMINATION LEGISLATION 
On 2 December 1972, the ALP won a majority in the House of Representatives and 
it formed the federal government for the first time in twenty-three years.  There was not, 
however, a simultaneous election for the Senate.  In 1972, half of the upper chamber’s 
membership had been elected in 1967 and the other half in 1970.655 The opposition parties, 
652 In 1971, in conjunction with several Aboriginal organizations, the Victorian Division of the UNAA held 
what it characterized as “a successful evening” in celebration of International Day for the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination, recognized annually on March 21.  The event featured Aboriginal speakers who discussed 
“aspects of ‘Discrimination in Aborigine health, Housing and Education.’”  UNAA (Victoria Division), Annual 
Report for the Year 1971-72 and Balance Sheet as at March 31, 1972, Melbourne, Australia, p. 9.  The Report was 
candid in assessing the relative “success” of its events.  For example, on that same page it notes that “[d]espite 
extensive free publicity and first class speakers, citizens of Melbourne preferred late night shopping to 
attending Scots Church Hall to hear first class speakers on ‘Land Rights for Aborigines:  Land Rights for 
Posterity,’” which it held on 10 December 1971 in commemoration of Human rights Day. 
653 See UNAA (Victoria Division), Annual Report for the Year 1971-72 and Balance Sheet as at March 31, 1972,
Melbourne, Australia, p. 10. 
654 Frank S. Stevens (ed.), Racism:  The Australian Experience (Sydney:  Australian and New Zealand Book Co., 
1972). 
655 Following the 1970 election, the distribution of Senate seats was as follows:  Liberal Party, twenty-one 
seats; Democratic Labor Party, five seats; Independents, three seats; and, the Country Party, five seats.   
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including the Liberal, National, and Democratic Labor Parties (DLP),656 held a majority of 
the Senate’s seats.  Bitter over their loss of power, they were in a position “to subject most 
of Labor’s legislation to obstruction or to complete defeat when they chose to do so.”657 In 
May 1974, following a double dissolution of Parliament precipitated by the Senate’s rejection 
of two government bills,658 the ALP still held only twenty-nine Senate seats to the thirty-one 
held by non-Labor parties.  The final Senate election during the Whitlam government’s 
abbreviated tenure was not held on 13 December 1975, at which time both chambers of 
Parliament were dissolved following the Governor-General’s controversial dismissal of the 
Whitlam Government.659 Thus, the ALP never controlled the Senate between 1972 and 
1975.  As I will show, this had significant consequences for its antidiscrimination legislation 
agenda.         
Upon winning government, Whitlam immediately used international human rights 
conventions as a means of distinguishing his government from its predecessors.  As one of 
Whitlam’s first actions as prime minister,660 he initiated a review of all international human 
rights instruments, assessing how and how soon they might be given effect in Australia.661 
Days after his election, Whitlam emphasized the importance his government attached to 
international human rights instruments, and he pledged to take all necessary steps to prohibit 
656 Formation of the DLP was the result of a split over the issue of communism within the Labor Party, see 
Robert Murray, The Split:  Australian Labor in the Fifties (Cheshire:  Melbourne, 1970).  
657 See Brian McKinlay, A Century of Struggle:  The A.L.P. a centenary history (Blackburn, Vic.:  Collins Dove, 
1988).  For example, on 10 April 1974, Whitlam secured a double-dissolution because the Senate had rejected 
various bills during the life of the Parliament.   
658 Double dissolutions are provided for in the Australian Constitution at §57. 
659 E. Gough Whitlam, The Truth of the Matter (Harmondsworth, Mx:  Penguin Books, 1979). 
660 Gough Whitlam attributes his personal commitment to human rights to the influence of his father, who 
had served from 1951 through 1954 as Australia’s representative to the Commission on Human Rights, during 
which time the Commission worked to convert the principles recognized in the UN Declaration into the 
ICCPR and the ICESCR.   
661 For example, in December 1973, the government acceded to the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of 
Stateless Persons, the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness and the 1967 Protocol relating to the 
Status of Refugees and in December 1974, it acceded to the 1953 Covenant on the Political Rights of Women.  
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discrimination on grounds of race.  The new government’s first weeks coincided with the 
last weeks of the UNGA conference in Sydney.  At Whitlam’s instruction, Australia’s UN 
delegation reversed course on an array of international issues—most notably apartheid—and 
Australia’s Permanent Representative to the UN signed both the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic Social and 
Cultural Rights.662 As a symbol of the government’s break with past policy, in January 1973 
the Department of Foreign Affairs launched a new publication, the Australian Foreign Affairs 
Record,663 and its lead article, “Australia and the United Nations,” explained the bold new 
direction of Australian foreign policy, with its emphasis on human rights.  In September 
1974, Whitlam addressed the UNGA, an event of great historical importance.  He was the 
first leader of an ALP Government to speak from the UN rostrum and only the second 
Australian head of government to address the UNGA, the first being Menzies in 1960.  In 
his speech, Whitlam acknowledged Australia’s “seriously flawed” record with regard to issues 
of race and human rights, and he promised to purge all forms of racial discrimination from 
Australia’s shores.  According to P.C.J. Curtis, Head of the Public Affairs and Cultural 
Relations Division of the Department of Foreign Affairs, this “admission” was “the first 
ever to have been made by an Australian Minister in an international body like the UN.”  In 
addition, Whitlam continued to use Parliament as a forum for discussing his government’s 
human rights policies.  Early in 1973, he pledged “to press ahead by every constitutional 
method available,” including the external affairs power, “to see that any traces of racism in 
Australia’s legislation and administration are expunged.”664 Significantly, Whitlam made it 
662 McKinlay, A Century of Struggle, 174. 
663 This publication was formerly known as Current Notes on International Affairs.
664 House of Representatives, Hansard, Vol. 82, 15 March 1973, 606.  
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clear that his government would use the constitution’s external affairs power to override 
“offensive” state legislation.665 
In June 1973, the federal government ratified International Labour Organization 
Convention (ILO) No.111, known as the Convention on Discrimination (Employment and 
Occupation).  Drafted in 1958, this convention proscribed discrimination in employment  on 
grounds of race, color, sex, religion, political opinion, national extraction or social origin.  
Pursuant to its obligations under this convention, the Whitlam government established a 
National Committee on Discrimination in Employment and Occupation and a 
corresponding committee in each of the six states.  These committees lacked statutory 
powers and were intended to serve as an interim measure until antidiscrimination legislation 
could be enacted. They were comprised of representatives of the Commonwealth and State 
Governments, as well as of employers’ organizations and trade unions, and they investigated 
complaints and sought to resolve them through consensus and conciliation.  Employers’ and 
workers’ organizations, vocational guidance and training, placement services, administrative 
instructions or practices, employment advertisements and superannuation were included in 
the committees’ areas of concern.  However, the most that the committees could do in the 
face of a recalcitrant party was to ask the Attorney-General to table in Parliament a report of 
the complaint together with the name of the discriminating party.   
Attorney-General Lionel Murphy introduced a Human Rights Bill and a Race 
Discrimination Bill into the Australian Senate in November 1973.  The Human Rights Bill 
1973 was derived explicitly from the ICCPR and it provided for a right to nondiscrimination.  
The Bill would apply to the states and create an Australian Human Rights Commissioner, 
empowered to investigate alleged human rights violations and initiate judicial proceedings.  
Importantly, the rights listed in the Bill would be enforceable not only against governmental 
665 House of Representatives, Hansard Vol. 84, 2167, 16 May 1973. 
158
action, but also against private action. At the Bill’s second reading, Murphy observed that 
Australia “is commonly regarded as a country where freedom and individuality are allowed 
to flourish,” yet basic democratic rights received “remarkably little legal protection in 
Australia.”  He questioned whether a mere “commitment to freedom is the best safeguard 
against encroachments on that freedom,” and he advocated legislation that would provide 
legal protection of specified rights through judicially enforced remedies.  Murphy argued that 
the Human Rights Bill would “help to make Australian society more free and just.”666 In 
introducing the Racial Discrimination Bill, Murphy summarized UN efforts to promote the 
elimination of racial discrimination, beginning with the UDHR in 1948 and down to the 
Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination in 1973.  He also noted the 
efforts of the UNAA and the work of Australian scholars Frank Stevens and Elizabeth 
Eggleston.   
Table 5.1:  Racial Discrimination Legislative Timeline 
 
Introduced into the Senate  13 November 1973 
 
Reintroduced into the Senate  16 April 1974 
 
Reintroduced into the Senate   31 October 1974 
 
Reintroduced into the Senate  13 February 1975 
 
Sent to the House of 
Representatives   3 June 1975 
 
Both Bills specified enforcement by Australia’s Industrial Court.  Besides the High 
Court, which was provided for in the Australian Constitution, the Industrial Court was the 
only federal court that existed at the time.  The Whitlam government did not trust the state 
courts to enforce these new laws, and it had not yet been able to create a new system of 
666 
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federal courts.  Both Bills provided for a transfer of jurisdiction to the new federal superior 
courts upon their creation.  The creation of a federal court system was highly controversial. 
The Federal Court of Australia was created by the Federal Court of Australia Act in 1976.  It 
began to exercise its jurisdiction on 1 February 1977. 
According to Peter Bailey, who was in the prime minister’s office the morning after 
the Bills were introduced, it was clear that their introduction “had evoked a strong and 
antagonistic response from the States.”  The prime minister’s office was, in Bailey’s words, 
“humming with the reverberations of angry telegrams from almost all the [State] 
Premiers.”667 As a result, and fearing negative political fallout that might result, Whitlam put 
the two measures put on hold pending further cabinet discussions.668 He ultimately decided 
to abandon the Human Rights Bill 1973, which Murphy had unexpectedly—and much to 
Whitlam’s dismay—introduced into Parliament.  Murphy, who had written the ALP’s 
platform on law reform, was committed to advancing human rights issues.669 In sharp 
contrast to previous Attorneys-General, Murphy sought to use his portfolio to advance 
sweeping and radical social change.  In this, he was assisted by three activist lawyers, Gareth 
Evans,670 Chris Ronalds, and Peter Bailey,671 who worked in the Department’s nascent 
Human Rights Branch.  All three would go on to play important roles in the development of 
Australia’s antidiscrimination law.672 
667 Bailey, Human Rights:  Australia in an International Context, 52; Williams, Human Rights under the Australian 
Constitution, 30. 
668 Bailey, Human Rights:  Australia in an International Context, 52. 
669 Jenny Hocking, Lionel Murphy:  A Political Biography (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press 1997), 183. 
670 In 1978, Gareth Evans was elected to the Senate, where he served until 1996.  From 1996 to 1999, he was 
a Member of Parliament.  In addition, he served as Attorney-General from 1983-84. 
671 Between 1981 and 1986, Peter Bailey served as Deputy Chairman and full-time chief executive of the 
Commonwealth’s Human Rights Commission.  In 1987, he joined the law faculty at the Australian National 
University, where he teaches courses on Anti-Discrimination Law and Human Rights Law in Australia.  He has 
published two books on antidiscrimination laws, Human Rights: Australia in an International Context and Peter 
Bailey, ed., Bringing Human Rights to Life (Sydney:  Federation Press, 1993). 
672 Within the Attorney-General’s Department, Chris Ronalds served as a Legal Officer and Senior Legal 
Officer from late 1973 through mid-1977.  Upon leaving the AG’s Department, she became the Legal Officer 
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The Bills broke new constitutional ground by invoking the external affairs power to 
legitimate the exercise of federal power in matters affecting the states.  In 1973, however, the 
ICCPR and the ICERD did not enjoy comparable international legitimacy.  The former had 
not yet received the requisite number of signatures to bring it into effect internationally, 
whereas the ICERD had entered into effect only in January 1969.  Because his government’s 
Bills, if enacted, would override contrary state provisions,673 Whitlam expected a court 
challenge by the states.  He reasoned that if called upon to decide the scope of the 
Commonwealth’s capacity to legislate under the external affairs power, High Court justices 
would be less likely to strike down legislation that derived from an internationally accepted 
convention on race for fear of a negative reaction within the international community of 
jurists.674 As a result of Whitlam’s decision, the Human Rights Bill lapsed with the 
prorogation of Parliament and was not reintroduced in the new parliamentary session, 
whereas the Race Discrimination Bill proceeded, albeit on a quite circuitous route.  It was 
reintroduced into the Senate two more times,675 and each time it lapsed with a prorogation 
of Parliament.  Finally, it was introduced into the House in February 1975 by Kep Enderby, 
of the NSW Anti-Discrimination Board from mid-1977 through late 1982.  As a legal adviser and consultant to 
the Office of the Status of Women, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, she was closely involved in 
the development of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984, the Policy Discussion Paper (Green Paper) Affirmative 
Action for Women (Canberra:  AGPS, 1984) and the development and passage of the Affirmative Action (Equal 
Employment Opportunity for Women) Act 1986.  Ronalds was also the principal author of National Employment 
Initiatives for People with Disabilities: a Discussion Paper (Canberra:  AGPS, 1990), the Report of the National 
Consultations with People with Disabilities (Canberra:  AGPS, 1991), the Report on the National Consultations on the Draft 
Commonwealth Disability Strategy (Canberra:  AGPS, 1994). In addition to numerous articles, Ronalds has 
published two editions of a book on antidiscrimination law in Australia, Chris Ronalds, Discrimination Law and 
Practice (Sydney:  Federation Press, 1998); Chris Ronalds and Rachel Pepper, Discrimination Law and Practice, 2nd 
ed. (Sydney:  Federation Press, 2004). 
673 The Australian Constitution contains a supremacy clause, see §109. 
674 E. Gough Whitlam, The Whitlam Government 1972-1975 (Ringwood, Vic.:  Viking, 1985), 178. 
675 A Race Discrimination Bill was reintroduced into the Senate in April 1974, although that Bill was never 
presented to the Senate for debate.  Another was reintroduced in October 1974, but it was withdrawn from the 
Senate in February 1975.  Following the introduction of a Race Discrimination Bill into the House in February 
1975, that Bill was transmitted to the Senate on April 15, 1975.  Senate debate on that Bill commenced on May 
15, 1975.  The 1975 Bill was modified in the House before going to the Senate (see Chaney, Senate Hansard,
May 22, 1975, 1801). 
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who had assumed the post of Attorney-General following Murphy’s controversial 
appointment to the High Court. 
The Racial Discrimination Bill was part of a broader and highly controversial elite-
driven shift in Australian policy towards “multiculturalism”. As marks of the controversy 
this stirred, one irate citizen blew a door off Parliament House and another appeared with a 
knife and threatened to kill Al Grassby, the Minister for Immigration.676 During 
Parliament’s consideration of the Race Discrimination Bill between 1973 and 1975, a 
number of reactionary groups, including the Immigration Restriction Council, Family Power: 
Families United for Australia, and the League of Rights677 directed their ire against the Bill.678 
In 1972, the League of Rights produced a pamphlet entitled “The Dangerous Myth of Racial 
Equality,” which rationalized the 1960 Sharpeville massacre in South Africa.  Other groups 
argued that antidiscrimination legislation would violate personal privacy by penalizing people 
who deliberately chose to marry within their race.679 
In the May 1974 federal election, the ALP lost only a single House seat, that of 
Riverina, by a margin of only 792 votes.  Al Grassby had won Riverina in 1969 with a swing 
of approximately 20%, a record in Australian federal elections, and he had retained the seat 
in the December 1972 election that brought the Whitlam Government to power.  Grassby’s 
service as Minister for Immigration was a key factor in his stunning loss to Country Party 
676 Al Grassby, The Morning After (Canberra:  Judicator Publications, 1979), 76-77. 
677 The first League of Rights, established in 1946 in South Australia, was born of opposition to a 
Commonwealth constitutional referendum.  Additional branches were subsequently organized in Victoria 
(1946), Queensland (1949), and Western Australia (1951), and a national organization, the Australian League of 
Rights was formed in 1960.  Eric Dudley Butler was named its National Director.  The League directed its ire 
towards Jews, endorsing the anti-Semitic tract the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, but it also targeted Asians and 
blacks. 
678 See Coleman, Senate Hansard, May 15, 1975, pp. 1521-22, 1526; Gietzelt, Senate Hansard, May 15, 1975, p. 
1534; Button, Senate Hansard, May 15, 1975, p. 1540. 
679 See Button, Senate Hansard, May 15, 1975, 1540-41. 
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candidate, Colonel John W. Sullivan.680 The Immigration Control Association (ICA), with 
Robert Clark serving as national president, was the main campaigner against Grassby.  
Clark’s efforts were motivated by his desire to leave his “’children and their children … a 
happy and racially homogenous country… and not a multi-racial mongrelized hotch-potch 
of troubled humanity.’”681 Moreover, according to Jim Warburton, Clark warned that “[t]his 
may be the last opportunity to engage in ‘free speech’ on this subject, …, because a Labor 
victory would mean re-introduction of Senator Murphy’s Racial Discrimination Bill.”682 
Following Grassby’s defeat, Whitlam appointed him to serve as  Special Consultant to the 
Federal Government on Community Relations.  It was widely expected that once the Racial 
Discrimination Bill became law, Grassby would be elevated to the post of Community 
Relations Commissioner.          
Within the Coalition, only a handful of MPs and Senators opposed the Bill on racist 
grounds.683 Some, however, argued that Australia did not suffer from racial 
discrimination.684 By 1975, when Parliament finally engaged in a full debate on the Racial 
Discrimination Bill, the Liberal Party was shifting its position on antidiscrimination 
legislation.  In 1974 it changed its platform was to recognize that “’the maintenance of 
individual freedom calls for positive measures by the Government and private organizations 
to encourage equal opportunity and to prevent discrimination against the individual or 
minority groups.’”685 During the 1975 debates, Liberal Senators Alan Missen and Frederick 
680 Grassby, The Morning After; Jim Warburton, “Racism in the Riverina” South Australian Journal of Social, 
Political and Cultural Comment (June, 1974).  There were other factors that may have contributed to Grassby’s 
loss.  Those included that Grassby had neglected his responsibilities to his electorate, particularly to his farming 
constituency, on account of ministerial duties that kept him busy and required frequent foreign travel or that 
his loss was the result of a larger rural swing against Labor.  
681 Quoted in Warburton, “Racism in the Riverina,” 8. 
682 As originally introduced, the Racial Discrimination Bill contained a provision that would have criminalized 
incitement to racial hatred.  It did not survive the Senate. 
683 Sheil, Senate, Hansard, 1526-27. 
684 Greenwood, Senate, Hansard, 1515, 1516-17; Wood, Senate, Hansard, 1543; Bunton, Senate, Hansard, 1808. 
685 Chaney, Senate Debates, 1803. 
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Chaney spoke passionately in support of the Racial Discrimination Bill, but Ian Wood 
denounced it and castigated his Liberal Party colleagues for displaying “too much weakness, 
too much jelly in the backbone … to stand up and do what is right.”686 The ALP cheerfully 
played up these differences.  Senator Peter Walsh, for example, suggested that the Liberal 
Party’s “small ‘l’ Liberals who take a tolerant and progressive view on … racism and other 
social matters” were hindered by “the Bourbons and dinosaurs within their own Party.”687 
The Coalition opposition, thus, walked the fine line of professing its support for racial 
equality, but denouncing the particulars of the Bill.  This led the ALP’s James McClelland to 
observe that although the opposition indicated that it did not oppose the Bill, “it is 
becoming increasingly obvious that [the opposition] accepts the Bill with great 
reluctance.”688 
Supporters of the Racial Discrimination Bill made three broad arguments.  First, they 
asserted that racial discrimination needed to be proscribed by law, and further, in contrast to 
traditional thinking in Australia legal circles, that rights would be better protected if they 
were codified.  Second, supporters praised the conciliatory approach embodied in the Bill, 
emphasizing that this was the preferred approach in the U.S., Canada, Britain, and New 
Zealand.689 And, third, they noted that the Bill provided for educational efforts in 
conjunction with its enforcement.   
The opposition voiced three main  arguments against the Bill.  First, it feared that the 
external affairs power was being transformed into an “internal affairs power” that might 
become plenary in its scope.690 Second, it doubted that antidiscrimination legislation was 
capable of changing “human motivations and conduct” and worried that it might actually 
686 Senate, Hansard, May 23, 1975, 1793. 
687 May 22, 1975, pp.1800-01. 
688 Senate, Hansard, 1980-81. 
689 Murphy, Senate, Hansard, 1977. 
690 Greenwood, Senate, Hansard, 1515, 1516-17. 
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exacerbate tensions.691 Third, it criticized specific aspects of the law’s enforcement 
mechanisms.  Most specifically, the Racial Discrimination Bill provided for the creation of a 
Commissioner for Community Relations who would possess power to compel the 
production of evidence and pursue court actions in the event that conciliation failed.  These 
powers were likened by members of the opposition to those of the “Star Chamber.”692 In 
addition, Coalition members asserted that the Bill contained “objectionable intrusions upon 
individual rights and privacy.”693 
As finally enacted, the Bill was shorn of three key elements due to opposition in the 
Senate.  First, the rules for proving that discrimination occurred were altered. A 
discriminatory motive had to be proven to be the dominant motive for a decision, whereas in 
the original Bill it was sufficient if a discriminatory motive were one of several different 
motives, some of which could be non-discriminatory.  Further, the original Bill had shifted 
the burden of proof in civil proceedings pursued so that once it was shown that the 
defendant committed the alleged act, the burden fell on the defendant to prove that his 
motive was not racially discriminatory.  Even those Liberal senators who supported the 
legislation as a whole, such as Missen, disapproved of this provision, and it was deleted.  
Second, as originally drafted the Bill rendered principals liable for unlawful discrimination 
committed by their agents.  This, too, was removed.  Third, the powers of the Commissioner 
for Community Relations were severely circumscribed; he was stripped of any power to 
bring civil proceedings or to compel participation in conciliation proceedings.   
As had been expected, Whitlam named Grassby as the Commissioner for 
Community Relations after the law was passed.  At the launch of this new office, Whitlam 
691 Greenwood, Senate, Hansard, 1515, 1516-17; Sheil, Senate, Hansard, 1527; Laucke, Senate, Hansard, 1536; 
Cormack, Senate, Hansard, 1795.. 
692 See Killen, House of Representatives Hansard, Vol. 93, 1220.  See also Greenwood, Senate, Hansard, 1514, 
1517. 
693 Killen, Qld., LP at House Hansard, Vol. 93, 1220. 
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asserted that the Racial Discrimination Act codified Australia’s new identity as “a 
multicultural nation, in which the linguistic and cultural heritage of the Aboriginal people 
and of peoples from all parts of the world can find an honoured place.”  Although he 
recognized the Act’s inadequacies, Whitlam praised it as Australia’s first legal articulation of 
its opposition to all forms of racial discrimination and as “the best guarantee that Australia 
have ever had that the dark forces of bigotry and prejudice which have prevailed so often in 
the past will never again be able to exercise influences far greater than their numbers in the 
community.”694 
A HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION 
In the election triggered by the Governor-General’s dismissal of the Whitlam 
government in November 1975, the Liberal Party routed the ALP, which lost thirty seats in 
the House of Representatives.  The Liberals won an outright majority for the first time in 
their history.  Twenty-one of the seats lost by the ALP had been held by  “Whitlamites” – 
reformers who had been elected between 1967 and 1974.695 The 1975 election left both 
parties with an equal number of Senate seats, twenty-seven each.  Despite their House 
majority, the Liberals decided to form a coalition government with their traditional partner, 
the National Country Party (NCP, formerly the Country Party).  Thus, they could count on 
the support of the NCP’s eight senators.  In the wake of the election victory, there were calls 
within the coalition parties to undo much of what the Whitlam government had done.  
Although the Fraser government did not rescind the Race Discrimination Act, the 
Commissioner for Community Relations nonetheless experienced great difficulty in 
694 E. Gough Whitlam, Australia and Asia (Adelaide:  Flinders University of South Australia, 1979), 19. 
695 Alan Ramsey, “The Hayden Years:  1976-82” in John Faulkner and Stuart Macintyre (eds.), True Believers:  
The Story of the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party (Crows Nest, NSW:  Allen and Unwin, 2001), 122-38.   
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performing his duties because he was forced to operate with a skeletal staff and limited 
resources.696 During 1976 the office was denied funds altogether.697 
In May 1977 a new center party, the Australian Democrats (ADs), was formed by 
Don Chipp, a former Liberal minister who had become disillusioned with Fraser’s 
leadership.  After the Democrats won two seats in the federal election seven months later, 
Chipp entered the Senate holding one of those seats. At the next general election, in October 
1980, the Democrats won five Senate seats and they gained the balance of power in the 
Senate. Before that happened, however, the Liberal Party again won an absolute majority of 
House seats in the December 1977 election.  Immediately after that election, the Fraser 
Government announced its intention to establish a Human Rights Commission that would 
examine both Commonwealth and, controversially, state laws and practices and report on 
their consistency with the ICCPR.  One Bill for doing this was introduced into the House as 
early as June 1977 and another was introduced in September 1979.698 But state leaders 
refused to endorse any Bill that the proposed commission power to investigate complaints 
relating to state legislation. Nevertheless, after eighteen months of “painstaking negotiation” 
with state representatives, the Fraser government ratified the ICCPR in August 1980699 and 
it established a Human Rights Bureau within the Attorney-General’s Department.700 This 
was led by Peter Bailey, who had been working as a special advisor to the Attorney-General’s 
696 Thornton, The Liberal Promise, 40. 
697 See Commissioner for Community Relations, First Annual Report 1976 (Canberra:  Australian Government 
Publishing Service, 1976). 
698 Tahmindjis 1996:  788; R.J. Ellicot, “Address to United Nations Association of Australia Seminar on the 
proposed Human Rights Commission” (Melbourne, 14 May 1977), press release No. 27A/77, 1. 
699 Ratification of the ICCPR was accompanied by nine reservations or declarations on fourteen Articles, 
which drew heavy fire from the ALP and human rights advocates.  See G. Triggs.  “Australia’s Ratification of 
the ICCPR:  Endorsement or Repudiation?”  31 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1982), 278; D. 
Rowland, “Australia’s Ratification of the ICCPR” 8 Justice (1981) 1. 
700 Press release of the Attorney-General (5 August 1980).  See E. Kamenka and Alice E.S. Tay, 
“Introduction:  Human Rights and the Australian Tradition” in Alice E.S. Tay (ed.), Teaching Human Rights—an 
Australian Symposium (Canberra:  Australian Government Printing Service, 1981), 14. 
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Department since June 1978. The Bureau operated similar to the proposed Commission, but 
it lacked the power to receive and process complaints, unless they were referred to it by the 
Attorney-General.   
In 1981, the Fraser government successfully steered a watered-down Bill through 
Parliament that established a Human Rights Commission. The Commission was authorized 
to examine the consistency of Commonwealth, but not state, legislation with the ICCPR and 
three UN declarations, namely, the Declaration on the Rights of the Child (1959), the 
Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons (1971), and the Declaration on the 
Rights of Disabled Persons (1975).  In addition, the Commission was authorized to 
investigate and conciliate complaints of discrimination, though it lacked any enforcement 
powers.  The Office of the Commissioner of Community Relations was integrated into the 
Commission, whereby the Commissioner, Grassby, lost his independent reporting powers.701 
As with the Racial Discrimination Act, the federal government relied upon the external 
affairs power to enact the new law.  In the estimation of Philip V. Tahmindjis, the Fraser 
government pursued the Human Rights Commission Act as the result of “political” 
considerations and “legal necessity,” rather than “ideological commitment.”702 As evidence 
of the Coalition’s ambivalence, the Human Rights Commission Act contained a sunset 
clause whereby the Commission would be terminated on 10 December 1986, unless 
reauthorized.   
Ironically, it fell upon the Fraser government to defend the Racial Discrimination 
Act of 1975 against a constitutional challenge mounted by the State of Queensland, which 
claimed that the Commonwealth government lacked the power under the  Constitution’s 
701 See Racial Discrimination Amendment Act 1981 and the Human Rights Commission Act 1981. 
702 Philip V. Tahmindjis, “From symbiosis to synergy? A comparative analysis of the impact of international 
human rights norms on the legal systems of Canada and Australia” (JSD Dissertation, Dalhousie University, 
Canada, 1996), 789. 
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Section 51(xxix) to enact the law.  This litigation arose after the Queensland government of 
Joh Bjelke-Petersen blocked an effort led by John Koowarta, an Aboriginal land rights 
activist, to buy a Crown lease of a pastoral property in Queensland pursuant to the terms of 
the federal Aboriginal Land Fund Act 1974.  The lease could not be transferred without the 
state government’s approval, but the Bjelke-Petersen government refused to approve the 
transfer because it believed that the state already had sufficient land reserved for indigenous 
peoples.  Prior to the 1980s, there had been little judicial consideration of the ambit of the 
external affairs power.703  
In Koowarta v. Bjelke-Petersen (1982) 153 CLR 168, the High Court upheld the validity 
of the Racial Discrimination Act by a majority of four to three. The Court majority—which 
included Lionel Murphy, the Attorney-General who had introduced the original Racial 
Discrimination Bills—concluded that the external affairs power could be used by the federal 
government to legislate international human rights obligations into law and that such laws 
could be validly enforced against the states.  Three of the majority justices, Murphy among 
them, further concluded that a matter need not have any inherent international character or 
aspect of international concern in order to qualify it as an “external affair;” rather, it was 
sufficient that an international body had recognized a matter as such. This construction of 
the external affairs power was reaffirmed by the High Court in Commonwealth v. Tasmania (the 
Tasmanian Dams Case) (1983), 158 CLR 1, in which the Court indicated that it would defer 
to the judgment of the executive government in determining whether a matter is of sufficient 
international concern to warrant use of the external affairs power. These decisions facilitated 
greater reliance on international human rights instruments in enacting  federal 
antidiscrimination legislation. 
703 The principal cases include R. v, Burgess ex parte Henry, 55 CLR 608 (1936); Airlines of NSW Pty. Ltd. V. 
NSW (No. 2), 113 CLR 54 (1965); and NSW v. Commonwealth (the Seas and Submerged Islands Case), 135 CLR 337 
(1975).   
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ANTIDISCRIMINATION LEGISLATION FOR WOMEN 
In the late 1970s, three States enacted legislation prohibiting sex discrimination, 
namely, New South Wales,704 Victoria,705 and South Australia.706 Liberal Senator Bob 
Ellicott, who had served as Attorney-General in the Fraser government from 1975 to 1977, 
suggested including a commitment to antidiscrimination legislation for women in the Liberal 
Party’s 1979 federal election platform.  Although his suggestion was rejected, over the next 
year drafting of such legislation was initiated within the Office of the Status of Women.  In 
November 1981, Senator Susan Ryan, a member of the ALP and a founding member of the 
Women’s Electoral Lobby (WEL), preempted these efforts by introducing a Sex 
Discrimination Bill as a private member’s bill.  In so doing, Ryan was “the first 
parliamentarian to place feminist issues on the agenda.”707 Although Ryan’s Bill was never 
brought to the floor for debate, a barrier was broken and the political context was changed. 
Feminist legal academics began exploring the idea of antidiscrimination legislation in the 
pages of law reviews.708 Australia signed the UN Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) on 17 July 1982.  Three months later, 
Acting Attorney-General, Neil Brown, and the Minister for Home Affairs and the 
Environment, Tom McVeigh, jointly announced a plan to introduce a Sex Discrimination 
Bill in Parliament.  Their proposed Bill was a limited measure that would have extended 
protection against discrimination on the ground of sex or marital status to Commonwealth 
704 Antidiscrimination Act 1977. 
705 Equal Opportunity Act 1977. 
706 Sex Discrimination Act 1975. 
707 Thornton, The Liberal Promise, 30. 
708 For example see Chris Ronalds, “Employment Discrimination Committees don’t work,” (1981) 6 Legal 
Service Bulletin 17; Margaret Thornton, “(Un)equal Pay for Work of Equal Value” (1981) 23 Journal of Industrial 
Relations 466; Margaret Thornton, “Sex Discrimination Legislation in Australia” (1982) 54 Australian Quarterly 
393; Margaret Thornton, “Anti-Discrimination Remedies” (1983) 9 Adelaide Law Review 235; Margaret 
Thornton, “The Legitimation of Sexual Harassment” (1984) 18 Scarlet Woman 2. 
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employees, and it was not introduced into Parliament before a change of government took 
place in March 1983.   
During the election campaign in late 1982 and early 1983, the ALP promised that it 
would introduce sex discrimination legislation if elected.  Upon winning the election,  
Senator Ryan was named Minister assisting the Prime Minister on the Status of Women in 
the new ALP government headed by Bob Hawke.  Chris Ronalds, who had worked on the 
Racial Discrimination Act, served as a legal adviser and consultant to the Office of the Status 
of Women in the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet and was closely involved in 
the development of the new government Bill.  Ryan introduced the fruits of those labors 
into the Senate on 2 June 1983.709 The Bill prohibited discrimination on grounds of sex, 
marital status, and pregnancy in employment,710 education,711 the provision of goods, 
services and accommodation,712 land,713 and the implementation of federal laws or 
programs.714 In contrast to Ryan’s private member’s bill in 1981, the 1983 Bill did not 
provide for affirmative action,715 and it provided for weaker enforcement mechanisms than 
her earlier proposal.  Several sources of constitutional authority were cited for the Bill, 
including the external affairs power, the corporations power,716 and the banking,717 
insurance,718 and trade and commerce powers.719 The Bill generated a firestorm of 
709 Sex Discrimination Bill 1983, see Senate, Hansard, 2 June, 1185. 
710 Sex Discrimination Act, §14. 
711 Sex Discrimination Act, §21. 
712 Sex Discrimination Act, §§22, 23. 
713 Sex Discrimination Act, §24. 
714 Sex Discrimination Act, §26. 
715 Affirmative action served as the subject of a subsequent legislative effort, which produced the Affirmative 
Action (Equal Opportunity for Women) Act 1986 and the Equal Employment Opportunity (Commonwealth 
Authorities) Act 1987. 
716 Australian Constitution, §51, xx. 
717 Australian Constitution, §51, xiii. 
718 Australian Constitution, §51, xiv. 
719 Australian Constitution, §51, i. 
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controversy from businesses opposed to state regulation and from conservative social 
groups who perceived the measure as a threat to the family.720 
Table 5.2:  Sex Discrimination Act Legislative Timeline 
 
Introduced into the Senate   2 June 1983 
 
Passed by the Senate and  27 February 1984 
 transmitted to the House 
 
Passed by the House   7 March 1984 
 
Entered into Force   1 August 1984 
 
The Sex Discrimination Bill became mired in the Senate for eight months due to a 
variety of objections from groups on both the left and the right.  Gay and lesbian groups 
unsuccessfully lobbied to have sexual orientation included as a protected ground.721 As 
concessions to religious organizations and business interests, the Hawke government 
ultimately agreed to two main amendments to the Bill.  First, religious schools were granted 
an exemption with regard to employment decisions.  As a result, discrimination on grounds 
of sex, marital status, and pregnancy were made permissible where a school was acting “in 
accordance with the doctrines, tenets, beliefs or teachings of a particular religion or creed” 
so long as the selection was made in good faith and in order “to avoid injury to the religious 
susceptibilities of adherents.”722 Second, a new provision was added tthat set forth an 
extended list of “occupational qualifications” designed to meet the needs of employers who 
720 See Lauchlan Chipman, “To Hell with Equality,” Quadrant (January, 1985), 44. 
721 In 1982, New South Wales added “homosexuality” as a protected ground in its Anti-Discrimination Act. 
722 Sex Discrimination Act 1984, §38. 
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wanted to include sex in the criteria for selecting employees to fill particular kinds of 
positions.   
The Sex Discrimination Act contained several provisions that had been removed 
from the Racial Discrimination Act.  First, it not only allowed complaints of discrimination 
to be made by an aggrieved individual, it also allowed complaints to be made by other 
persons, amounting to “representative complaints.”  Second, whereas the Senate had 
stripped the Commissioner for Community Relations of the power to obtain documents and 
other information relevant to the conciliation process, the Human Rights Commission was 
granted those powers under the terms of the Sex Discrimination Act.723 Third, the Sex 
Discrimination Act rendered employers liable for the discriminatory actions of their agents, 
unless an employer could show that an agent was acting against instructions.724 A similar 
measure had been rejected in the Senate in 1975.  Finally, a person could be found to have 
committed unlawful discrimination “whether or not the discrimination is the dominant or 
substantial reason” for the action.725 This, too, contrasted with Racial Discrimination Act. 
After significant redrafting, the Sex Discrimination Bill passed through both Houses 
of Parliament less than twelve months after its introduction.  It entered into force on 1 
August 1984.  This was remarkably faster than the two years it took for the Racial 
Discrimination Bill to become law.  Several reasons explain the difference.  First, by 1984, 
the Racial Discrimination Act had been in force for nine years.  In that period, only four 
cases had been brought before the federal courts, and this had curbed fears that 
antidiscrimination legislation would unleash a wave of vexatious litigation.726 Second, the 
723 Sex Discrimination Act, §54. 
724 Sex Discrimination Act, §106.  This provision was successfully invoked in Boyle v. Isham Ozden & Ors (1986) 
EOC 92-165. 
725 Sex Discrimination Act, §8. 
726 Koowarta (1982); Gerhardy v. Brown (1983) 49 ALR 169; Yildez v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs 
(1982) 46 ALR 112; and Viskauskas and Another v. Niland (1983) 47 ALR 32. 
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High Court’s decisions in Koowarta and the Tasmanian Dams case had undermined 
arguments that the external affairs power could not be used as a basis for legislating 
international human rights obligations into domestic law.727 Third, the women’s movement 
had been up and running for nearly ten years and was buoyed in its efforts by international 
developments, such as the International Decade of Women, which had begun in 1975, and 
the opening for signature of the CEDAW.  Indeed, arguments about Australia’s international 
obligations were prominent role among the Act’s supporters.728 Fourth, although the Racial 
Sex Discrimination Act was highly controversial when it was first enacted, the Coalition 
parties had succeeded in modifying it to meet some of their objections, and they had become 
reconciled to the existence of antidiscrimination legislation.  At the 1986 election, for 
example, important Coalition figures—including the current prime minister, John Howard—
advocated abolition of the Human Rights Commission, but they did not advocate the repeal 
of the Racial or Sex Discrimination Acts.   
 
THE DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION ACT 
Over the years, numerous reviews of disability policy had been undertaken by  
Australian governments.729 In 1983, the Hawke government strengthened the voice of 
727 (1982) 153 CLR 168. 
728 See Ryan, Senate, Hansard, 2 June 1983, 1185. 
729 Report of the Handicapped Programs Review New Directions AGPS Canberra 1985; Labour and Disability 
Workforce Consultancy National Employment Initiatives for People with Disabilities AGPS Canberra 1990 (Ronalds 
report); Senate Standing Committee on Community Affairs Report Employment of People with Disabilities Canberra 
April 1992; KPGM Peat Marwick Review of the Commonwealth Rehabilitation Service May 1993; Human Rights and 
Equal Opportunity Commission Human Rights and Mental Illness: Report of the National Inquiry into the Human Rights 
of People with Mental Illness AGPS Canberra 1993; Privacy Commissioner and the Victorian Office of the Public 
Advocate Private Lives: An initial investigation of privacy and disability issues August 1993; Privacy Commissioner and 
the Victorian Office of the Public Advocate Private Lives: An initial investigation of privacy and disability issues August 
1993; Privacy Commissioner and the Victorian Office of the Public Advocate Private Lives: An initial investigation 
of privacy and disability issues August 1993; MGM Consultants in Human Services Advancing Advocacy Disability 
Advocacy Effectiveness Project September 1995; Australian Institute of Health and Welfare The demand for 
disability support services in Australia AGPS Canberra 1996; Anna Yeatman Getting Real The Interim Report of the 
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people with disabilities by establishing the Disability Advisory Council to provide direct 
advice to the federal government.  During the 1980s, an array of disability rights groups 
formed, including the Disabled Peoples’ International (Australia) Ltd. (DPIA), and people 
with disabilities took control of existing groups that had historically spoken for them.  The 
media also started to take greater notice of disability rights issues and disabled people 
increasingly confronted MPs by visiting their offices and protesting outside Parliament.  In 
1988, the Australian Bureau of Statistics conducted a Survey on Disability and Ageing and 
found that approximately 2.5 million Australians were “disabled” to some extent.730 
The Disability Discrimination Act of 1992 was the product of lobbying by disability 
rights groups and bureaucratic insiders.  Two government bodies played especially important 
roles in translating group demands into government law.  These were the Disability Advisory 
Council of Australia, chaired by Graeme Innes, and the Disability Anti-Discrimination 
Legislation Committee, chaired by Chris Ronalds, who had played a key role in the 
development of the racial and sex discrimination acts.  Ronalds also served as principal 
author of the National Employment Initiatives for People with Disabilities: a Discussion Paper,731 
which was released in August 1990, and the Report of the National Consultations with People with 
Disabilities, which was released in 1991.732 Both reports were instrumental in placing 
antidiscrimination legislation for the disabled directly onto the government agenda and 
shaping the contours of public debate.  In 1994, after the Disability Discrimination Act 
became law, Ronalds conducted consultations and compiled a Report on the National 
Review of the CSDA AGPS January 1996; and, Australian Law Reform Commission, Making Rights Count:  
Services for people with a disability (Canberra:  Government Printer, 1996). 
730 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Survey on Disability and Ageing (Canberra:  Government Printing Service, 
1988). 
731 (Canberra:  Australia Government Printing Service, 1990). 
732 (Canberra;  Australia Government Printing Service, 1991). 
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Consultations on the Draft Commonwealth Disability Strategy,733 which has since served as a 
foundational document in implementing federal policy toward the disabled. 
By 1992, five states and the Australian Capital Territory had laws prohibiting 
disability discrimination, and such legislation was proposed for Tasmania, the sixth state, and 
for the Northern Territory.  In introducing the federal government’s Disability 
Discrimination Bill before a gallery filled with members of the Disability Advisory Council 
of Australia, MP Brian Howe described the Labor Party’s “vision is a fairer Australia where 
people with disabilities are regarded as equals, with the same rights as all other citizens, with 
recourse to systems that redress any infringements of their rights.”  It was “essential,” in his 
opinion that there be “a legislative basis to enable people with disabilities to participate in the 
economic, social and political spheres of the community and subsequently to determine the 
direction of their own lives.”734 Throughout the debate, numerous MPS and senators 
acknowledged that discrimination against people with disabilities is a matter of international 
concern and they referenced the United Nations Decade of Disabled Persons and Australia’s 
international obligations. 
The Liberal-National Party opposition did not oppose the Bill, but it worried about 
the implementation costs.  The opposition negotiated several exemptions, including 
exemptions for the defense forces, individuals with infectious diseases, and a temporary 
exemption for the telecommunication industry.735 In the Senate, the Australian Democrats 
supported the Bill, although they opposed these exemptions as well as provisions that 
omitted matters of Social Security and Immigration from the Bill’s jurisdiction.     
733 (Canberra:  Australia Government Printing Service, 1994). 
734 House, Hansard 26 May 1992, 2750. 
735 See House, Hansard, 19 August 1992, 221.  
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As enacted, the Disability Discrimination Act covered all of the same areas as the 
other federal antidiscrimination laws.736 Along with the specific exemptions negotiated by 
the Coalition parties, the Act includes two general exceptions: unjustifiable hardship and the 
inherent requirements of the job.  Once a complainant shows that he or she has been 
subjected to unlawful discrimination, the respondent claiming one of these exemptions bears 
an evidentiary burden.  The post of Disability Discrimination Commissioner was established 
and assigned responsibility for investigating and conciliating complaints of disability 
discrimination. The Disability Discrimination Act empowers the Commissioner either to 
dismiss complaints found to be unsubstantiated or to attempt to reach a settlement of the 
complaint. The aim of the legislation is to promote resolution through conciliation wherever 
possible.  However, where the Commissioner is unable to resolve a complaint by 
conciliation, he or she may refer the matter to the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity 
Commission (HREOC),737 which can then consider the complaint and issue a non-binding 
determination.  Parties wishing to enforce that determination are required to apply to the 
Federal Court, which will rehear the matter and make a legally binding judgment. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Relative to other Anglo-American countries, Australia was a late developer in terms 
of antidiscrimination legislation.  The postwar dominance of conservative political interests 
kept that legislation off of the governmental agenda.  The ALP’s skillful use of international 
human rights and domestic issues fueled the country’s first antidiscrimination law, the Racial 
Discrimination Act, but a hostile Senate ensured that the law would be marginalized within 
736 These include work, accommodation, education, access to premises, the provision of goods, facilities, 
services and land; existing laws; and the administration of Commonwealth laws and programs. 
737 The HREOC was created in 1986 upon the expiration of the sunset provision in the Human Rights 
Commission Bill. 
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the political system.  Subsequent groups would gain access to the federal antidiscrimination 
regime, but at no point were the enforcement institutions empowered to represent 
complainants before the courts. 
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Conclusion 
During the second half of the twentieth century, governments in the Anglo-
American countries were increasingly implored and inclined not only to end their own 
discriminatory laws and policies, but also to act against racially discriminatory societal 
practices. Societal discrimination could not, however, be eliminated simply by implementing 
nondiscriminatory state policies and actions, although such reforms were important. Rather, 
in order to combat societal discrimination states had to reassert their authority over the 
private sphere and renegotiate an existing set of common law property and contract rights. 
American sociologists and social psychologists, based mainly in New York, propagated a set 
of ideas about human nature, the capacity of law to reshape human behavior, and the 
requisites of democracy. These ideas were embraced by newly established UN and other 
international bodies in the wake of World War II and then disseminated around the world. 
An array of UN and ILO declarations and conventions embodied these ideas and pushed 
them onto the policy agendas of several countries, including New Zealand and Australia. As 
I have shown, however, the ideology of antidiscrimination and the project of erecting 
antidiscrimination regimes had little effect until national political elites deemed them to be 
political necessities.  
In the decades after World War II, when the U.S., Canada, and Britain were 
experimenting with antidiscrimination laws, no such laws were pursued in the antipodean 
parliaments. This disparity was the result of two main circumstances. First, in New Zealand 
and Australia potential constituencies for the ideology of antidiscrimination were small. 
Second, there were few political opportunities for those who did subscribe to this ideology 
to act. In the early 1960s, however, a new generation of social scientists in the antipodean 
countries began to replicate the research that American social scientists had pioneered during 
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and after the war. On the other hand, the small and conservative legal academies in New 
Zealand and Australia resisted the ideology of antidiscrimination. New Zealand, with its 
unitary political system, provided no laboratories for antidiscrimination policy 
experimentation at the level of constituent states.  The Department of Maori Affairs was 
able to keep antidiscrimination legislation off the government’s agenda for more than ten 
years. Australia’s six states could have served as legal innovators, but conservative forces 
dominated them for most of the postwar period. The Australian Labor Party won 
government in South Australia in the early 1960s, and under the leadership of its reformist 
Attorney-General, Don Dunstan, it enacted the country’s first antidiscrimination law in 
1966. However, no other states enacted comparable laws until New South Wales did so over 
ten years later. At the federal level, Sir Robert Menzies’ successive Liberal and Country Party 
coalition governments successfully stifled proposals within the federal bureaucracy to 
implement antidiscrimination policies mandated by the UN and by several international 
treaties and covenants.  
Australia’s debates over antidiscrimination legislation were more acrimonious and 
contentious than those in New Zealand.  Three reasons explain the difference. First, in New 
Zealand, the conservative National Party introduced all of the country’s main 
antidiscrimination laws. The Labour Party, which still had strong socialist inclinations, was 
not likely to oppose those laws on grounds that they infringed property and contract rights, 
which some National Party and many business opponents of the laws insisted were 
principled objections to the laws’ passage. In the late 1970s, the Labour Party’s ties to 
organized labor prevented it from aggressively pursuing antidiscrimination legislation for 
women, but the ties were not strong enough to induce Labour to oppose the Nationals’ 
legislation altogether. By 1977, when the Human Rights Commission Act was being 
considered, women’ rights had been construed as human rights in a bevy of international 
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declarations and conventions. Domestically, moreover, New Zealand’s women’s movement 
had developed an organizational base, through groups like the Women’s Electoral Lobby, 
put heavy pressure on the Wellington government to act.  
Second, from an institutional perspective New Zealand’s unicameral parliament, over 
which a single party presided by virtue of controlling a majority of seats, offer the Labour 
Party no real means of contesting or shaping the National Party’s legislative proposals. Until 
1966, New Zealand elected its parliament according to a first-past-the-post system.738 This, 
combined with a lack of other institutional restraints, afforded the cabinet and governing 
party with what Geoffrey Palmer has described as “unbridled power.”739 By contrast, the 
Australian Senate, in which non-Labor parties controlled the balance of power between 1972 
and 1975, gave opponents a powerful platform from which to contest the antidiscrimination 
bills that Labor’s two Whitlam governments introduced into the federal Parliament. Because 
all bills needed the assent of both houses of Parliament, senators were able to strip the Racial 
Discrimination Bill of its most innovative features, including giving the Commissioner for 
Community Relations access to the courts.  
Third, in Australia consideration of antidiscrimination legislation coincided with 
broader policy and ideological shifts. The Racial Discrimination Bills, for example, were 
debated in the context of important changes in the country’s immigration policy. During the 
late 1960s and early 1970s, both Coalition and Labor Party governments worked to 
dismantle the White Australia policy against strong opposition by various groups in the 
738 Following a 1993 referendum, New Zealand adopted a mixed-member-proportional (MMP) representation 
electoral system.  The first election under that new system was held in 1996.  See Geoffrey Palmer and 
Matthew Palmer, Bridled Power:  New Zealand’s Constitution and Government, 4th ed. (New York:  Oxford University 
Press, 2004). 
739 Geoffrey Palmer, Unbridled power?  An interpretation of New Zealand's constitution and government (New York:  
Oxford University Press, 1979); Geoffrey Palmer, Unbridled power:  An interpretation of New Zealand's constitution 
and government, 2nd ed. (Auckland:  Oxford University Press, 1987). 
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community.740 There was, in effect, a political elite consensus that racially discriminatory 
immigration laws were doing injury to Australia’s international standing. This paved the way 
for the Labor Party to portray the Racial Discrimination Act as part of its larger effort to 
remake Australia’s national image as a cosmopolitan nation in Asia.  Historically, New 
Zealand had also maintained a racially discriminatory immigration policy, and it did not 
liberalize that policy until the 1980s.741 Consequently, debates over New Zealand’s national 
image were not coupled to the discussion of domestic antidiscrimination laws, and this made 
the latter’s acceptance and passage all the more difficult.  
By 1984, when the Australian Parliament was finally considering legislation 
prohibiting sex discrimination, conservative groups were vehement in their opposition to 
such legislation on behalf of women. But here again, the Australian debate was cast in broad 
terms about the appropriate role of women in society and the stability of the family unit. In 
somewhat parallel fashion, it was not until New Zealand considered homosexuality as a 
protected ground that it engaged with the issue of antidiscrimination laws pertaining to 
women.  
Despite these political differences, both Australia and New Zealand constructed 
antidiscrimination regimes that were comparatively conservative, especially as regards the 
terms of their enforcement structures. Neither country has created an enforcement structure 
that fosters litigation, preferring instead to mediate or conciliate most complaints of 
discrimination. New Zealand has, however, empowered a state official to represent 
complainants before the courts, whereas Australia has only given its enforcement agencies 
the power to intervene in particular kinds of cases or to file amicus curiae briefs. Neither 
740 See Katharine Betts, Ideology and immigration:  Australia 1976 to 1987 (Carlton, Vic.:  Melbourne University 
Press, 1988); and Katharine Betts, The great divide:  immigration politics in Australia (Sydney:  Duffy and Snellgrove, 
1999). 
741 See the Immigration Act of 1987; see also Patrick Ongley and David Pearson, “Post-1945 international 
migration: New Zealand, Australia and Canada compared” 29 International Migration Review (Fall 1995), 765-294. 
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antipodean country yet has an antidiscrimination regime that approaches the American 
regime’s active role for the state accompanied by tough enforcement institutions.742 
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